Shalom all,
Israel’s October 27 election has produced a political paradox: the bloc that won the most seats cannot govern alone, while the opposition’s path to power may depend on Arab parties whose support raises difficult questions about Israel’s identity, security and future borders. The struggle to form a government is about far more than who becomes prime minister. It is about the kind of country Israel intends to be, the policies it is prepared to pursue and the external forces that may seek to influence its democratic process.
Israel has voted, but the central question is not simply who can reach 61 seats in the Knesset. It is whether Israel’s political leaders can assemble a government that is numerically viable, politically coherent and capable of maintaining public confidence on national security, the war against terrorism, relations between Jewish and Arab citizens and the country’s future direction.
The results have created a contest in which parliamentary arithmetic, political loyalties and national-security concerns pull in different directions. Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing, religious and ultra-Orthodox bloc has emerged as the largest political camp, but it lacks a majority. Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc also falls short. The combined representation of the Arab parties – Ra’am and Joint List – gives both of them the potential to determine which camp can form a government.
The consequences extend well beyond coalition negotiations. Yair Golan’s “Democrats Party”, which managed to acquire enough votes for 8 seats, has advocated cooperation with Arab parties and supports a diplomatic alternative to permanent Israeli control over Judea and Samaria (commonly referred to as the “West Bank” [of the Jordan River]), including the possibility of a demilitarised “Palestinian” state. Other opposition parties are less willing to partner with Arab parties, while Netanyahu’s allies remain divided from the opposition over settlement policy, the judiciary, military-service exemptions and the future of the territories.
What the numbers tell us
As of today, October 30, 2026, the Central Elections Committee has published the final election results, subject to any subsequent formal corrections.
Final distribution of the 120 Knesset seats:
| Party | Seats |
| Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu | 27 |
| Yashar, led by Gad Eisenkot | 21 |
| B’Yachad, associated with Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid | 12 |
| Joint List (of Arab parties) | 11 |
| The Democrats, led by Yair Golan | 8 |
| Ra’am (Arab party), led by Mansour Abbas | 8 |
| Yisrael Beytenu, led by Avigdor Liberman | 7 |
| United Torah Judaism | 7 |
| Otzma Yehudit | 7 |
| Shas | 6 |
| Religious Zionism | 6 |
| Total | 120 |
What remains outstanding?
(1) The results are to be formally submitted to President Isaac Herzog on November 4, following examination of errors and complaints and (2) The new Knesset is scheduled to be sworn in on November 10.
The figures reveal several important facts. Likud, with 27 seats, is the largest individual party, but its broader bloc has only 53 seats – eight short of the 61 normally required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset. Eisenkot’s opposition bloc has 48 seats, leaving it 13 short. The two Arab parties together hold 19 seats, giving them considerable potential leverage. The election has therefore produced no unambiguous mandate for either major camp to govern alone.
The result also reflects a divided electorate. Netanyahu’s bloc has lost substantial ground compared with its representation in the outgoing Knesset. The opposition has the potential parliamentary numbers to replace Netanyahu, but it does not have an agreed coalition capable of using them. As the Associated Press’s analysis observes, the result leaves both camps facing complicated negotiations and the possibility of another election.
The possible routes to a government
There are several plausible paths out of the deadlock, but none is straightforward. A national-unity government is one possibility. It would require major concessions on controversial issues such as ultra-Orthodox military service, judicial policy, security and the future of Judea and Samaria. It would also require Netanyahu and at least some of his opponents to swallow their pride, reverse years of political positioning and accept a partnership with politicians they have campaigned against.
Netanyahu could also attempt to retain power by persuading individual opposition lawmakers to defect, negotiating with parties outside his current bloc or proposing a broader unity government. But a government that depends on defections would also have to demonstrate that it could survive future confidence votes and contentious legislation.
The opposition has another possible route: cooperation with the Arab parties. On the reported arithmetic, an alliance of all opposition parties, including the Arab parties, would command 67 seats – enough for a significant parliamentary majority. But a majority on paper is not necessarily a stable government. The parties would have to negotiate the terms of cooperation, the distribution of responsibilities and the limits of their disagreements on security and foreign policy. They would also have to decide whether the Arab parties would join the coalition formally or support it from outside.
Reuters’ analysis of possible ways out of the deadlock identifies a unity government, an administration dependent on Arab-party support, attempts to attract defectors and another election as possible scenarios. If no agreement can be reached, a caretaker government could remain in office while the political process continues.
Ultimately, the election is a test not only of political arithmetic, but of political judgment. A majority of seats can establish a government, but it cannot by itself establish trust. That requires clarity about the state the government intends to serve, the citizens it intends to protect and the principles it will not abandon.
Arab-party support: Democratic participation and national-security questions
The participation of Arab citizens in Israel’s political system is a legitimate feature of its parliamentary democracy. Arab citizens vote, stand for election and serve in the Knesset. The question is not whether they are entitled to participate, but whether the policies and commitments of particular parties are compatible with the responsibilities of a government coalition they may help establish.
A prospective coalition is entitled – and obliged – to scrutinise the political programs, statements and records of every party whose support it needs. Questions about the character of the state, the Arab-Israeli conflict, military policy and national security cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. At the same time, the actions or views of individual politicians must not be attributed indiscriminately to Arab citizens as a whole.
The two Arab parties have different political histories and approaches, but their combined parliamentary strength makes their positions consequential. Their support for an opposition government would raise difficult questions about Israel’s national identity, the future of Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, security arrangements and the prospect of a “Palestinian” state. These are not peripheral matters. They go to the heart of the decisions any Israeli government must make.
Qatar and allegations of foreign interference in the election
A further and particularly troubling development emerged after the vote. On October 29, Central Elections Committee chairman Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg instructed Shin Bet chief David Zini to investigate serious suspicions that foreign entities had attempted to influence the election through unlawful funding and possible electoral bribery. Although Sohlberg’s letter did not publicly name a country, Israeli media reports identified Qatar – and, in some reports, Turkey – as possible sources of funds allegedly channelled into Israel to influence voting in Arab communities.
According to reports by The Times of Israel, The Jerusalem Post and Ynet, the suspicion under investigation is that substantial sums of money were transferred to organisations or intermediaries in order to mobilise Arab voters. The alleged purpose was to increase turnout among Arab citizens and thereby strengthen the electoral position of the Arab parties. Some reports have described suspected attempts to distribute money or benefits to potential voters. If money was offered in exchange for voting for a particular list – or for voting at all – the matter would go beyond ordinary political campaigning and raise serious questions of electoral bribery and foreign interference.
It is essential, however, to distinguish the allegations from established findings. The investigation is ongoing. The public information available so far does not establish that Qatar directed such a campaign, that individual voters were in fact paid to vote for a particular party, or that the results were changed. The Shin Bet has said that its inquiry is based on intelligence it collected and has cautioned against using it to cast suspicion on Arab voters generally. The Central Elections Committee has also indicated that the investigation would not delay publication of the election results or the coalition-building process. The Jerusalem Post’s subsequent report sets out these important qualifications.
Qatar has categorically denied interfering in the election or funding activities intended to influence its outcome. Its Foreign Ministry spokesman described the allegations as a disinformation campaign. That denial must be recorded, but it does not remove the need for a full and independent investigation. The relevant question is whether the evidence substantiates or refutes the suspicions – not whether the allegations are politically convenient to one camp or another.
The issue is especially serious in light of the broader concerns about Qatar’s influence in Israel, including the separate “Qatargate” affair involving allegations concerning individuals close to the Prime Minister. The election-related suspicions must be investigated on their own evidence and merits. Nevertheless, any attempt by a foreign government to use money to influence Israeli voters, political organizations or the composition of the Knesset would constitute a direct challenge to Israel’s democratic sovereignty. A country cannot permit its elections to become an arena in which foreign governments purchase political influence.
Nor should the allegations be used to delegitimise the lawful votes of Arab citizens. If individuals or organisations accepted unlawful foreign money or engaged in electoral bribery, responsibility must be established through evidence and due process. It would be wrong to treat an entire community – or every vote cast for an Arab party – as suspect. Protecting the integrity of the election requires both a serious investigation of possible foreign interference and respect for the rights of citizens who voted lawfully. Nevertheless, if election bribery is proven to be true, it would affect the validity of the results in predominantly Arab communities.
The Political Mobilisation of the Arab Vote
With all of the foregoing being said, we cannot ignore the political significance of the substantial voter turnout within the Arab community, particularly, although not exclusively, in areas where the population is predominantly Arab. The growing effort to translate demographic strength and political mobilisation into greater influence within the Knesset has, in some quarters, been described as a form of “Silent Jihad” [holy war] – the pursuit of political objectives and influence through democratic institutions rather than military confrontation. The underlying concern is that objectives which have not been achieved through armed conflict may instead be pursued through political representation and influence within Israel’s own governing institutions.
These concerns have acquired a new dimension in light of the allegations of foreign interference in the recent election, including the reported suspicions that Qatar sought to finance organisations involved in mobilising Arab voters. As noted above, this matter is under investigation, which needs to determine whether such funding was provided, who received it, for what purpose, and whether any unlawful payments or inducements were made to voters.
If direct evidence establishes that individual votes were obtained through bribery or other unlawful means, those votes may be subject to disqualification. Under Israel’s election law, the courts may also annul voting at particular polling stations, or, in exceptional circumstances, address the validity of the election results more broadly, provided the alleged irregularities are sufficiently substantial to affect the outcome. As The Times of Israel’s legal analysis explains, however, the threshold is significant, and there is no basis for assuming that the election results, or the Arab parties’ representation, will automatically be invalidated.
Nevertheless, the political implications extend beyond the investigation itself. Even without formally joining a governing coalition, the Arab parties may find a political avenue into government through the willingness of Yair Golan’s Democrats Party to cooperate with them and rely on their parliamentary support. In this sense, the Democrats could become the political bridge through which the Arab parties exercise influence over the composition and policies of Israel’s next government – an outcome that makes the Democrats’ political positions and their proposed relationship with the Arab parties particularly consequential. It would provide the Arab parties with an opportunity to do indirectly what they cannot do directly
The Democrats party: Arab partnership and a different vision of Judea and Samaria
The position of Yair Golan’s Democrats Party is central to the coalition debate. Formed in 2024 through a merger of the left-wing Labor and Meretz parties, it defines itself as Zionist, liberal and democratic. Its platform includes strengthening democratic institutions, opposing annexation of Judea and Samaria, promoting equality in military service and advancing a diplomatic alternative to repeated rounds of conflict.
The Israel Democracy Institute’s profile of the Democrats sets out these positions. The Jerusalem Post’s guide to the party adds that the Democrats oppose state funding for outposts and farms they regard as illegal and want to reverse current arrangements that place significant civil-administration authority in the hands of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.
The party also stands apart from other Jewish-led opposition parties in its openness to Arab-party participation. After the election, Golan urged opposition leaders to reconsider their objections and examine the possibility of a government supported by the Arab parties. His argument is that the opposition should not rule out a potential majority simply because some of its members are reluctant to cooperate with Arab parties. The Jerusalem Post’s report and The Times of Israel’s account document that position.
The party’s diplomatic position is equally important. The Jerusalem Post’s report on the Democrats’ election program describes Golan’s preference for a broader regional agreement and a diplomatic alternative to repeated military confrontation. Other prominent figures in Golan’s party have advocated the division of the land and the establishment of a demilitarised “Palestinian” state as part of a regional agreement.
The policy choices of the Democrats party raise the question of what a future Israeli government would do about Judea and Samaria and Gaza – and what a “Palestinian” state would mean for Israel’s actual geography and security. Support for such a state does not settle the borders, the status of Jerusalem or issues related to Israel’s security.
What the election has – and has not – decided.
The election has created a mathematical opportunity for an opposition government, but it has not established that such a government can be formed or sustained. The potential 67-seat opposition majority would bring together parties with sharply different views on Israel’s national identity, the future of the administered territories and “Palestinian” statehood. The Democrats’ position could help make an opposition majority possible, but it could also expose disagreements within that majority.
The emerging allegations of foreign interference add another dimension to the uncertainty. If substantiated, they would raise fundamental questions about the independence of Israel’s electoral process and the extent to which foreign governments may attempt to shape its political future, as well as the validity of the votes cast for Arab parties. If not substantiated, the allegations must not be allowed to undermine public confidence in citizens who exercised their democratic right to vote.
The questions Israel must answer
The first question is whether Arab parties can legitimately participate in an Israeli government. The answer is yes: their participation is a legitimate possibility within Israel’s democratic system. But, whether a particular party should enter a particular coalition depends on its program, its commitments and the responsibilities it is prepared to accept. Democratic inclusion does not eliminate the need for scrutiny of national-security policy.
The second question is whether an opposition government can be formed with Arab-party support. On the reported numbers, the answer, in principle, is yes. But the political obstacles are substantial, and no numerical calculation can guarantee that a coalition will remain united when confronted with security crises or contentious legislation.
The third question is whether foreign money was used in an attempt to influence the election and, if so, who organised it, who received it and whether it affected the result. This must be answered by a thorough investigation, not by political accusations or premature conclusions. Israel’s electoral sovereignty and the integrity of its democratic institutions are at stake, as well as the number of seats available to Arab parties.
Israel’s election has not supplied easy answers. It has exposed the distance between assembling a parliamentary majority and agreeing on the country’s future. The next government will be judged not simply by who occupies the prime minister’s office, but by whether it can make decisions that are defensible, workable and sustainable.
The ultimate questions are therefore unavoidable: Who will govern Israel? What will that government do about the future of the land? What concrete arrangements will protect Israel’s citizens when political promises meet the test of reality? And can Israel ensure that its democratic choices are made by its own citizens, free from improper foreign influence?
Until those questions are answered, a government may be mathematically possible while Israel’s strategic future – and the integrity of its political process – remain unresolved.
May it be that no weapon – military or political – formed against us would prosper. (Isaiah 54:17)
Shabbat Shalom,
Marvin
