Shalom all.

Like most things in the political divide, one’s perspective concerning the purported “ceasefire” that went into effect at 10:00 a.m. on November 27, 2024, brought a series of mixed responses. Some said it was great, others said that it signaled the defeat of Hezbollah, still others said that it was a joke and a disaster. Those who praised the ceasefire said that it will push-start the stalled negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of the hostages. Others said it would cause negotiations with Hamas to be more problematic.

So, what are we talking about? For a birds-eye view of what the “ceasefire agreement” entails, see here.

Glancing at the 13 points listed in the so-called “ceasefire agreement”, the first thing that we notice is that the “agreement” is actually an “announcement” made by the United States and France of a ceasefire deal for the “Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701”. A fancy title with a lot of nice-sounding words, but, essentially, of little practical value. I am writing as a pragmatic realist, making every effort to awaken many who laud the document as a dramatic breakthrough, signaling the beginning of the end of belligerency in the Middle East.

The announcement itself is a statement of “understanding” made by two non-combatant parties (the United States and France), regarding the commitments made by the governments of the Republic of Lebanon and the State of Israel. Are we missing something here? Where is the participation and commitment of the Hezbollah? The Republic of Lebanon is not one of the parties that is involved in the fighting. But, it is making commitments that are intended to curtail the activities of Hezbollah, which is the terrorist organization that renewed its belligerency against Israel on October 8, 2023.

Irrespective of how one wants to view the latest “ceasefire” deal, one cannot escape the conclusion that it is, in very large measure, a re-hashing of the prior deal that resulted in Security Council Resolution 1701 that ended the Second Lebanon War in 2006 – a Resolution that was immediately broken and continues to be violated by the Hezbollah.

Point 2 of the “understandings” says that starting at 04:00 in the morning of November 27, 2024, the Government of Lebanon would act to “prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups in the territory of Lebanon from carrying out any operations against Israel, and Israel will not carry out any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military, or other state targets, in the territory of Lebanon by land, air, or sea.” 

The Lebanese army already has a large number of Hezbollah in its ranks. To expect that Lebanese army would actively engage the Hezbollah militarily to prevent it from acting against Israel is like living on Fantasy Island. For the last 18 years, Hezbollah has effectively been in control of Lebanon from a number of perspectives – it functions as a terrorist organization with a sovereign state behind it. And now, because of the pressure exerted by the U.S. and France, Israel has acquiesced and committed itself not to pursue “offensive military operations against Lebanese targets”. For a prior TWTW discussion of UN Resolution 1701, see here.

Point 9 of the “understandings” obligates Israel and Lebanon to act “in co-ordination with UNIFIL, to reformulate and enhance the tripartite mechanism (hereinafter: ‘the Mechanism’) … hosted by UNIFIL, chaired by the US, and including France, [to] monitor, verify, and assist in ensuring enforcement of these commitments.” This provision brings the U.S. and France on board to get involved in helping to ensure enforcement of the commitments. However, these are future undertakings that should have been “in place” prior to the announcement of the ceasefire and the failure to work them out for immediate implementation is a serious omission on the part of the negotiating parties. 

Point 10 of the “understandings’ calls upon Israel and Lebanon to report alleged violations to the Mechanism and UNIFIL, and allows them also “to communicate directly with the UN Security Council.” In the meantime, the “Mechanism” will do its homework in an effort to help facilitate that the commitments will be enforced. This provision is almost ludicrous. To expect that Israel would turn to the U.N. to complain about a violation of round two of efforts to enforce Security Council Resolution 1701 is a pipe dream. Any observer of decisions reached by the U.N. in recent years can almost conclude that the U.N. exists so that it can condemn Israel.

Point 12 of the “undertakings” is probably one of the more serious provisions of the document. It requires Israel to gradually withdraw its forces to a point south of the Blue Line within 60 days from the start of the ceasefire. 

There is also a “Side Letter” of the U.S., the contents of which are not specifically stated in the above Times of Israel article. Nevertheless, the contents are said to affirm Israel’s right to defend itself against renewed threats [from Hezbollah]. Other provisions: The US will provide Israel with intelligence information about violations of the terms of the ceasefire deal, and specifically, of any indication that Hezbollah is attempting to infiltrate the ranks of the Lebanese Army [whose ranks have already been infiltrated]. Israel may be restricted from responding to Hezbollah violations  of the ceasefire beyond southern Lebanon, but would be able to act if the Lebanese Army is unable or unwilling to deal with the violations and only after it notifies the United States, “wherever possible”. And finally, the “Side Letter’ would allow Israel to conduct reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, for purposes of gathering intelligence, provided that Israeli jets do not break the sound barrier. A slow-moving jet is an easy target for ground-to-air defense systems. It is difficult to grasp why Israel would agree to such a provision.

Much can be said about the contents of the “Side Letter”, which can be left for a later date. Nevertheless, even a cursory review of its provisions reveals that Israel is being restricted on paper. Before it can effectively act, it needs to report, to notify and to wait and see whether the Lebanese army would be willing and able to deal with Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire. Another seemingly ridiculous limitation.

There is no doubt that during the last two and a half months Israel dealt a heavy blow to Hezbollah. A ceasefire that prevents the loss of life and injury to body and soul is always a goal to strive for. But, we’ve been in this show before and the last thing we need right now is a repeat of the mistakes that we made back in 2006. Hezbollah is the largest and strongest of Iran’s proxies in the region and the serious damage to this terrorist organization will undoubtedly have an impact upon the regime of the Persian Puppeteer. That impact, however, remains to be seen.

So why did Israel agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon, when, despite the losses of life and limb on the part of the IDF, we were dismantling the terrorist organization, eliminated its leadership cadre, destroyed much of its tunnel infrastructure, as well as a large percentage of its missiles, and captured thousands of Hezbollah weapons of all kinds?

According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, there were three reasons to pursue a ceasefire, namely: (1) focus on the Iranian threat; (2) replenish our supply of arms, which have been depleted and give the IDF a much-needed rest; and (3) disconnect the Hezbollah from its support of Hamas, leaving the Gaza terrorist organization isolated.

It all sounds good, reasonable and practical. But, what about the fourth, unspecified reason for the ceasefire – the pressure placed upon Israel by the Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration to get done with the wars and bring the hostages home before the end of the present American administration and the beginning of the next one. Biden needs to achieve something positive and Trump doesn’t want to begin with something negative.

This last “reason” is not what you will read about in the multitude of tabloids and media that have applauded the ceasefire during the last week. But, when a special U.S. envoy comes to town and within a short period of time a “ceasefire deal” is announced, we need to open our eyes to see behind the scenes the realities that all of the actors want to publicly deny. 

More than once the U.S. has indicated that it would withhold military supplies if Israel does not toe the line and behave like an obedient child. But, it is not just military supplies. It is the power to stave off resolutions against Israel by the U.N. Security Council, where the U.S. has a veto, which it has exercised many times in the past for Israel’s benefit. That is the real point of persuasion.

And what about the incoming President? Mr. Trump has made it clear that he wants Netanyahu to end the war and bring the hostages home before he takes office on January 20, 2025. If Netanyahu could have done both over the last year, he would have. But, unilateral withdrawal of forces from Gaza does not guarantee the return of all of the hostages, alive or dead. Still, one of the last things that Israel needs is a Security Council Resolution directing the cessation of military action by Israel in Lebanon. Another “last thing” is to disappoint an incoming President of the United States, particularly one that has been a genuine friend of Israel in the past and who, it is hoped, will continue to be a true friend in the future. Are these realistic and pragmatic reasons to commit to a ceasefire? Of course they are. Is it probable that such reasons would not be admitted by the politicians on both sides of the Atlantic? Definitely. So we are left with speculation about the real reasons for entering into a ceasefire in Lebanon at this point.

By the way, the ceasefire was violated almost immediately by the Hezbollah. Israel responded and Hezbollah launched two mortars into Israeli territory earlier this evening. Israel, of course, responded to militarily to the launchings with strikes in southern Lebanon. In the meantime, Trump threatened that “there will be ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against Humanity” if the hostages aren’t released by the date that he assumes office as President.

But, back to the “ceasefire agreement” – It leaves Hezbollah in power. There is emphasis on a “buffer zone”, as was originally called for in Security Council Resolution 1701. The residents of the Israel’s northern towns will not be able to return without fear of additional attacks from the Hezbollah neighbors. According to an article by Jonathan Spyer in Middle East Forum, “[Residents] of Israel’s north are indeed set once again to have Hezbollah as their neighbours, though the organisation will be a weakened, chastened version of its former self – at least for a while. This in turn means that a further round of fighting, sooner or later, is a near inevitability. Hezbollah are the owners of Lebanon. Iran is the owner of Hezbollah. The final uprooting of this organisation is unlikely to take place without this salient reality being taken into account.”

One major problem with the “ceasefire” in Lebanon, which, as noted, has already been broken, is that Hezbollah not only survived, but  remains the power behind all national decisions in Lebanon. This is tantamount to continuing the status quo that existed prior to Israel’s actions against the terrorist organization on its home territory during the last two and a half months. The “ceasefire agreement” contains no demand by Israel to dismantle Hezbollah, either as an organization, a military force or a political power.

The by-product of the “ceasefire agreement” in Lebanon is that the negotiations for a potential ceasefire agreement with Hamas in Gaza have been made considerably more difficult. The terms of the Lebanese ceasefire will most likely be treated as a precedent for any deal with Hamas and whatever was “agreed to” up to this point will most likely be reconsidered in light of the “understandings” that also relate to Hezbollah. For Hamas, who ran Gaza with an iron fist, settling for anything less than what Hezbollah achieved would be considered as a “loss of face”, reducing both the image and status of Hamas, as well as being considered weaker than Hezbollah throughout the greater Muslim world. Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, return of displaced Lebanese citizens to their homes, promises of financial assistance that will enable them to rebuild homes and infrastructures … and tunnels, as well as international supervision of southern Lebanon is deal number one. There is added pressure on the government to conclude deal number two in Gaza. But, there is also considerable opposition to the deal that was made and the one that is on the negotiating table.

So, was the ceasefire deal good or not? Time will tell.

And while we wait, remember:

For the LORD God is a sun and shield: The LORD gives grace and glory: No good thing does He withhold from those that walk uprightly. (Psalm 84:11)

So, bless, be blessed and be a blessing. 

Marvin