Shalom all,
The central warning that deserves our attention is no longer simply that Washington and Jerusalem may disagree over a particular Israeli government, military operation, or diplomatic decision. The more consequential question is whether a fundamental change in American political attitudes could eventually transform the United States’ relationship with Israel itself – from that of a strategic ally into one in which an American administration regards Israel as an adversary.
That possibility was raised starkly by American historian Victor Davis Hanson following the 2026 midterm elections. In an interview with The Daily Signal, Hanson said that he could envision a time when Israel might become an enemy of the United States, at least in the eyes of a future administration. He also warned that antisemitism had become increasingly influential within the Democratic Party. His language was deliberately provocative, and his sweeping characterization of the entire party should not be accepted as an established fact. Nevertheless, the underlying concern deserves serious attention: anti-Israel and, in some instances, explicitly antisemitic rhetoric is gaining greater acceptance in politically influential sections of American public life.
The danger is not that every Democrat opposes Israel, or that criticism of an Israeli government is inherently antisemitic. It is that a political movement can gradually move from criticizing particular Israeli policies to questioning Israel’s legitimacy, its right to defend itself, and ultimately the legitimacy of the Jewish state as such. When that distinction disappears, the consequences extend far beyond a disagreement over policy. They reach the foundations of the alliance on which Israel has relied for generations.
The 2026 elections should therefore be understood not as an isolated political setback or victory, but as a warning about the direction of American politics, the future of bipartisan support for Israel, and the need for Israel to prepare for a substantially different strategic environment.
The midterm result: A political earthquake, but not yet a change of American foreign policy
The immediate political implications are substantial. The November 3 elections gave Democrats control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the first time during President Donald Trump’s current presidency that Republicans will face a Congress controlled by the opposing party. According to Reuters’ election report , Democrats secured at least 54 Senate seats and gained at least 30 seats in the House, with a small number of races still unresolved when the results were reported. The election was driven in large part by voter dissatisfaction with the economy, the cost of living, tariffs, and the consequences of the war with Iran. It was also a rejection of the President’s leadership and policies.
For Israel, however, the significance lies not merely in the change of congressional control, but in the political forces that have gained influence within the Democratic Party and the policy positions they are bringing into the national debate. A Democratic Congress can investigate the administration, scrutinize military assistance to Israel, hold hearings, place pressure on nominees, and use its control of legislation and appropriations to challenge the administration’s policies. It cannot, by itself, dictate the President’s foreign policy or override a presidential veto without the necessary supermajorities. The distinction is important: the new Congress does not automatically make the United States an adversary of Israel. It does, however, create a powerful institutional platform from which pressure on the relationship can be intensified.
The Reuters analysis of the election’s implications for Israel describes the result as potentially prompting the most significant reassessment of American support for Israel in decades. It notes that several newly elected progressive lawmakers oppose military aid to Israel and that younger voters have become increasingly critical of Washington’s support. Democrats are also expected to scrutinize American assistance, Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank, and the administration’s handling of the conflict with Iran.
This is not a development that began on election night. In July 2026, the House of Representatives defeated an amendment that would have cut off military aid to Israel, but the vote exposed a remarkable change within the Democratic caucus: 103 Democrats supported the measure, together with one Republican. The amendment was defeated 314 to 104, and Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries opposed it as too broad. Nevertheless, the number of Democratic representatives prepared to support ending aid to Israel would have been almost unimaginable in earlier years. The Reuters report on that vote documented a growing division between progressive Democrats seeking to end military assistance and moderates who continue to support at least defensive aid.
That division is now one of the central political questions confronting Israel. The Democratic Party is not uniformly anti-Israel. Indeed, moderate Democrats and several prominent Jewish and pro-Israel elected officials also won important victories in the midterms. The Times of Israel, in its analysis, “We are just getting started”: Midterm blowout normalizes anti-zionism in Democratic politics, points out that moderates such as Hakeem Jeffries, Ritchie Torres, Gregory Meeks, Josh Shapiro and Jon Ossoff remain influential. They outnumber the party’s most radical members. Yet the same analysis warns that the electoral success of the party’s more radical wing is likely to pull the Democratic debate further toward anti-Israel positions.
The danger, therefore, is not that every Democrat has abandoned Israel. It is that the political cost of taking an openly hostile position toward Israel is diminishing in important constituencies, while the electoral rewards for doing so may be increasing. A party can retain a moderate majority and still find its policy agenda increasingly shaped by a smaller, more vocal, and more ideologically committed faction. This is particularly true when that faction is successful in primaries, mobilizes younger voters, dominates parts of the media conversation, and makes support for Israel a test of political loyalty.
From criticism of Israeli policy to rejection of Israel itself
There is a distinction that must be maintained in any serious discussion of this subject. Criticism of an Israeli government, its military decisions, settlement policy, or conduct in a particular conflict is not automatically antisemitic. Democratic societies must permit vigorous criticism of governments, including the government of Israel. Nor should every person who supports national aspirations for those wanting to be called “Palestinians” be treated as hostile to Jews or to Israel.
The concern arises when criticism crosses into a different category: denying the Jewish people the right to national self-determination; treating the existence of the State of Israel as inherently illegitimate; applying standards to Israel that are not applied to other states; holding Jewish communities collectively responsible for Israeli government decisions; excusing or glorifying violence against Israeli civilians; or portraying the Jewish state as uniquely evil and therefore undeserving of the protections afforded to other nations.
These are not merely disagreements over the conduct of a particular war. They challenge the legitimacy of Israel itself. And when such positions become normalized in political institutions, the distinction between opposing a government and opposing the country’s existence becomes increasingly difficult to preserve.
Hanson’s warning should be understood in this context, rather than accepted wholesale. His assertion that the entire Democratic Party is infected with antisemitism is too sweeping. It overlooks Democrats who have consistently supported Israel and who oppose antisemitism. It also risks weakening the argument by treating a diverse political party as though it were a single ideological entity. The more defensible and more serious argument is that antisemitic rhetoric and forms of anti-Zionism are becoming increasingly acceptable within significant and influential parts of the party, and that traditional pro-Israel voices are facing greater difficulty in containing that trend.
The issue is not confined to the Democratic Party. There are also voices on the American right who have embraced isolationism, questioned the value of American alliances, or promoted conspiratorial rhetoric about Israel and Jewish influence. The future of American support for Israel cannot safely be measured by party labels alone. Israel must recognize that its traditional supporters in both parties may face challenges from different political directions.
This is one reason the midterm results should be viewed as a warning to Israel rather than as an invitation to align itself more closely with one American party against the other. A relationship dependent on the electoral fortunes of a single party, a single President, or a particular political faction is inherently vulnerable.
The Hanson warning: Hamas, the Houthis, Iran, and the consequences of a different administration
Hanson’s most alarming prediction is that a future Democratic administration could restore funding to Hamas, remove the terrorist designation from the Houthis, and align American policy more closely with forces hostile to Israel. These statements are predictions about what Hanson fears could happen under a future administration, not descriptions of current American policy or proof that the Democratic Party has adopted such a program.
The distinction concerning Hamas is especially important. The United States designates Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization, and federal law prohibits knowingly providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The relevant provision, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2339B, makes such support a federal crime. It would therefore be misleading to suggest that ordinary American humanitarian assistance to Gazan civilians is the same thing as direct funding of Hamas.
The real concern is the possibility that a future administration could reverse policies designed to prevent Hamas from benefiting from aid, weaken restrictions on entities and channels connected to it, or adopt an approach to Gaza that effectively restores Hamas’s political and operational influence. Humanitarian assistance to civilians is necessary and legitimate. But the method of delivering that assistance, the entities controlling its distribution, and the safeguards against diversion are matters of direct Israeli security concern. Any American policy that ignores Hamas’s capacity to exploit civilian institutions and aid networks would create a serious danger.
The same caution applies to the Houthis. Removing or restoring a terrorist designation is a policy decision that can have legal and financial consequences. It should not be confused with a claim that every administration that considers a different designation is necessarily supporting terrorism. Nevertheless, if Washington were to weaken pressure on an armed organization that attacks international shipping, threatens Israel, and operates as part of Iran’s regional network, the consequences would extend well beyond a diplomatic disagreement.
Hanson’s discussion of Iran is equally significant. In his October 29 interview with The Daily Signal, he argued that the United States, Israel, and regional partners should consider further action against Iran’s military and industrial infrastructure, including the deeply protected facility known as Pickaxe Mountain. He also advocated stronger economic pressure, restrictions on Iran’s ability to export oil, support for opposition groups within Iran, and protection of maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. He suggested that a sustained campaign could weaken the regime and potentially create conditions for its collapse.
In the Hebrew article published by Maariv and circulated through MSN, Hanson also urged a decisive strike against the Iranian nuclear threat rather than repeated cycles of negotiation followed by limited military action. The facility he identified was Pickaxe Mountain, not Fordow. His proposed approach is his own strategic assessment; it should not be mistaken for an established American or Israeli plan. Nor should the possibility of regime collapse be presented as a predictable result of military action. Such a strategy would carry substantial military, diplomatic, economic, and regional risks.
Nevertheless, the larger point is unmistakable. Iran is not simply another foreign-policy issue for Israel. It is the principal state sponsor of an interconnected network of armed organizations that threaten Israel and regional stability. A fundamental change in Washington’s approach to Tehran could therefore alter Israel’s security environment in ways that no amount of diplomatic reassurance could easily offset.
The question Israel must ask is not whether every American administration will agree with every Israeli decision. That has never been realistic. The question is whether the United States will continue to recognize that Iran’s regional ambitions, its support for armed proxies, and its pursuit of strategic military capabilities constitute a threat to American as well as Israeli interests. If that shared understanding erodes, the alliance itself will be placed under pressure.
Political Islam and the danger of confusing an ideology with a population
The growing influence of political Islam in American political life must also be addressed, but it must be done carefully and with factual discipline. The issue is not the presence of Muslim citizens in American society, their participation in elections, their right to hold office, or their freedom to express religious and political views. Those are ordinary features of a democratic society. Muslim Americans are not a single political bloc, and they should not be treated as though they share one ideology or one position toward Israel.
The distinction that matters is between Muslims as individuals and communities, on the one hand, and Islamist political movements, on the other. Political Islam, or Islamism, describes a range of movements that seek to organize political power and public life according to particular interpretations of Islam. These movements differ considerably. Some participate in democratic institutions while pursuing religiously based political goals; others reject pluralism, seek to subordinate civil law to religious authority, or endorse violence. Hamas itself emerged from the “Palestinian” branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. That historical connection is relevant when examining the ideology and political objectives of specific organizations, but it does not justify treating all Muslims, or all Muslim political participation, as an extension of Hamas or the Brotherhood.
The Pew Research Center’s 2025 analysis of Muslim Americans’ political attitudes illustrates why generalizations are inappropriate. It found that Muslim Americans hold a range of views and do not consistently align with either major party. The same research notes that Muslims constitute slightly more than one percent of the American adult population, although their political influence can be more significant in areas where they are concentrated. Pew’s earlier survey of Muslim American view of the Israel-Hamas war found strong sympathy for Gazans and substantial opposition to American military aid to Israel, but it also found that a majority of respondents held an unfavorable view of Hamas. These findings should be read for what they show – not converted into claims about a uniform political or religious agenda.
The relevant concern is the possibility of political convergence between different movements that do not necessarily share the same ultimate objectives. Progressive activists may oppose Israel because of their ideological views on colonialism, race, nationalism, or American foreign policy. Islamist movements may oppose Israel for religious, ideological, or regional political reasons. Some Muslim voters may oppose Israeli military policy because of humanitarian concerns or identification with so-called “Palestinians”. These motivations are not interchangeable. Yet they can sometimes produce the same political result: pressure to end military assistance, isolate Israel diplomatically, or deny it the freedom to defend itself.
That convergence deserves scrutiny, particularly when organizations or political figures advocate policies that would weaken Israel while expressing support for movements that reject Israel’s existence or endorse violence. The appropriate response is to identify the organizations, statements, financial relationships, and political objectives involved, and to establish the evidence in each case. It is not to make unsupported allegations against Muslim Americans as a whole.
Israel and its supporters should insist on this distinction. It is both morally necessary and strategically wise. An argument against political extremism loses credibility when it appears to condemn an entire religious population. The objective must be to expose and challenge extremist ideology, not to undermine the democratic rights of American citizens.
The local political arena is no longer peripheral
The national debate is only one part of the problem. Local politics can shape the environment in which Jewish communities live and in which future national leaders develop their political identities. Mayors, city councils, school boards, university trustees, state legislators, and local party organizations can adopt resolutions, divestment measures, procurement restrictions, and public policies that single out Israel. They can also influence the treatment of Jewish students, the security of synagogues and community institutions, and the public legitimacy given to anti-Israel campaigns.
Local political movements should not be dismissed as irrelevant simply because they do not immediately change federal policy. Local officials can become governors, members of Congress, senators, or presidential contenders. Campaigns that begin with municipal resolutions can develop into statewide party platforms. Political language once confined to activist circles can become acceptable in mainstream political debate through repetition and electoral success.
The election of prominent progressive candidates and the growing influence of anti-Zionist activists should therefore be examined not only for their immediate legislative consequences, but also for what they indicate about the future leadership of the Democratic Party. The question is not simply who won a particular seat. It is what political ideas are being rewarded, what rhetoric is being normalized, and which positions are becoming prerequisites for electoral success in particular constituencies.
Israel must pay attention to these developments before they reach Washington in the form of legislation, funding restrictions, or foreign-policy decisions. It also needs to maintain direct relationships with local Jewish communities, state and municipal leaders, universities, and civic organizations. A strategy that focuses exclusively on the White House and Congress will miss much of the political environment in which American attitudes toward Israel are being shaped.
Israel’s own political crossroads
The American midterm elections are taking place at almost exactly the same time as Israel’s own political upheaval. Israel’s October 27 election did not produce a clear parliamentary majority for either principal bloc. According to the Congressional Research Service’s October 30 analysis of Israel’s 2026 election, Likud won the largest number of seats, with 27, but the bloc aligned with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured only 53 seats. The opposing bloc, led by Gadi Eisenkot, won 48, while Arab-led parties secured the remaining seats. Neither side had an obvious path to a majority government. After the heads of the different political parties met with Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog during the last two days, he will make a decision as to who will be given the first option to establish a coalition government. With most of the political party mandates favoring Eisenkot, it is reasonable to presume that the responsibility to establish a government will be given to him. But then, Israeli politics being unpredictable, the first choice might be given to Netanyahu. In any event, we will know soon enough.
The failure of the election to produce a decisive result creates uncertainty over Israel’s political direction at a moment when its relationship with Washington is under growing pressure. A new government could create an opportunity to repair relations with moderate Democrats, strengthen bipartisan support, and address some of the policies that have become sources of friction with American and European partners. The CRS analysis notes that a change in government could affect Israeli policy toward the West Bank, the judicial system, and the formation of a broader governing coalition. It also points out that Eisenkot has not proposed abandoning Israel’s security objectives or accepting the establishment of a “Palestinian” state under his leadership.
The possibility of a change in government should not, however, be treated as a solution to the deeper problem. If opposition to Israel is rooted in disagreement with Netanyahu, a different prime minister and a different governing coalition may reduce tensions. But if the opposition is rooted in rejection of Zionism, Jewish national self-determination, or Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state, a change of government will not satisfy it. Israel must be able to distinguish between legitimate criticism that can be addressed through policy and ideological hostility that will remain regardless of who occupies the prime minister’s office.
At the same time, Israel cannot ignore the consequences of its own conduct and political decisions. Its security needs are real, and no Israeli government can be expected to compromise the country’s survival to satisfy foreign opinion. But that does not mean that every policy is beyond review or that diplomatic consequences can be disregarded. Policies that alienate potential allies, weaken international support, or provide avoidable opportunities for hostile campaigns should be examined honestly. A government that is serious about preserving the American alliance must understand that security policy and diplomacy are not competing obligations; they are mutually reinforcing elements of national security.
There is also a danger in turning the American political debate into an Israeli partisan issue. Israeli leaders must not identify the future of the country with the electoral fortunes of Republicans, Democrats, Trump, or any prospective 2028 presidential candidate. The United States is Israel’s most important strategic partner, but American politics is changing. Israel must be prepared to work with whichever administration the American people elect.
Why the alliance still matters – and why it cannot be taken for granted
The strategic relationship between the United States and Israel has never rested solely on shared sentiment or religious and historical affinity. It has been built on shared security interests, intelligence cooperation, technological development, military capabilities, and a common interest in confronting threats to regional stability.
The Congressional Research Service’s report, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023, explains that American assistance reflects longstanding domestic support, shared strategic objectives, and historical ties. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding provides for $38 billion in military assistance over the ten fiscal years from 2019 through 2028, subject to congressional appropriations. That assistance includes funding for military procurement and missile-defense programs.
This relationship benefits both countries. Israel provides intelligence, technological innovation, military experience, and a capable regional partner. The United States benefits from cooperation with a democratic state that has demonstrated its ability to defend itself and to confront threats that also endanger American personnel and interests. Iran’s support for armed organizations, its attacks on regional partners, and its threats to international shipping are not exclusively Israeli concerns.
Hanson’s own earlier argument for supporting Israel, in The Strategic Case for Supporting Israel, makes this point: American support for Israel is not simply an act of generosity. It serves American strategic interests. That argument needs to be communicated far more effectively in the United States, particularly to younger Americans who may have little knowledge of the history of the alliance, the threats Israel faces, or the role Israel plays in the regional balance of power.
But the scale of American assistance also exposes Israel’s vulnerability. A country that relies heavily on another government’s political willingness to provide military supplies, replenish stockpiles, and support it in international institutions cannot assume that this support will remain unchanged forever. The possibility of restrictions, conditions, delays, or political pressure must be incorporated into Israel’s long-term security planning.
The objective should not be to weaken the American alliance or to suggest that Israel can simply replace it. It should be to preserve the alliance while reducing the degree to which Israel’s essential security capabilities depend on the decisions of any single administration. Domestic defense production, strategic stockpiles, research and development, and diversified international partnerships must become even more important.
What Israel must do now
Israel’s response MUST BE strategic, sustained, and bipartisan. It cannot be limited to public statements issued during a crisis or to diplomatic visits when a disagreement with Washington becomes acute. The relationship requires continuous investment, particularly at a time when American political attitudes are changing.
First, Israel must rebuild and strengthen its relationships across the American political spectrum. That means maintaining close ties with Republicans while making a determined effort to engage moderate Democrats, Democratic governors, senators, representatives, mayors, and emerging political leaders. Israel must not allow itself to become identified with one party or one faction. Its case should be presented as a national-security argument that transcends party politics: Israel is a democratic ally confronting common threats, and its security contributes to American security.
Second, Israel and its supporters must become much more effective in explaining the nature of the threats it faces. Public diplomacy cannot consist merely of responding to the latest accusation or defending the latest military operation. It must explain the history of the conflict, the objectives of Iran and its regional proxies, the nature of Hamas, the threats posed by Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the consequences for the United States and its allies if these organizations are allowed to operate without effective restraint. It must also acknowledge civilian suffering, explain the legal and operational challenges of fighting armed organizations embedded in civilian areas, and respond to legitimate criticism with credible facts rather than slogans.
Third, Israel must develop a professional and evidence-based effort to monitor antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and political extremism in American institutions. That effort should document specific statements, policies, organizational affiliations, funding arrangements, and political campaigns. It should distinguish between legitimate criticism, discriminatory rhetoric, and support for violence. It should not rely on broad accusations or attempt to label every critic of Israel an antisemite. Credibility is essential. The stronger the evidence, the more difficult it becomes for political leaders and institutions to dismiss legitimate concerns.
Fourth, Israel must pay much greater attention to local and state politics. It should work with Jewish communities, campus organizations, churches, civic groups, and local elected officials to challenge discriminatory initiatives and to promote informed discussion. It should not wait until an anti-Israel resolution becomes a national controversy or until a local political figure has developed into a national leader. The political environment is shaped at every level, and Israel’s engagement must reflect that reality.
Fifth, Israel should strengthen its relationships with American Jewish communities and evangelical Christian supporters, while recognizing that neither group is politically or ideologically uniform. Jewish communities must not be treated as a political instrument of the Israeli government. Their concerns, disagreements, and security needs deserve serious attention. Evangelical support is also important, but Israel should not assume that it can rely indefinitely on any single religious or political constituency. The broader objective must be to cultivate support based on shared democratic values, historical understanding, and strategic interests.
Sixth, Israel must prepare now for the 2028 presidential election. It should understand the foreign-policy positions of prospective candidates, their advisers, their congressional supporters, and the political coalitions that may bring them to power. The 2026 midterms have demonstrated that positions once considered marginal can acquire influence rapidly. Waiting until a presidential campaign is underway would be too late. Israel needs to engage early, present its strategic case, and ensure that the consequences of a fundamental change in American policy are understood by those who may soon be making it.
Finally, Israel must strengthen its own capacity to act independently. That means investing in domestic defense production, maintaining adequate stockpiles of ammunition and essential military equipment, expanding technological cooperation with reliable partners, and diversifying strategic relationships with countries such as India and moderate Arab states. The Abraham Accords and other regional partnerships should be treated as strategic assets, not merely diplomatic achievements. Israel should preserve and expand those relationships wherever its security interests permit.
None of these measures requires Israel to abandon its principles or to compromise its security. They require the opposite: a recognition that national independence is strengthened when a country has reliable allies but is not wholly dependent on their continued political goodwill.
The lesson of 2026: Israel must prepare for an America that may be different
The most important lesson of the 2026 elections is that Israel can no longer assume that the bipartisan political consensus that sustained the American alliance for decades will remain intact without deliberate effort. The election has given Democrats control of Congress, but it has also revealed a deeper shift in the political environment. The growing influence of anti-Israel voices, the normalization of increasingly radical rhetoric, and the emergence of new political coalitions may shape the direction of American policy well beyond the current Congress.
Hanson’s warning that a future American administration might regard Israel as an enemy is not a prediction that should be accepted as inevitable. It is a scenario that Israel must take seriously enough to prepare against. The immediate congressional consequences of the midterms are constrained by the President’s veto power and the division of authority in the American system. The more consequential question is what may happen after the 2028 presidential election, particularly if the political forces that gained momentum in 2026 succeed in securing control of the White House as well as Congress.
From a Biblical point of view, Israel’s security is dependent upon the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. From a human point of view, the United States remains indispensable to Israel’s security. Neither one of those relationships should be taken for granted. Israel must be prepared to defend its interests in Washington, in state capitals, in universities, in the media, and among the American public. It must also be willing to examine its own policies honestly, correct avoidable mistakes, and distinguish between disagreements that can be resolved through diplomacy and ideological hostility that cannot.
The simultaneous political changes in Washington and Jerusalem present both a danger and an opportunity. A new Israeli government may be able to rebuild relationships and restore confidence among American constituencies that have become increasingly alienated. But no Israeli government can assume that changing the prime minister will resolve opposition rooted in rejection of the Jewish state’s legitimacy. Nor can Israel afford to rely on the assumption that a future American administration will always share its understanding of the threats posed by Iran and its allies.
Israel must therefore pursue two objectives at the same time: preserve and strengthen its strategic alliance with the United States and become more capable of protecting its national interests if that alliance is weakened or subjected to political conditions. It must speak to both American parties, invest in public understanding, confront extremism with facts, and reduce vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a hostile administration.
The relationship between the United States and Israel has endured because it has served the interests of both countries. It must continue to do so. But enduring alliances are not sustained by history alone. They require leadership, political engagement, strategic clarity, and a willingness to prepare for changing circumstances.
Israel must recognize that it cannot choose who governs America, but it can determine how prepared it will be for the consequences of changing American politics. It must strengthen its defenses, preserve its independence, cultivate relationships across the American political spectrum, and never take the support of any administration for granted.
The United States, for its part, must recognize that its relationship with Israel is not merely a matter of political convenience or the temporary preferences of an elected government. It is a friendship grounded in shared values, mutual security, historical ties, and a commitment to stand with an ally whose survival and freedom are continually challenged. America must decide whether it will remain faithful to that friendship, or allow short-term political considerations to undermine a partnership that has served both nations and contributed to regional stability.
The biblical principle underlying that relationship is expressed in God’s promise to Abraham: “I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse; and in you all the families of the earth will be blessed” (Genesis 12:3). That promise speaks not only of blessing, but also of the profound responsibility that accompanies how nations treat the people through whom God declared His purposes. And the enduring principle of friendship and loyalty is captured in Proverbs 17:17: “A friend loves at all times, and a brother is born for adversity”. May Israel prove steadfast in its friendship with the United States, and may America remain steadfast in its friendship with Israel – not merely when that friendship is politically convenient, but especially when it is tested.
Bless, be blessed and be a blessing. Shabbat Shalom!
Marvin
