Tag: saudi-arabia

Make the Next War Unnecessary!

On By marvinskLeave a comment

Shalom all,

Israel has spent the past several years learning a brutal lesson: the most dangerous threat is not always the enemy you can see. It is the threat you see, analyze, debate – and then discover too late that you should have acted.

That is the thread running through the latest reporting from Gaza, Iran, Syria and the wider Middle East. Hamas is still testing the boundaries of the postwar arrangement in Gaza. Iran is rebuilding. Hezbollah remains part of Tehran’s regional network. Russia is positioning itself to retain a strategic foothold in Syria. Regional powers are pursuing their own interests. And Washington, while remaining indispensable to Israel, is simultaneously balancing its own global priorities.

None of this means that another October 7 is inevitable. It does mean that Israel is entering a period in which strategic complacency could be more dangerous than strategic weakness.

The question facing Israel now is not simply whether it can defeat its enemies. It is whether it can prevent those enemies from rebuilding the conditions for the next war.

Gaza: The warning signs are back

The most immediate concern is Gaza. According to the latest reporting from Israel’s Channel 12, approximately 50 members of Hamas’s elite Nukhba force were observed conducting what Israeli forces understood to be an exercise simulating an attack on, and takeover of, a Jewish community. It is widely known that Hamas wants to capture Israeli soldiers and/or civilians, to create the image of re-establishing control and being “in charge” of Gaza. Upon seeing the attack simulation exercise, Israeli forces raised their alert level and moved additional troops toward the border. Soldiers on the ground reportedly requested permission to strike, believing that allowing the activity to continue risked leaving Israel vulnerable to surprise.

The military’s reported explanation was different from the political accusation subsequently made by opposition leader Avigdor Lieberman. According to the report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not identify a sufficiently specific target that met the criteria for an attack, so it remained on heightened defensive alert rather than striking.

Lieberman characterized the decision as a return to the “containment” policy and the pre-October 7 “conception” that preceded the Hamas massacre.

Here, terminology matters.

The Israeli expression “the conception” refers to the strategic assumptions that dominated Israeli thinking before October 7, 2023: that Hamas was deterred, that it was primarily concerned with governing Gaza and improving its economic circumstances, and that a major Hamas offensive was unlikely. The problem was not that Israel had no intelligence. The problem was that the information that should have challenged those assumptions was not given the weight it deserved.

The above news report should be treated carefully. It does not establish that Hamas was preparing to launch another October 7th. Nor does it establish that the IDF was wrong not to strike. There is an enormous difference between observing suspicious activity and having a legally and operationally valid target.

But it raises a question Israel cannot afford to avoid: What happens when the enemy appears to be rehearsing precisely the kind of operation Israel has already experienced?

The question becomes even more significant because Gaza surveillance soldiers observing Hamas activity reported that what was taking place reminded them of the period preceding October 7th. That is the real warning. Israel cannot demand absolute certainty before responding to every suspicious development. But neither can it afford to demand certainty when the cost of being wrong could be catastrophic.

The answer is not to attack every ambiguous gathering, but to ensure that intelligence, surveillance, command decisions and deterrence operate as one system. A warning that does not produce a prompt and appropriate decision cannot be said to be a warning system. After October 7, Israel’s greatest challenge is not simply defeating its enemies, but recognizing – and acting on – the warning signs before they become the next war.

And this is where Gaza connects directly to the broader regional picture.

Hamas does not have to start a war to prepare for one.
The danger in Gaza is not necessarily an immediate offensive. It is the reconstitution of Hamas. The terrorist organization does not need to fire thousands of rockets to demonstrate that it is rebuilding its capabilities. It can recruit, train, organize, gather intelligence, test boundaries and study Israeli responses. And all the while, it can attempt to placate international sensitivities by agreeing to “store their weapons”, while not agreeing to “give them up”. But, as a result of an “understanding” reached between Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and senior officials from the Board of Peace, that the weaponry of Hamas will be turned over to the proposed National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), the interim technocratic government and the International Stabilization Force (ISF). But, Hamas has rejected the Board of Peace disarmament plan. So again, we see agreements being made regarding how third parties are to behave, but the third parties are not part of the agreement.

That is why the current arrangements surrounding the “Yellow Line” matter so much. The “Yellow Line” is the terminology being used for the boundary in Gaza separating the areas under the current postwar arrangement. Israeli forces have reportedly pulled back toward designated military positions, while Hamas and other armed elements remain in the broader Gaza environment.

The fundamental issue, therefore, is not the line itself. It is whether the existence of the line has credible consequences. A boundary is meaningful only if both sides understand what will happen when it is breached. If Hamas approaches it, probes it or conducts military activity near it, Israel must know in advance if it will be treated as a violation and what response is authorized. Otherwise, the boundary becomes an invitation to test.

Recent developments underscore the point. One of the major Israeli media reported an IDF claim that a tank in Gaza was struck by an explosive device in what the military described as a serious violation of the truce, while IDF troops also killed two terrorists who crossed the “Yellow Line”. 

That is precisely why the Gaza question cannot be reduced to whether Israel should “continue the war” or “maintain the ceasefire.” The real issue is whether the ceasefire creates security. A ceasefire that prevents immediate large-scale fighting while allowing an enemy to rebuild its military capabilities cannot be the basis for a durable peace. Conversely, a ceasefire backed by credible enforcement, intelligence and disarmament can become the foundation for something much better and considerably stronger.

Israel’s challenge is to make sure it is the latter.

Iran is the larger clock.
Beyond Gaza lies the strategic problem that may ultimately determine Israel’s security for years to come: Iran.

According to one analysis, Iran has moved rapidly to rebuild capabilities damaged during the recent military confrontations. The concern is particularly acute regarding its missile and military infrastructure. That should change causes Israel to re-think the factor of time.

Because the question should not simply be whether Iran is weaker today than it was before the war. The question that needs to be asked is: How quickly is Iran becoming stronger again?

A military victory can destroy facilities. It cannot automatically destroy knowledge, industrial capacity, organizational structures or political determination. And Iran has something Israel cannot afford to ignore strategic depth. Tehran does not have to rely exclusively on direct confrontation. It can work through partners and proxies while rebuilding its own capabilities.

While the friction in Gaza and Lebanon fronts increases, the IDF expresses concern that Iran, along with its terrorist proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, are trying to coordinate to rebuild the terror axis – a move that would increase the pressure on Israel. That means Israel cannot treat Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen as entirely separate problems, but rather as pieces of the same strategic environment.

The northern front remains unfinished.

Even after years of confrontation, the Hezbollah terrorist organization remains embedded in Lebanon’s political and military landscape. Its leadership continues to challenge efforts to constrain its freedom of action, while Iran remains a major source of regional support. 

That does not necessarily mean that Hezbollah is about to launch another full-scale war, although that is always a possibility. What it does mean is that Hezbollah has an incentive to learn. It can study Israeli defensive arrangements and maneuvering. It can test political reactions. It can preserve organizational structures. It can determine where Israel is willing to act and where Israel prefers restraint. That is how strategic positions change without a formal declaration of war.

The above defense reporting in the above article in the Jerusalem Post is of considerable importance beyond the immediate incidents it describes. The question confronting Israel is whether it can prevent its enemies from using periods of reduced fighting to rebuild the very capabilities that made previous wars possible.

The same principle applies to the Houthis. The Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen demonstrates how far the consequences can spread and that the conflict is already regional. The Houthi activity in the region of the Red Sea highlights the vulnerability of maritime commerce around one of the world’s most important shipping corridors.

The significance for Israel is broader than shipping. Iran and its partners have demonstrated an ability to transform regional military pressure into economic pressure. Energy prices, shipping insurance, trade routes and global supply chains can all become part of a regional confrontation. That is why Israel’s national-security problem can no longer be divided neatly into “military” and “economic” categories.

They are becoming one problem.

Washington can apply pressure – but Israel cannot outsource its security. This brings the United States into the picture.

A recent analysis of President Donald Trump’s options for increasing economic pressure on Iran describes measures ranging from additional sanctions on Iranian oil and financial networks to potentially much more ambitious attempts to restrict Iran’s trade. The difficulty is that American power has limits even when American political will is strong.

China’s relationship with Iranian oil, the potential consequences of targeting Chinese financial institutions, the complexity of Iran’s borders and the wider economic effects of sanctions all constrain Washington’s options. But that does not make American pressure unimportant. It makes it valuable. Israel should want maximum American diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Iran. But Israel should also recognize that Washington has global interests that extend far beyond the Middle East.

America has to consider China, Russia, global trade, energy markets, European allies and its own military commitments. Israel has one overriding strategic priority: Israeli security.

The strongest possible American-Israeli relationship, therefore, requires neither dependence nor distance. It requires partnership between two countries that understand each other’s interests while recognizing that although their interests are not identical, they can, nevertheless, pursue their mutual interests together, and still achieve their separate ones.

Regional friends are not necessarily Israeli strategic partners.
Israel should welcome improved relations with Arab and Muslim states.

But, friendship in international politics does not mean identical interests. A country can cooperate with Israel while simultaneously pursuing policies that are designed primarily to advance its own security, as well as its economic or regional position. That is not necessarily betrayal. It is what is loosely referred to as “international politics”. But, along with such a pursuit, Israel must be cautious about entering into agreements with neighboring countries, who make written promises for peace and who smile and shake hands in front of the international media, while attempting to lull Israel to sleep and secretly plan for widescale, multi-front war against Israel.

The lesson is not to “trust nobody”, but to verify everything. An agreement is valuable when it creates mechanisms that make violations difficult, detectable and costly. Diplomatic promises have value only when backed by credible enforcement. Without consequences for violations, an agreement is little more than a cloud without rain – visible, reassuring, and ultimately incapable of delivering security.

That principle is particularly important in the new Middle East, where alliances are shifting rapidly. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states are all pursuing their own calculations about Iran, America, Israel and the future regional order. This is clearly displayed in the recent Mecca Agreement discussed in The Week That Was of August 10th. Israel should cultivate as many relationships as possible. But, it should never confuse another country’s interests with its own.

And then there is Russia – a relatively slow expansion of its tentacles into the Middle East that is easy to overlook. Russia appears poised to preserve a military presence in Syria under a new agreement with the government of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Moscow would reportedly retain access to the naval facility at Tartus and the Hmeimim air base, while Russian personnel would help train Syria’s new military and security forces. 

If the arrangement develops as the parties appear to anticipate, it represents a significant strategic achievement for Vladimir Putin. Russia’s presence in Syria is not a historical footnote. Tartus is Russia’s only naval facility in the Mediterranean and has hosted a Russian presence since the Soviet era. Hmeimim became the principal Russian air facility in Syria after Moscow intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015.

As an aside – the irony is extraordinary. Russia supported Bashar al-Assad, helped him escape Syria when his regime collapsed, and granted him refuge in Moscow. Now Moscow appears to be negotiating a relationship with the very government that replaced him. At the same time, the Syrian authorities have reportedly agreed to transform the Russian facilities into “joint training and qualification centers,” with civilian administration of portions of the sites and a reorganization of Russia’s military presence.

The terminology here is important as well. An article in Hebrew refers to “training and qualification centers” to describe the new arrangement, rather than simply calling the sites Russian military bases. That distinction may be politically useful to both Damascus and Moscow.

But strategically, what matters is access. If Russian personnel remain at Tartus and Hmeimim, Moscow retains a Mediterranean foothold. If the facilities continue to support Russian transportation and logistics, Russia retains an important connection between the Mediterranean and its operations elsewhere, including Africa.

That makes Syria another northern arena in which Israel must account for great-power interests and worse, a location for a potential invasion.

Russia does not have to be an enemy of Israel to be a complication for Israel. In fact, that is precisely what makes the situation more complicated. Moscow’s interests may sometimes align with Jerusalem’s, particularly regarding jihadist groups or regional stability. At other times, Russian interests can conflict sharply with Israel’s freedom of action, particularly when Iran or other actors are involved.

The strategic lesson is the same as with regional diplomacy: Cooperation is useful. Dependency is dangerous.

The post-Assad Middle East is not necessarily a simpler Middle East. Iran wants influence. Turkey wants influence. Russia wants influence. Arab states want influence. And Syria’s new government wants to survive.

Thus, Israel faces a different strategic environment from the one it confronted during the Assad years. The old map of alliances has been disrupted – a situation that creates risks, as well as opportunities. The danger, as well as the concern, is that Israel could assume that the removal of one hostile regime automatically removes the strategic problem. It doesn’t. It simply changes the players, but not necessarily the problem.

And Russia’s apparent success in preserving access to Syria is a reminder that the Middle East’s strategic competition is larger than the Israel-Iran confrontation.

The central issue is deterrence.
When all these developments are viewed together, a common theme emerges.

Gaza is testing Israeli boundaries. Iran is rebuilding. Hezbollah remains part of a regional network. The Houthis can threaten strategic waterways. Regional governments are pursuing their own interests. America is applying pressure but balancing global priorities. Russia is seeking to preserve its Mediterranean position.

These are not isolated stories. They are manifestations of the same underlying reality:

The Middle East is not entering a postwar era. It is entering a period of strategic repositioning. That distinction is crucial. A postwar period implies consolidation. Strategic repositioning means everyone is preparing for the next contest. Israel must think beyond the question of whether its enemies are currently capable of launching a major attack. It needs to ask what those enemies will be capable of doing six months, one year or three years from now. 

That is why the surveillance of Gaza is so important. It is not necessarily evidence of an imminent catastrophe. It is evidence that Israel’s enemies are still thinking about military options. That mandates that Israel must do the same.

Israel’s greatest strategic asset is what it learned on October 7.  There is one enormous difference between Israel today and Israel on October 6, 2023. Israel now knows what strategic surprise looks like. It knows that Hamas can train for a major operation while Israel interprets the evidence through an existing strategic assumption.

It knows that warning signs can accumulate without producing action. It knows that deterrence can be stronger on paper than it is in the enemy’s mind. It knows that an organization dismissed as primarily interested in governance can still prepare for a massive attack. And it knows that intelligence collection means very little if the institution receiving the intelligence has already decided what it expects to see.

The challenge now is to avoid making the opposite mistake. Israel cannot become so traumatized by October 7 that every ambiguous event is interpreted as the beginning of another catastrophe. That would produce endless escalation. The goal has to be more sophisticated.

Israel needs a security doctrine capable of distinguishing between noise, preparation and imminent danger, while making sure that the system is designed to respond before preparation becomes an irreversible threat. That is much more difficult than simply ordering an attack. But it is also much more sustainable.

The Take-Away – The most important question facing Israel today is not whether its enemies are plotting another October 7th. That is a given, as Hamas leadership has repeatedly stated that it is planning additional, similar actions. The question that Israel must answer and respond to is whether the conditions that made October 7th possible are being allowed to return. That is a much more useful question. 

If Hamas is rebuilding, Israel must know.
If Hamas is training, Israel must know.
If Iran is rebuilding its strategic capabilities, Israel must know.
If Hezbollah is reconstructing its position, Israel must know.
If Iran is expanding its influence through Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, Israel must know.
If Russia is establishing a new long-term military relationship with Syria, Israel must not only know, but understand what that means and take appropriate precautionary measures.
And if regional governments are looking to become partners with Israel, while simultaneously pursuing independent strategies, including a future coordinated attack against it, Israel must recognize that also and plan accordingly.

The answer is not perpetual war. Nor is it blind faith in diplomacy. It is deterrence backed by credible capability, diplomacy backed by verification, intelligence backed by action, and alliances backed by strategic independence.

Israel should pursue agreements whenever agreements are genuinely able to improve its security. It should increase its efforts to cultivate relationships throughout the region. It should maintain its indispensable partnership with Washington. It should cautiously welcome the emergence of a more stable Syria, while not losing sight of the fact that Russia is now more entrenched in our northern border. 

But it must keep its ears attuned and its eyes open and seek wisdom to understand the Middle East as it actually is, rather than as Israel would like it to be.

Enemies learn. Friends have interests. Ceasefires can be temporary. Boundaries can be tested. Military capabilities can be rebuilt. And great powers rarely leave strategic real estate uncontested.

The lesson gleaned from the events of October 7th is not that Israel must strike first at every possible threat. Rather, the lesson is that Israel must never again allow a reassuring strategic assumption to override an uncomfortable warning.

Today, Israel has the benefit of hindsight. The real test is whether it will use it wisely. 

Because the objective should not be simply to win the next war. The objective should be to make the next war unnecessary – and to make absolutely certain that if an enemy nevertheless chooses confrontation, Israel is never again surprised by the opening move.

Do not trust in princes, in mortal man, in whom there is no salvation. His spirit departs, he returns to the earth. In that very day his thoughts perish. How blessed is he whose help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the Lord his God. (Psalm 146:3-5)

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing!

Have a great week.

Marvin

The “Mecca Agreement” – One for All and All for One!

On By marvinsk2 Comments

Shalom all.

In a region where alliances shift like desert sand, a newly forged defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan is more than a routine agreement. It is a new geopolitical alignment taking shape across the Muslim world. It is a signal – a signal of ambition, anxiety, and a reordering of power in the Middle East and beyond. and Israel would be unwise to ignore it.

On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed what they call the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, declaring that an armed attack against one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. The agreement brings together three very different powers: Saudi Arabia, with its enormous financial resources and religious significance; Turkey, with one of the region’s most capable conventional militaries and an increasingly independent foreign policy; and Pakistan, a major South Asian military power and the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state. 

The agreement does not yet constitute a NATO-style alliance. Saudi Arabia insists that it is neither a military axis nor a sectarian or religious bloc, while Turkey says it is defensive and directed against no particular country. 

According to reporting from multiple sources, such as World Israel News, The Times of Israel, Reuters, The Jerusalem Post, Atlantic Council and The Washington Post, among others, the pact includes several concrete provisions for joint military planning and exercises; defense industrial cooperation; intelligence sharing mechanisms; missile and air-defense collaboration and crisis response coordination (a loose framework – short of NATO-style Article 5) for mutual consultation in the event of threats.

Formally, the pact stops short of a binding collective defense treaty. Practically, however, it creates the infrastructure for one.

Yet the political circumstances surrounding the agreement deserve much closer attention. Because immediately after the pact was signed, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif described Israel as illegitimate and a common threat and called for Islamic countries to coordinate against it.

That juxtaposition raises a much larger question:

Is this merely a regional security arrangement – or could it become the beginning of a broader political alignment in which opposition to Israel becomes one of the forces holding the emerging bloc together?

The answer is not yet clear. But the question is too important to ignore.

The “Mecca Agreement” (or the “Crescent Pact”): What Is Really Being Created?
The most important mistake would be to assume that Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have suddenly become a unified anti-Israel or even anti-Iran bloc.

They have not. Their interests are considerably more complicated.

Saudi Arabia has spent years attempting to balance two competing imperatives. On the one hand, it wants security against Iran, protection of its critical infrastructure and greater strategic independence. On the other hand, Riyadh does not want to become trapped in a permanent confrontation with Tehran or subordinate its foreign policy to Washington – or to any other external power.

The new pact therefore makes sense as strategic insurance.

Turkey has its own calculation. Ankara increasingly seeks strategic autonomy and a greater leadership role in the Muslim world. It competes with Iran for influence in several theaters while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with Tehran. It also has increasingly serious disagreements with Israel over Gaza and the wider regional order.

Pakistan’s calculation is different again. Islamabad has long-standing military and economic ties with Saudi Arabia, maintains important relations with Turkey and has its own strategic preoccupations in South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. At the same time, Pakistan has consistently attached enormous political importance to the Palestinian question.

The result is not a natural alliance in which all three countries want precisely the same thing. It is a coalition of overlapping interests.

And that may actually be more important than ideological unity.

The Washington Post article reports that analysts see the most likely consequences not as massive troop deployments, but as deeper cooperation in diplomacy, defense production and technology transfer. The three countries possess complementary assets: Saudi capital, Turkish defense-industry capabilities and Pakistani military experience. 

Those assets could eventually create something much more consequential than the original document suggests. Not necessarily a NATO, but something potentially more flexible: capital + military capability + technology + diplomatic coordination + political solidarity.

That is a combination Israel must watch carefully.

Iran is the immediate shadow – but not necessarily the ultimate destination.
Iran is clearly part of the strategic background. Saudi Arabia views Iranian power as a major threat. Turkey is competing with Iran for regional influence. Pakistan must continue to maintain a working relationship with Iran because of geography and its own regional interests.

Yet all three pact countries have reasons to avoid an open-ended confrontation with Tehran. Indeed, Turkey’s representative explicitly told Tehran that the agreement was not aimed at Iran, while Iranian officials dismissed the pact as insufficient to provide Saudi Arabia with genuine security. 

This tells us something important. Iran may be the catalyst for the pact without being the only strategic issue the pact eventually addresses.

And that is where Israel enters the picture.

The Turkey – Saudi Competition
The alliance also has another dimension that cannot be ignored: the competition over who speaks for the Sunni Muslim world. Saudi Arabia possesses an unparalleled source of religious legitimacy as guardian of Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina. Its model of influence rests on religious authority, Arab identity, economic power, diplomacy and the Saudi monarchy. 

Turkey, on the other hand, offers a different model. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has increasingly presented Turkey as an independent center of Muslim political power, drawing upon the historical memory of the Ottoman Empire, as well as on its own political activism and military capability. The Turkish government has repeatedly positioned itself as a defender of Muslim and so-call “Palestinian” interests, particularly concerning Jerusalem.

Pakistan offers yet another model: Islamic solidarity combined with considerable conventional military power and nuclear deterrence.

These three visions can coexist – but they do not necessarily point toward the same ultimate leader. Indeed, the pact could provide each country with a larger platform from which to pursue its own conception of Islamic leadership. 

That is why the alliance should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of unity. It may instead represent cooperation among competing powers that have discovered that cooperation can increase each one’s influence.

And Then Comes Israel. The most consequential development, therefore, may be not what the agreement says, but what political meaning is attached to it. 

Saudi Arabia says the agreement is not a religious bloc.
Turkey says it is not directed against any particular country.
Yet Pakistan’s defense minister almost immediately described Israel as a shared threat and called for Islamic unity against it. 

That does not prove that Saudi Arabia or Turkey has adopted Pakistan’s position. It does demonstrate, however, how easily regional security cooperation can become connected to the broader political language of Islamic solidarity. 

And that brings us to the deeper question: Why Has Opposition to Israel Become So Powerful in the Muslim World?

There is an important qualification that must be made at the outset: There is no single underlying reason shared by all Muslim-majority countries for opposing Israel.

The Muslim world is not politically or ideologically homogeneous. Egypt and Jordan maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco have established relations through the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia itself has maintained periods of quiet strategic contact with Israel and has at times appeared interested in normalization.

Therefore, it would be intellectually inadequate – and strategically counterproductive – to reduce opposition to Israel simply to “Islam”. The reality is more complicated.

Opposition to Israel has become powerful because several different forces have converged around the “Palestinian” issue: nationalism, religion, history, domestic politics, anti-Western sentiment, regional competition and the strategic interests of governments.

The Israeli-“Palestinian” conflict began primarily as a struggle involving territory, nationalism and competing claims to political sovereignty. It is clearly without doubt that religious “Islam” remains vehemently opposed to Israel’s existence on land formerly controlled in the not-too-distant past by the Ottoman Empire, an existence which prevents the coming of the Mahdi, an Islamic deliverer from the line of the Prophet Muhammad. This issue is much more complex than what can be clarified in the brief reference here.

Over time, however, the conflict acquired a powerful religious dimension.

Jerusalem – and particularly the al-Aqsa Mosque – became central symbols in Islamist political discourse. The false claims and narratives of Arabs who want to recognize a non-existent “Palestinian” state and the occupation of so-called “Palestinian” land, were increasingly portrayed by Islamist movements as a symbol of Muslim dispossession and humiliation.

That transformation matters because a territorial dispute can theoretically be negotiated. But, a conflict portrayed as a struggle over sacred territory and religious dignity is much more difficult to compromise.

But there is an equally important distinction: Opposition to Israeli government policies is not automatically antisemitism, and opposition to Israel is not automatically motivated by religious hatred of Jews. Nevertheless, the difference between the two are very often blurred and they are treated alike.

At the same time, religious rhetoric can cross that line when opposition to the policies of a state becomes rejection of the legitimacy of Jews as a people or of Jewish self-determination altogether. Unfortunately, this has become the rule, rather than the exception.

Nevertheless, the distinction must be preserved.

Israel became a symbol of Western power
For many nationalist and Islamist movements, Israel is not perceived merely as another Middle Eastern country. It is portrayed as the regional extension of Western power. 

The longstanding strategic relationship between Israel and the United States reinforces this perception. Consequently, hostility toward Israel can become intertwined with hostility toward American influence, Western intervention and what many movements describe as colonialism.

This explains why the above symbolisms can become vehicles for much broader grievances. Israel itself became a symbol. And symbols are often more politically powerful than facts.

There is another reality that governments cannot ignore. Public sympathy for Arabs claiming identity as “Palestinians” is extremely powerful in many Muslim-majority societies and their domestic politics magnify that issue.

That creates a dilemma for governments whose strategic interests may actually favor cooperation with Israel. A government can privately recognize that Israel possesses valuable intelligence, technology, life-saving innovations in medicine, economic or security capabilities while at the same time recognizing that an openly pro-Israel policy could provoke serious domestic opposition.

The result is strategic hedging – cooperation behind closed doors, but strong rhetoric in public.

The Saudi case illustrates the dilemma particularly well. Riyadh has strategic reasons to consider closer relations with Israel, but it also has powerful regional and domestic reasons to avoid appearing to abandon the cause of the “Palestinians”. This tension helps explain why normalization between the two countries has repeatedly proved difficult.

Perhaps the most overlooked element is that what is referred to as the “Palestinian issue” has also become a contest for Islamic leadership. The issue is not only about Israel and the so-called “Palestinians”. It has also become a way for Muslim governments and movements to demonstrate who speaks for the Muslim world.

Saudi Arabia can claim religious leadership through Mecca and Medina.
Turkey can claim political leadership through its Ottoman historical legacy, activism and military reach.
Pakistan can invoke Islamic solidarity while possessing a major military establishment and nuclear capability.

Each can therefore gain political capital by demonstrating that it is defending Muslims against perceived external threats.

Israel becomes an especially powerful subject through which such leadership can be demonstrated. This helps explain why anti-Israel rhetoric sometimes becomes stronger than a government’s immediate strategic interests would appear to require. The rhetoric itself has political value.

This is why the Saudi-Turkish rivalry makes the new pact more complicated and their relationship deserves particular attention. The two countries may cooperate, but they are not identical powers with identical visions.

Saudi Arabia emphasizes religious custodianship, Arab leadership, economic transformation and state sovereignty.
Turkey emphasizes historical memory, political activism, strategic independence and military capability.
Pakistan adds a third dimension: Islamic solidarity combined with substantial military weight and nuclear deterrence.

The three countries therefore have a reason to cooperate without having a reason to surrender their separate ambitions. That distinction may ultimately determine the future of the pact.

What Should Israel Conclude? In my opinion, Israel should avoid two opposite mistakes.

The first would be complacency: dismissing the pact as merely symbolic.
The second would be exaggeration: declaring that a unified anti-Israel Muslim military alliance has already been created.

Neither conclusion is justified by the available evidence.

The Washington Post report indicates that the immediate emphasis is collective deterrence and greater cooperation in diplomacy, defense production and technology. It also indicates that large-scale military deployments by Turkey and Pakistan are unlikely. 

But the World Israel News article demonstrates that the political environment surrounding the agreement can move rapidly toward explicit anti-Israel rhetoric. 

That is the real warning. The question is not whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan will suddenly fight Israel together. The more realistic question is whether an initially defensive regional framework could gradually develop into: security cooperation + political coordination + Islamic solidarity + coordinated diplomacy = a much more difficult strategic environment for Israel.

That possibility cannot be dismissed.

Considerations of What Israel Should Do
The last thing that Israel needs right now is to over-react. It should calculate how to respond diplomatically and strategically rather than reactively.

First, Israel should continue pursuing efforts towards normalization with Saudi Arabia. Saudi participation in the new pact does not necessarily mean that Riyadh has abandoned the possibility of relations with Jerusalem. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s insistence that the new agreement does not replace its existing international partnerships suggests that Riyadh is deliberately preserving strategic flexibility. The major hurdle to overcome is Riyadh’s insistence that any normalization with Israel can only take place after the establishment of a “Palestinian” state.

Second, Israel should strengthen the Abraham Accords and its relationships with Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco. The existence of Muslim-majority states willing to maintain relations with Israel is itself proof that the Muslim world cannot accurately be described as a single anti-Israel bloc, even though some feign a willingness to consider friendship with Israel while planning for its destruction.

Third, Israel and the United States should coordinate closely. If the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani framework becomes a permanent regional institution, Washington will have a major interest in ensuring that it does not evolve into a structure explicitly hostile to Israel or fundamentally opposed to the existing regional order. It will also have to carefully negotiate how to maintain alliances with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, particularly as the latter may be looking to countries other than the U.S. for protection and strategic cooperation.

Fourth, Israel should recognize and try to capitalize on the internal contradictions within the pact. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have different strategic priorities, different relationships with Iran and different visions of regional leadership. Those differences are not weaknesses to be exploited through confrontation; they are realities that diplomacy can work with. 

Finally, Israel should distinguish carefully between Muslim opposition to particular Israeli policies, support for national aspirations to establish a “Palestinian” state, opposition to normalization, and rejection of Israel’s existence altogether.

Those are four different positions. Treating them as one phenomenon would make Israeli policy less effective, not more.

Conclusion: The “Mecca Agreement” Is a Warning – Not Yet an Axis.The “Mecca Agreement” should therefore be understood neither as an insignificant diplomatic document, nor as an already completed anti-Israel military axis.

It is definitely something more interesting – and, potentially, more consequential. It is the beginning of a regional security architecture involving three countries with considerable economic, military, diplomatic and political resources. While some reporting suggests that its immediate purpose is collective deterrence and expanded cooperation, rather than an anti-Israel or anti-Iran military bloc, the rhetoric surrounding the agreement tells another story.

Pakistan’s call for Islamic unity against Israel demonstrates the possibility that the language of regional security could eventually become intertwined with the language of Islamic political solidarity.

That is where the deeper issue lies.
The challenge for Israel is not that the Muslim world is united against it. It is that the so-called “Palestinian issue” has become powerful enough to unite otherwise competing Muslim states temporarily around a common political narrative.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan do not need to agree on everything. They need only to discover that cooperation against a perceived common adversary advances each of their interests.

That is why Israel should act now – not because a new anti-Israel axis has already emerged, but because the future direction of this new regional architecture is still undecided.

Israel’s central strategic objective should be simple: Prevent a regional security arrangement from becoming a permanent anti-Israel political bloc – while simultaneously demonstrating that cooperation with Israel is compatible with Muslim, Arab and regional interests.

The struggle, in the end, is not simply over WHETHER Israel has enemies, because it DOES have enemies. The question is whether those enemies can transform their separate grievances and competing ambitions into a durable common front.

And that is a question of diplomacy, as much as power.

Be broken, O peoples, and be shatttered; and give ear, all remote places of the earth. Gird yourselves, yet be shattered; Gird yourselves, yet be shattered. Devise a plan, but it will be thwarted; State a proposal, but it will not stand. For God is with us. (Isaiah 8:9-10) The nations can associate, prepare, take counsel and speak their plans, but ultimately, it will come to nothing. The closing verse is: “For God is with us.” (ki immanu El)

Remember: Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Have a great week!

Marvin