When Fantasies Replace Facts: The Growing Assault on Israel, Jews, and Zionism.

Shalom all,

The elections in Israel and the United States have exposed a changing political reality. But the developments that have followed are perhaps even more revealing. From growing disagreements between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over Iran, to the emergence of increasingly hostile political voices in Washington and the open intimidation of Jews on American streets, the challenges facing Israel and its relationship with the United States are becoming harder to ignore.

In my November 5 article, America at the Crossroads: What the 2026 Elections Mean for Israel – and What Israel Must Do Now, I discussed the erosion of bipartisan support for Israel and the need for Israel to prepare for a potentially different relationship with Washington. Subsequent developments have brought those concerns into sharper focus.

But there is an even more disturbing development that deserves particular attention: the growing tendency to accept, repeat, and act upon unsubstantiated accusations against Israel, Jews, and Zionism without examining the facts. Increasingly, public opinion appears willing to accept accusations simply because they are repeated often enough, regardless of their accuracy or the evidence supporting them. This is not merely a political disagreement. It represents a dangerous surrender of independent judgment and critical thinking.

Less than a century has passed since the Holocaust. Yet Jew hatred and antisemitism, twin evils that never disappeared, are again becoming increasingly visible, not only in the corridors of government through anti-Israel political voices, but also on the streets of countries that pride themselves on their democratic values. The question is how much more hostility, intimidation, and distortion of historical truth will be tolerated before people recognize the danger.

Iran: The disagreement that could redefine the relationship.

Perhaps the most immediate test of the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu concerns Iran. According to World Israel News, the two leaders reportedly had an exceptionally heated telephone conversation over whether the United States should resume large-scale military operations against Tehran. Netanyahu’s office rejected the characterization of the conversation, while a senior Israeli official described it as not difficult.

Nevertheless, the reported disagreement points to a significant difference in priorities. Netanyahu reportedly favors renewed military action, while Trump has increasingly expressed a preference for diplomatic negotiations and economic pressure.

The difference is understandable. For the United States, another military confrontation carries substantial political, economic, and regional consequences. For Israel, however, the Iranian threat is not an abstract foreign-policy concern. It is an existential security issue involving a regime that has repeatedly threatened Israel’s destruction and supported terrorist organizations throughout the region.

Trump’s November 12th declaration that the United States no longer needs an agreement with Iran adds another dimension to the uncertainty. Meanwhile, Iran’s former IRGC commander and senior security official Mohsen Rezaei has vowed that not one grain of enriched uranium will leave Iran and threatened American bases in Europe should the United States attack again.

These developments expose the central problem. What Washington might consider a satisfactory conclusion to the confrontation may not address Israel’s fundamental security requirements. An arrangement that leaves Iran with enriched uranium, the capacity to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure, and its regional network of armed proxies would hardly constitute a lasting solution.

Israel cannot afford to regard the difference between an American diplomatic objective and its own existential security requirements as a minor disagreement.

From political rhetoric to intimidation on American streets…

The changing political climate is not confined to Washington. It is increasingly finding expression in public demonstrations and the intimidation of Jewish individuals and businesses.

A particularly disturbing example occurred in Philadelphia on November 8, when an anti-Israel group organized a boycott bicycle demonstration targeting six Jewish-owned businesses. The timing was especially troubling: the demonstration took place immediately before the 88th anniversary of Kristallnacht, the November 9–10, 1938, pogrom during which Nazi groups and German civilians attacked Jewish homes, businesses, and synagogues.

The organizing group, Philly Bike On Your Left, describes itself as an anti-fascist, anti-Zionist social cycling collective. It identified the establishments as “Zionist establishments,” claiming that the demonstration was directed at their owners’ support for Israel rather than their Jewish identity.

That explanation becomes difficult to accept when one considers what actually occurred. Jewish individuals who questioned the demonstrators were subjected to antisemitic insults. One demonstrator shouted, “Get out of our country, Jew!” Another, when questioned about the timing of the demonstration in relation to Kristallnacht, responded, “Maybe they learn their lesson this time.”

The Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia rejected the organizers’ explanation, asserting that the businesses were targeted because they were Jewish-owned.

There is a fundamental distinction between criticizing Israel’s government, advocating a boycott of Israeli products, and targeting Jewish-owned businesses in an American city. When such activity is accompanied by antisemitic insults and references to a historical pogrom against Jews, it can no longer be dismissed as ordinary political expression.

Lawful demonstrations and freedom of expression are essential democratic rights. But those rights do not provide immunity for threats, assault, or intimidation. Philadelphia police reported approximately 300 anti-Israel demonstrators and 200 counterprotesters. Three individuals were arrested, including one on an assault charge. Nevertheless, the incident raises serious questions about whether Jewish citizens are receiving the same protection from intimidation and hostility that should be afforded to every other community.

The danger is that the normalization of such conduct will encourage further intimidation, while the absence of effective deterrence may convince those responsible that they can continue without meaningful consequences.

When does anti-Zionism become antisemitism? The answer becomes increasingly apparent when Jews are singled out, threatened, or treated as legitimate targets because of their connection to Israel. The distinction between opposing a government’s policies and directing hostility toward an entire religious or ethnic community must not be allowed to disappear.

The political implications are becoming clearer.

The developments in Washington provide a broader context for what is happening on American streets.

New Jersey Congressman-elect Adam Hamawy, for example, refused to characterize Iran as an American adversary when questioned during a CNN interview. He suggested that the United States had pushed Iran into a confrontation and that both countries should step back, adding: “We’re making adversaries when we should be making friends.”

There is nothing inherently objectionable about advocating diplomacy. But responsible diplomacy requires acknowledging the nature and history of the other party. Iran’s decades of hostility toward the United States, its support for terrorist organizations, and its attacks against American interests cannot simply be dismissed as consequences of American policy.

A recent Buckley Institute survey of 803 American undergraduates found that 38% considered “Palestine” a better American ally than Israel, compared with 25% who selected Israel. Another 37% were undecided. The survey also found that 22% agreed with the statement, “America deserved September 11th.” These findings should not be interpreted as representing all American university students, but they are nevertheless deeply troubling and should be a cause for concern for every American.

This concern extends beyond the immediate political influence of these students. Attitudes developing on university campuses today may become the prevailing assumptions of tomorrow’s political leadership.

That possibility is already becoming apparent. House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries has called for a major overhaul of American policy toward Israel, including reconsideration of the existing military assistance framework.

This moves the debate beyond criticism of particular Israeli military operations or disagreements with Netanyahu’s government. It challenges the institutional foundations of American-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation. Israel has legitimate reason to be concerned when opposition to a particular government’s policies begins translating into efforts to dismantle longstanding strategic arrangements.

The security consequences are no longer abstract.

The Iranian threat is not directed exclusively at Israel. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth are among senior Trump administration officials reportedly residing at protected military installations or government accommodations because of security concerns. Other senior officials have also reportedly relocated following threats.

Although the circumstances differ and not every relocation has been attributed to Iran, these developments illustrate the increasingly serious security environment confronting American officials.

The Iranian regime’s threats against American personnel and officials are a reminder that Tehran’s activities are not exclusively an Israeli concern. The United States has its own security interests at stake. American political leaders must decide whether they will recognize this shared threat or allow domestic political divisions to obscure it.

A contrast that should not be overlooked…

Amid these developments, Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten has offered a strikingly different example. He announced that he had installed a mezuzah on the doorpost of his home as a gesture of solidarity with the Jewish community amid rising antisemitism in the Netherlands.

Speaking at a Kristallnacht commemoration at Amsterdam’s Portuguese Synagogue, he urged Jewish citizens not to abandon their country because of threats to their safety, declaring: “This is your home. The Netherlands is our shared home.”

His gesture recognizes an important truth: antisemitism is not simply a disagreement over Israel’s policies. It threatens the safety, dignity, and rightful place of Jewish citizens within their own countries. Jewish people should not have to conceal their identity, avoid their businesses, or fear public demonstrations because of their connection to Israel.

The same principle must apply in America and throughout the democratic world.

Israel’s contribution to the world

There is another reality that deserves recognition. While Israel is frequently portrayed internationally through the lens of conflict, its contributions to science, medicine, technology, and human welfare continue to benefit the international community.

A recent example is an experimental blood test developed by researchers at the Weizmann Institute of Science and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The research, published in Nature, reportedly detected early-stage breast cancer with 95% accuracy in the study population. Although further research and clinical validation are necessary, the findings are promising.

This is not an argument that scientific achievements should exempt Israel from criticism. Rather, it illustrates the contrast between the contributions Israel makes to the world and the increasingly hostile political environment in which those contributions are frequently overlooked.

Israel could choose to restrict the benefits of its scientific achievements to its own population. Instead, it continues to contribute to the welfare of people throughout the world, including in countries whose political establishments are often among its harshest critics.

Who is celebrating the changing political landscape?

Perhaps the most revealing reaction to the election results has come from Israel’s enemies themselves.

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem openly celebrated the political setbacks suffered by Trump and Netanyahu. Referring to the American election results, he declared: “Today, we have a good opportunity. Trump was defeated in the elections.” He added: “Donald Trump’s project was defeated, and Benjamin Netanyahu is broken.” Qassem viewed the results as an opportunity for Iran and its regional allies to resist American pressure and undermine efforts to confront Tehran and disarm Hezbollah.

These remarks should not be dismissed. Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed terrorist organization with a direct interest in weakening both countries’ ability to confront Iran and its regional network. Its celebration does not establish that the American-Israeli alliance is collapsing, but it demonstrates that those committed to Israel’s destruction believe the changing political environment offers them an advantage.

While Washington and Jerusalem debate the future direction of their relationship, Tehran and Hezbollah are already calculating how they can benefit from the divisions.

The handwriting on the wall…

The developments following the elections should be viewed as a test of the American-Israeli alliance, but the implications extend considerably further. The relationship between the two countries is being challenged by disagreements over Iran, growing opposition to military cooperation, and political movements increasingly willing to question Israel’s legitimacy and its right to defend itself.

Yet perhaps the greatest danger is not any single political disagreement. It is the growing willingness of individuals, organizations, public officials, and ordinary citizens to accept accusations against Israel, Jews, and Zionism without demanding evidence or examining the facts.

History is being distorted, and in some instances deliberately rewritten. The Holocaust is denied or minimized. Israel is accused of virtually every evil imaginable, often without regard for the evidence, the actions of terrorist organizations, or the circumstances surrounding the conflict. Repeated allegations gradually become accepted as established facts, while those who question them are dismissed or attacked.

The familiar attitude of “I’ve made up my mind. Don’t confuse me with the facts!” is becoming increasingly apparent. We may dismiss such statements as stupidity, but Dietrich Bonhoeffer offered a far more sobering understanding: stupidity is not necessarily a lack of intelligence; it can be a surrender of it. His observations in Letters and Papers from Prison (1945) remain remarkably relevant. I encourage you to take a few minutes to listen to this discussion of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of why intelligent people become stupid.

The danger is not limited to Israel or the Jewish people. When public opinion abandons independent thought, when historical truth becomes subordinate to political narratives, and when accusations are accepted simply because they reinforce existing prejudices, the principles upon which democratic societies depend are placed at risk.

There is a responsibility that belongs to each of us. If something encountered on social media is offensive, speak out, but first consider what makes it offensive and why it matters. If public officials, whose positions and salaries are funded by the public, make egregious misrepresentations of facts, challenge them. If the preservation of historical truth matters, defend it openly. But do so without responding to offense with offense or allowing our own conduct to undermine the very principles we seek to protect. Our response must be firm, principled, and measured, even when confronting words and actions that are anything but.

The American-Israeli relationship has endured because it rests upon shared strategic interests, intelligence cooperation, technological development, democratic values, and the recognition that the security of the two countries is interconnected. Neither country can afford to assume that this relationship will sustain itself without continued commitment.

And neither can we afford to remain silent when antisemitism is normalized, historical truth is distorted, and unsubstantiated accusations are transformed into accepted public opinion.

The words attributed to Martin Niemöller remain a sobering warning:

“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out – because I was not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out – because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out – because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me – and there was no one left to speak for me.”

The elections have changed the political landscape. What follows will determine not only the future of the American-Israeli alliance, but also whether the principles of truth, freedom, security, and equal protection under the law will continue to be upheld.

Stand with Israel. Stand for historical truth. And, above all, do not surrender the responsibility to think critically, examine the facts, and speak out when truth is being sacrificed to prejudice.

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Shabbat Shalom!

Marvin

America at the Crossroads: What the 2026 Elections Mean for Israel – and What Israel Must Do Now

Shalom all,

The central warning that deserves our attention is no longer simply that Washington and Jerusalem may disagree over a particular Israeli government, military operation, or diplomatic decision. The more consequential question is whether a fundamental change in American political attitudes could eventually transform the United States’ relationship with Israel itself – from that of a strategic ally into one in which an American administration regards Israel as an adversary.

That possibility was raised starkly by American historian Victor Davis Hanson following the 2026 midterm elections. In an interview with The Daily Signal, Hanson said that he could envision a time when Israel might become an enemy of the United States, at least in the eyes of a future administration. He also warned that antisemitism had become increasingly influential within the Democratic Party. His language was deliberately provocative, and his sweeping characterization of the entire party should not be accepted as an established fact. Nevertheless, the underlying concern deserves serious attention: anti-Israel and, in some instances, explicitly antisemitic rhetoric is gaining greater acceptance in politically influential sections of American public life.

The danger is not that every Democrat opposes Israel, or that criticism of an Israeli government is inherently antisemitic. It is that a political movement can gradually move from criticizing particular Israeli policies to questioning Israel’s legitimacy, its right to defend itself, and ultimately the legitimacy of the Jewish state as such. When that distinction disappears, the consequences extend far beyond a disagreement over policy. They reach the foundations of the alliance on which Israel has relied for generations.

The 2026 elections should therefore be understood not as an isolated political setback or victory, but as a warning about the direction of American politics, the future of bipartisan support for Israel, and the need for Israel to prepare for a substantially different strategic environment.

The midterm result: A political earthquake, but not yet a change of American foreign policy

The immediate political implications are substantial. The November 3 elections gave Democrats control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the first time during President Donald Trump’s current presidency that Republicans will face a Congress controlled by the opposing party. According to Reuters’ election report , Democrats secured at least 54 Senate seats and gained at least 30 seats in the House, with a small number of races still unresolved when the results were reported. The election was driven in large part by voter dissatisfaction with the economy, the cost of living, tariffs, and the consequences of the war with Iran. It was also a rejection of the President’s leadership and policies.

For Israel, however, the significance lies not merely in the change of congressional control, but in the political forces that have gained influence within the Democratic Party and the policy positions they are bringing into the national debate. A Democratic Congress can investigate the administration, scrutinize military assistance to Israel, hold hearings, place pressure on nominees, and use its control of legislation and appropriations to challenge the administration’s policies. It cannot, by itself, dictate the President’s foreign policy or override a presidential veto without the necessary supermajorities. The distinction is important: the new Congress does not automatically make the United States an adversary of Israel. It does, however, create a powerful institutional platform from which pressure on the relationship can be intensified.

The Reuters analysis of the election’s implications for Israel describes the result as potentially prompting the most significant reassessment of American support for Israel in decades. It notes that several newly elected progressive lawmakers oppose military aid to Israel and that younger voters have become increasingly critical of Washington’s support. Democrats are also expected to scrutinize American assistance, Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank, and the administration’s handling of the conflict with Iran.

This is not a development that began on election night. In July 2026, the House of Representatives defeated an amendment that would have cut off military aid to Israel, but the vote exposed a remarkable change within the Democratic caucus: 103 Democrats supported the measure, together with one Republican. The amendment was defeated 314 to 104, and Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries opposed it as too broad. Nevertheless, the number of Democratic representatives prepared to support ending aid to Israel would have been almost unimaginable in earlier years. The Reuters report on that vote documented a growing division between progressive Democrats seeking to end military assistance and moderates who continue to support at least defensive aid.

That division is now one of the central political questions confronting Israel. The Democratic Party is not uniformly anti-Israel. Indeed, moderate Democrats and several prominent Jewish and pro-Israel elected officials also won important victories in the midterms. The Times of Israel, in its analysis, “We are just getting started”: Midterm blowout normalizes anti-zionism in Democratic politics, points out that moderates such as Hakeem Jeffries, Ritchie Torres, Gregory Meeks, Josh Shapiro and Jon Ossoff remain influential. They outnumber the party’s most radical members. Yet the same analysis warns that the electoral success of the party’s more radical wing is likely to pull the Democratic debate further toward anti-Israel positions.

The danger, therefore, is not that every Democrat has abandoned Israel. It is that the political cost of taking an openly hostile position toward Israel is diminishing in important constituencies, while the electoral rewards for doing so may be increasing. A party can retain a moderate majority and still find its policy agenda increasingly shaped by a smaller, more vocal, and more ideologically committed faction. This is particularly true when that faction is successful in primaries, mobilizes younger voters, dominates parts of the media conversation, and makes support for Israel a test of political loyalty.

From criticism of Israeli policy to rejection of Israel itself

There is a distinction that must be maintained in any serious discussion of this subject. Criticism of an Israeli government, its military decisions, settlement policy, or conduct in a particular conflict is not automatically antisemitic. Democratic societies must permit vigorous criticism of governments, including the government of Israel. Nor should every person who supports national aspirations for those wanting to be called “Palestinians” be treated as hostile to Jews or to Israel.

The concern arises when criticism crosses into a different category: denying the Jewish people the right to national self-determination; treating the existence of the State of Israel as inherently illegitimate; applying standards to Israel that are not applied to other states; holding Jewish communities collectively responsible for Israeli government decisions; excusing or glorifying violence against Israeli civilians; or portraying the Jewish state as uniquely evil and therefore undeserving of the protections afforded to other nations.

These are not merely disagreements over the conduct of a particular war. They challenge the legitimacy of Israel itself. And when such positions become normalized in political institutions, the distinction between opposing a government and opposing the country’s existence becomes increasingly difficult to preserve.

Hanson’s warning should be understood in this context, rather than accepted wholesale. His assertion that the entire Democratic Party is infected with antisemitism is too sweeping. It overlooks Democrats who have consistently supported Israel and who oppose antisemitism. It also risks weakening the argument by treating a diverse political party as though it were a single ideological entity. The more defensible and more serious argument is that antisemitic rhetoric and forms of anti-Zionism are becoming increasingly acceptable within significant and influential parts of the party, and that traditional pro-Israel voices are facing greater difficulty in containing that trend.

The issue is not confined to the Democratic Party. There are also voices on the American right who have embraced isolationism, questioned the value of American alliances, or promoted conspiratorial rhetoric about Israel and Jewish influence. The future of American support for Israel cannot safely be measured by party labels alone. Israel must recognize that its traditional supporters in both parties may face challenges from different political directions.

This is one reason the midterm results should be viewed as a warning to Israel rather than as an invitation to align itself more closely with one American party against the other. A relationship dependent on the electoral fortunes of a single party, a single President, or a particular political faction is inherently vulnerable.

The Hanson warning: Hamas, the Houthis, Iran, and the consequences of a different administration

Hanson’s most alarming prediction is that a future Democratic administration could restore funding to Hamas, remove the terrorist designation from the Houthis, and align American policy more closely with forces hostile to Israel. These statements are predictions about what Hanson fears could happen under a future administration, not descriptions of current American policy or proof that the Democratic Party has adopted such a program.

The distinction concerning Hamas is especially important. The United States designates Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization, and federal law prohibits knowingly providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The relevant provision, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2339B, makes such support a federal crime. It would therefore be misleading to suggest that ordinary American humanitarian assistance to Gazan civilians is the same thing as direct funding of Hamas.

The real concern is the possibility that a future administration could reverse policies designed to prevent Hamas from benefiting from aid, weaken restrictions on entities and channels connected to it, or adopt an approach to Gaza that effectively restores Hamas’s political and operational influence. Humanitarian assistance to civilians is necessary and legitimate. But the method of delivering that assistance, the entities controlling its distribution, and the safeguards against diversion are matters of direct Israeli security concern. Any American policy that ignores Hamas’s capacity to exploit civilian institutions and aid networks would create a serious danger.

The same caution applies to the Houthis. Removing or restoring a terrorist designation is a policy decision that can have legal and financial consequences. It should not be confused with a claim that every administration that considers a different designation is necessarily supporting terrorism. Nevertheless, if Washington were to weaken pressure on an armed organization that attacks international shipping, threatens Israel, and operates as part of Iran’s regional network, the consequences would extend well beyond a diplomatic disagreement.

Hanson’s discussion of Iran is equally significant. In his October 29 interview with The Daily Signal, he argued that the United States, Israel, and regional partners should consider further action against Iran’s military and industrial infrastructure, including the deeply protected facility known as Pickaxe Mountain. He also advocated stronger economic pressure, restrictions on Iran’s ability to export oil, support for opposition groups within Iran, and protection of maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. He suggested that a sustained campaign could weaken the regime and potentially create conditions for its collapse.

In the Hebrew article published by Maariv and circulated through MSN, Hanson also urged a decisive strike against the Iranian nuclear threat rather than repeated cycles of negotiation followed by limited military action. The facility he identified was Pickaxe Mountain, not Fordow. His proposed approach is his own strategic assessment; it should not be mistaken for an established American or Israeli plan. Nor should the possibility of regime collapse be presented as a predictable result of military action. Such a strategy would carry substantial military, diplomatic, economic, and regional risks.

Nevertheless, the larger point is unmistakable. Iran is not simply another foreign-policy issue for Israel. It is the principal state sponsor of an interconnected network of armed organizations that threaten Israel and regional stability. A fundamental change in Washington’s approach to Tehran could therefore alter Israel’s security environment in ways that no amount of diplomatic reassurance could easily offset.

The question Israel must ask is not whether every American administration will agree with every Israeli decision. That has never been realistic. The question is whether the United States will continue to recognize that Iran’s regional ambitions, its support for armed proxies, and its pursuit of strategic military capabilities constitute a threat to American as well as Israeli interests. If that shared understanding erodes, the alliance itself will be placed under pressure.

Political Islam and the danger of confusing an ideology with a population

The growing influence of political Islam in American political life must also be addressed, but it must be done carefully and with factual discipline. The issue is not the presence of Muslim citizens in American society, their participation in elections, their right to hold office, or their freedom to express religious and political views. Those are ordinary features of a democratic society. Muslim Americans are not a single political bloc, and they should not be treated as though they share one ideology or one position toward Israel.

The distinction that matters is between Muslims as individuals and communities, on the one hand, and Islamist political movements, on the other. Political Islam, or Islamism, describes a range of movements that seek to organize political power and public life according to particular interpretations of Islam. These movements differ considerably. Some participate in democratic institutions while pursuing religiously based political goals; others reject pluralism, seek to subordinate civil law to religious authority, or endorse violence. Hamas itself emerged from the “Palestinian” branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. That historical connection is relevant when examining the ideology and political objectives of specific organizations, but it does not justify treating all Muslims, or all Muslim political participation, as an extension of Hamas or the Brotherhood.

The Pew Research Center’s 2025 analysis of Muslim Americans’ political attitudes illustrates why generalizations are inappropriate. It found that Muslim Americans hold a range of views and do not consistently align with either major party. The same research notes that Muslims constitute slightly more than one percent of the American adult population, although their political influence can be more significant in areas where they are concentrated. Pew’s earlier survey of Muslim American view of the Israel-Hamas war found strong sympathy for Gazans and substantial opposition to American military aid to Israel, but it also found that a majority of respondents held an unfavorable view of Hamas. These findings should be read for what they show – not converted into claims about a uniform political or religious agenda.

The relevant concern is the possibility of political convergence between different movements that do not necessarily share the same ultimate objectives. Progressive activists may oppose Israel because of their ideological views on colonialism, race, nationalism, or American foreign policy. Islamist movements may oppose Israel for religious, ideological, or regional political reasons. Some Muslim voters may oppose Israeli military policy because of humanitarian concerns or identification with so-called “Palestinians”. These motivations are not interchangeable. Yet they can sometimes produce the same political result: pressure to end military assistance, isolate Israel diplomatically, or deny it the freedom to defend itself.

That convergence deserves scrutiny, particularly when organizations or political figures advocate policies that would weaken Israel while expressing support for movements that reject Israel’s existence or endorse violence. The appropriate response is to identify the organizations, statements, financial relationships, and political objectives involved, and to establish the evidence in each case. It is not to make unsupported allegations against Muslim Americans as a whole.

Israel and its supporters should insist on this distinction. It is both morally necessary and strategically wise. An argument against political extremism loses credibility when it appears to condemn an entire religious population. The objective must be to expose and challenge extremist ideology, not to undermine the democratic rights of American citizens.

The local political arena is no longer peripheral

The national debate is only one part of the problem. Local politics can shape the environment in which Jewish communities live and in which future national leaders develop their political identities. Mayors, city councils, school boards, university trustees, state legislators, and local party organizations can adopt resolutions, divestment measures, procurement restrictions, and public policies that single out Israel. They can also influence the treatment of Jewish students, the security of synagogues and community institutions, and the public legitimacy given to anti-Israel campaigns.

Local political movements should not be dismissed as irrelevant simply because they do not immediately change federal policy. Local officials can become governors, members of Congress, senators, or presidential contenders. Campaigns that begin with municipal resolutions can develop into statewide party platforms. Political language once confined to activist circles can become acceptable in mainstream political debate through repetition and electoral success.

The election of prominent progressive candidates and the growing influence of anti-Zionist activists should therefore be examined not only for their immediate legislative consequences, but also for what they indicate about the future leadership of the Democratic Party. The question is not simply who won a particular seat. It is what political ideas are being rewarded, what rhetoric is being normalized, and which positions are becoming prerequisites for electoral success in particular constituencies.

Israel must pay attention to these developments before they reach Washington in the form of legislation, funding restrictions, or foreign-policy decisions. It also needs to maintain direct relationships with local Jewish communities, state and municipal leaders, universities, and civic organizations. A strategy that focuses exclusively on the White House and Congress will miss much of the political environment in which American attitudes toward Israel are being shaped.

Israel’s own political crossroads

The American midterm elections are taking place at almost exactly the same time as Israel’s own political upheaval. Israel’s October 27 election did not produce a clear parliamentary majority for either principal bloc. According to the Congressional Research Service’s October 30 analysis of Israel’s 2026 election, Likud won the largest number of seats, with 27, but the bloc aligned with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured only 53 seats. The opposing bloc, led by Gadi Eisenkot, won 48, while Arab-led parties secured the remaining seats. Neither side had an obvious path to a majority government. After the heads of the different political parties met with Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog during the last two days, he will make a decision as to who will be given the first option to establish a coalition government. With most of the political party mandates favoring Eisenkot, it is reasonable to presume that the responsibility to establish a government will be given to him. But then, Israeli politics being unpredictable, the first choice might be given to Netanyahu. In any event, we will know soon enough.

The failure of the election to produce a decisive result creates uncertainty over Israel’s political direction at a moment when its relationship with Washington is under growing pressure. A new government could create an opportunity to repair relations with moderate Democrats, strengthen bipartisan support, and address some of the policies that have become sources of friction with American and European partners. The CRS analysis notes that a change in government could affect Israeli policy toward the West Bank, the judicial system, and the formation of a broader governing coalition. It also points out that Eisenkot has not proposed abandoning Israel’s security objectives or accepting the establishment of a “Palestinian” state under his leadership.

The possibility of a change in government should not, however, be treated as a solution to the deeper problem. If opposition to Israel is rooted in disagreement with Netanyahu, a different prime minister and a different governing coalition may reduce tensions. But if the opposition is rooted in rejection of Zionism, Jewish national self-determination, or Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state, a change of government will not satisfy it. Israel must be able to distinguish between legitimate criticism that can be addressed through policy and ideological hostility that will remain regardless of who occupies the prime minister’s office.

At the same time, Israel cannot ignore the consequences of its own conduct and political decisions. Its security needs are real, and no Israeli government can be expected to compromise the country’s survival to satisfy foreign opinion. But that does not mean that every policy is beyond review or that diplomatic consequences can be disregarded. Policies that alienate potential allies, weaken international support, or provide avoidable opportunities for hostile campaigns should be examined honestly. A government that is serious about preserving the American alliance must understand that security policy and diplomacy are not competing obligations; they are mutually reinforcing elements of national security.

There is also a danger in turning the American political debate into an Israeli partisan issue. Israeli leaders must not identify the future of the country with the electoral fortunes of Republicans, Democrats, Trump, or any prospective 2028 presidential candidate. The United States is Israel’s most important strategic partner, but American politics is changing. Israel must be prepared to work with whichever administration the American people elect.

Why the alliance still matters – and why it cannot be taken for granted

The strategic relationship between the United States and Israel has never rested solely on shared sentiment or religious and historical affinity. It has been built on shared security interests, intelligence cooperation, technological development, military capabilities, and a common interest in confronting threats to regional stability.

The Congressional Research Service’s report, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023, explains that American assistance reflects longstanding domestic support, shared strategic objectives, and historical ties. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding provides for $38 billion in military assistance over the ten fiscal years from 2019 through 2028, subject to congressional appropriations. That assistance includes funding for military procurement and missile-defense programs.

This relationship benefits both countries. Israel provides intelligence, technological innovation, military experience, and a capable regional partner. The United States benefits from cooperation with a democratic state that has demonstrated its ability to defend itself and to confront threats that also endanger American personnel and interests. Iran’s support for armed organizations, its attacks on regional partners, and its threats to international shipping are not exclusively Israeli concerns.

Hanson’s own earlier argument for supporting Israel, in The Strategic Case for Supporting Israel, makes this point: American support for Israel is not simply an act of generosity. It serves American strategic interests. That argument needs to be communicated far more effectively in the United States, particularly to younger Americans who may have little knowledge of the history of the alliance, the threats Israel faces, or the role Israel plays in the regional balance of power.

But the scale of American assistance also exposes Israel’s vulnerability. A country that relies heavily on another government’s political willingness to provide military supplies, replenish stockpiles, and support it in international institutions cannot assume that this support will remain unchanged forever. The possibility of restrictions, conditions, delays, or political pressure must be incorporated into Israel’s long-term security planning.

The objective should not be to weaken the American alliance or to suggest that Israel can simply replace it. It should be to preserve the alliance while reducing the degree to which Israel’s essential security capabilities depend on the decisions of any single administration. Domestic defense production, strategic stockpiles, research and development, and diversified international partnerships must become even more important.

What Israel must do now

Israel’s response MUST BE strategic, sustained, and bipartisan. It cannot be limited to public statements issued during a crisis or to diplomatic visits when a disagreement with Washington becomes acute. The relationship requires continuous investment, particularly at a time when American political attitudes are changing.

First, Israel must rebuild and strengthen its relationships across the American political spectrum. That means maintaining close ties with Republicans while making a determined effort to engage moderate Democrats, Democratic governors, senators, representatives, mayors, and emerging political leaders. Israel must not allow itself to become identified with one party or one faction. Its case should be presented as a national-security argument that transcends party politics: Israel is a democratic ally confronting common threats, and its security contributes to American security.

Second, Israel and its supporters must become much more effective in explaining the nature of the threats it faces. Public diplomacy cannot consist merely of responding to the latest accusation or defending the latest military operation. It must explain the history of the conflict, the objectives of Iran and its regional proxies, the nature of Hamas, the threats posed by Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the consequences for the United States and its allies if these organizations are allowed to operate without effective restraint. It must also acknowledge civilian suffering, explain the legal and operational challenges of fighting armed organizations embedded in civilian areas, and respond to legitimate criticism with credible facts rather than slogans.

Third, Israel must develop a professional and evidence-based effort to monitor antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and political extremism in American institutions. That effort should document specific statements, policies, organizational affiliations, funding arrangements, and political campaigns. It should distinguish between legitimate criticism, discriminatory rhetoric, and support for violence. It should not rely on broad accusations or attempt to label every critic of Israel an antisemite. Credibility is essential. The stronger the evidence, the more difficult it becomes for political leaders and institutions to dismiss legitimate concerns.

Fourth, Israel must pay much greater attention to local and state politics. It should work with Jewish communities, campus organizations, churches, civic groups, and local elected officials to challenge discriminatory initiatives and to promote informed discussion. It should not wait until an anti-Israel resolution becomes a national controversy or until a local political figure has developed into a national leader. The political environment is shaped at every level, and Israel’s engagement must reflect that reality.

Fifth, Israel should strengthen its relationships with American Jewish communities and evangelical Christian supporters, while recognizing that neither group is politically or ideologically uniform. Jewish communities must not be treated as a political instrument of the Israeli government. Their concerns, disagreements, and security needs deserve serious attention. Evangelical support is also important, but Israel should not assume that it can rely indefinitely on any single religious or political constituency. The broader objective must be to cultivate support based on shared democratic values, historical understanding, and strategic interests.

Sixth, Israel must prepare now for the 2028 presidential election. It should understand the foreign-policy positions of prospective candidates, their advisers, their congressional supporters, and the political coalitions that may bring them to power. The 2026 midterms have demonstrated that positions once considered marginal can acquire influence rapidly. Waiting until a presidential campaign is underway would be too late. Israel needs to engage early, present its strategic case, and ensure that the consequences of a fundamental change in American policy are understood by those who may soon be making it.

Finally, Israel must strengthen its own capacity to act independently. That means investing in domestic defense production, maintaining adequate stockpiles of ammunition and essential military equipment, expanding technological cooperation with reliable partners, and diversifying strategic relationships with countries such as India and moderate Arab states. The Abraham Accords and other regional partnerships should be treated as strategic assets, not merely diplomatic achievements. Israel should preserve and expand those relationships wherever its security interests permit.

None of these measures requires Israel to abandon its principles or to compromise its security. They require the opposite: a recognition that national independence is strengthened when a country has reliable allies but is not wholly dependent on their continued political goodwill.

The lesson of 2026: Israel must prepare for an America that may be different

The most important lesson of the 2026 elections is that Israel can no longer assume that the bipartisan political consensus that sustained the American alliance for decades will remain intact without deliberate effort. The election has given Democrats control of Congress, but it has also revealed a deeper shift in the political environment. The growing influence of anti-Israel voices, the normalization of increasingly radical rhetoric, and the emergence of new political coalitions may shape the direction of American policy well beyond the current Congress.

Hanson’s warning that a future American administration might regard Israel as an enemy is not a prediction that should be accepted as inevitable. It is a scenario that Israel must take seriously enough to prepare against. The immediate congressional consequences of the midterms are constrained by the President’s veto power and the division of authority in the American system. The more consequential question is what may happen after the 2028 presidential election, particularly if the political forces that gained momentum in 2026 succeed in securing control of the White House as well as Congress.

From a Biblical point of view, Israel’s security is dependent upon the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. From a human point of view, the United States remains indispensable to Israel’s security. Neither one of those relationships should be taken for granted. Israel must be prepared to defend its interests in Washington, in state capitals, in universities, in the media, and among the American public. It must also be willing to examine its own policies honestly, correct avoidable mistakes, and distinguish between disagreements that can be resolved through diplomacy and ideological hostility that cannot.

The simultaneous political changes in Washington and Jerusalem present both a danger and an opportunity. A new Israeli government may be able to rebuild relationships and restore confidence among American constituencies that have become increasingly alienated. But no Israeli government can assume that changing the prime minister will resolve opposition rooted in rejection of the Jewish state’s legitimacy. Nor can Israel afford to rely on the assumption that a future American administration will always share its understanding of the threats posed by Iran and its allies.

Israel must therefore pursue two objectives at the same time: preserve and strengthen its strategic alliance with the United States and become more capable of protecting its national interests if that alliance is weakened or subjected to political conditions. It must speak to both American parties, invest in public understanding, confront extremism with facts, and reduce vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a hostile administration.

The relationship between the United States and Israel has endured because it has served the interests of both countries. It must continue to do so. But enduring alliances are not sustained by history alone. They require leadership, political engagement, strategic clarity, and a willingness to prepare for changing circumstances.

Israel must recognize that it cannot choose who governs America, but it can determine how prepared it will be for the consequences of changing American politics. It must strengthen its defenses, preserve its independence, cultivate relationships across the American political spectrum, and never take the support of any administration for granted.

The United States, for its part, must recognize that its relationship with Israel is not merely a matter of political convenience or the temporary preferences of an elected government. It is a friendship grounded in shared values, mutual security, historical ties, and a commitment to stand with an ally whose survival and freedom are continually challenged. America must decide whether it will remain faithful to that friendship, or allow short-term political considerations to undermine a partnership that has served both nations and contributed to regional stability.

The biblical principle underlying that relationship is expressed in God’s promise to Abraham: “I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse; and in you all the families of the earth will be blessed” (Genesis 12:3). That promise speaks not only of blessing, but also of the profound responsibility that accompanies how nations treat the people through whom God declared His purposes. And the enduring principle of friendship and loyalty is captured in Proverbs 17:17: “A friend loves at all times, and a brother is born for adversity”. May Israel prove steadfast in its friendship with the United States, and may America remain steadfast in its friendship with Israel – not merely when that friendship is politically convenient, but especially when it is tested.

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing. Shabbat Shalom!

Marvin

Israel at the Crossroads: An Election About More Than Netanyahu

Shalom all,

Israel enters the final days before its October 27 election with an extraordinary contradiction. After three years of war, regional confrontation and national trauma, Israelis are being asked to make a political decision about the country’s future while many of the questions that ought to define that future remain unresolved. Who is responsible for October 7? What does victory in Gaza mean? How should Israel deal with Iran and Hezbollah? Can the country remain both Jewish and democratic while its Jewish and Arab citizens become increasingly estranged?

And, perhaps most immediately, can any political leader assemble a government capable of governing?

The election is therefore not simply a contest between Benjamin Netanyahu and his opponents. It is a referendum on responsibility, security, the character of the State of Israel and the political system that Israelis want to emerge from the wreckage of the past three years.

The political map is unusually fluid. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party continue to campaign on the familiar combination of national security, a strong Jewish-national identity and the argument that Israel needs experienced leadership in an exceptionally dangerous region. Netanyahu insists that his government has demonstrated Israel’s ability to confront Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran and that Israel must not gamble with its survival. This week he specifically rejected speculation that he intends to launch another preemptive attack on Iran before the election, while warning that Israel would respond forcefully to any Iranian or proxy attack.

His opponents, however, argue that the central issue is precisely Netanyahu’s record of leadership. They point to October 7, the absence of a state commission of inquiry, the continuing political influence of the ultra-Orthodox parties and the growing power of the far right. For them, the election is an opportunity to replace what they describe as a government of division with a government of “repair and reconstruction.”

The principal challenger is former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and his Yashar (“Direct”) party. Eisenkot has emerged as the strongest individual challenger in many polls, presenting himself as a security-minded alternative who can restore public trust without abandoning Israel’s military strength. His message is deliberately not one of a traditional Israeli “peace camp.”  Indeed, most of the principal opposition leaders remain firmly within the Zionist security consensus and do not advocate the immediate creation of a Palestinian state. Their argument is rather that Israel can be equally determined about its security while changing the way the country is governed and the way it conducts itself internationally.

Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad (“Together”) party represents another important strand of the opposition: economically reformist, security-minded and generally right of centre, but opposed to the present political arrangement. Bennett has emphasized reducing the cost of living, breaking monopolies, streamlining government and expanding military service. His party also supports civil marriage and changes to the existing arrangements with the ultra-Orthodox. Bennett has made three particularly significant demands for any future government: a state commission of inquiry into October 7, universal military enlistment and a constitution for Israel.

Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel Our Home”) party occupies a distinctly hawkish and secular position. He supports, among other things, a strong national-security posture and universal military service, but is deeply hostile to the political power of the ultra-Orthodox parties. His refusal to support a government dependent upon the Arab parties is particularly significant because it could make the arithmetic of a post-election coalition much more difficult.

Yair Golan’s Democrats party represent the clearest ideological break with the Netanyahu government. The party places democracy, judicial independence, separation of religion and state, civil marriage and institutional accountability at the centre of its programme. It opposes annexation of Judea and Samaria (what is referred to as “the West Bank” [of the Jordan River]), supports a more diplomatic approach to the “Palestinian” issue and, significantly, is the only major opposition party openly prepared to contemplate the participation of an Arab party in a governing coalition.

Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) party remains a centrist, secular and liberal alternative, while also opposing Netanyahu’s return to power. Together, Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan and Liberman have publicly pledged to cooperate in an effort to establish what they call a Zionist, statesmanlike government devoted to “repair and reconstruction.” They have promised not to attack one another during the campaign and to establish joint working groups on such issues as ultra-Orthodox enlistment and the creation of a state commission of inquiry into October 7. This promise had a short life, as Liberman took a stand against Eisenkot. The attack followed Liberman’s declaration Thursday that if the opposition fails to obtain a majority vote, he would not support a minority government that would allow the Likud to become a coalition partner, even temporarily, but without Netanyahu – an option floated by Eisenkot.

Yet there is an even greater weakness in this apparent unity: they have not agreed who should actually lead the country.

That may become the election’s central problem. Israel’s proportional electoral system means that winning the largest number of seats does not automatically make a party’s leader prime minister. A government requires the support of at least 61 of the 120 members of the Knesset. Current polling suggests that neither the Netanyahu camp nor the opposition has a guaranteed path to that number. Israel could therefore emerge from October 27 with a clear electoral winner but without a clear government.

Another potentially important player is former IDF Brigadier General Ofer Winter and his new Amcha Yisrael (“Your People, Israel”) party. Winter, a highly decorated combat commander and former commander of the Givati Brigade and Fire Formation, has positioned Amcha Yisrael as a broad, national movement rather than a sectoral religious party. The slate combines a strongly security-oriented outlook with an attempt to appeal beyond the religious-Zionist constituency, most notably through the inclusion of Arab-Israeli public figure Yoseph Haddad in the number-two position. Winter has called for a broad right-wing government and has taken a particularly hard line on Gaza, including support for what he describes as voluntary emigration of Gazans.

The party’s immediate challenge, however, is crossing the electoral threshold. Its entry into the Knesset could materially affect the coalition arithmetic on the right. If it does cross the threshold, Amcha Yisrael could potentially become a natural partner in a Netanyahu-led government, although Winter’s insistence on his own political red lines could make coalition negotiations less straightforward than simply assuming that his seats would automatically join the Likud bloc. At the same time, the campaign surrounding Haddad illustrates the increasingly personal and sometimes vicious nature of this election. He is a journalist and activist who advocates for Israel on social media and international speaking tours. He served as a Commander of the elite Golani Brigade of the IDF and was seriously injured during a fierce battle during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Haddad has been subjected to attacks and attempts to undermine his reputation precisely because of his prominent position on the Amcha Yisrael list and his role as an Arab-Israeli advocate for Israel. Whatever one’s political view of Haddad or Winter, the effort to discredit Haddad raises a broader question: is Israel prepared to recognize an Arab-Israeli patriot as a legitimate participant in a predominantly Jewish political movement, or will political opponents attempt to turn his identity itself into a weapon? That question gives Amcha Yisrael an importance disproportionate to its current polling numbers.

And this brings us to the most uncomfortable question in this election: the Arab vote.

Arab citizens constitute roughly one-fifth of Israel’s population, and the Arab parties could hold the balance of power in a closely divided Knesset. Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am (an acronym for “Reshima Aravit Meuhedet” – “United Arab List”) is particularly important. Abbas has condemned the October 7 attack, has concentrated heavily on crime and socioeconomic issues affecting Arab communities and has previously demonstrated that an Arab party can participate pragmatically in an Israeli governing coalition. Yet Netanyahu and virtually all of his principal opposition rivals have said they will not include an Arab-led party in a coalition.

This creates an extraordinary political paradox. The Arab parties may be sufficiently strong to determine who can form a government, while the principal Jewish parties insist that they will not permit them actually to be part of that government. That position may be politically understandable in the aftermath of October 7 and amid continuing security concerns. The issue is made more sensitive by what happened earlier in the campaign. The Central Elections Committee voted to disqualify Ra’am and the Joint List from participating in the election, but the Supreme Court subsequently overturned those disqualifications. The episode exposed just how politically charged the electoral process has become. The argument is no longer merely about policies; it is increasingly about who is regarded as legitimately entitled to participate in Israel’s democracy.

There is another problem. Israel is attempting to conduct a national election while still living under extraordinary security conditions. Authorities are preparing polling stations for possible missile attacks, sirens and other emergencies, including plans involving shelters and potentially extended voting hours. Postponing an election would itself require an extraordinary parliamentary threshold. At the same time, Israeli security officials are preparing for possible attacks and foreign interference directed at the electoral process.

The security situation remains inseparable from the politics. Gaza is no longer experiencing the same level of fighting that characterized the height of the war, but the conflict is not simply over. The implementation of the American-sponsored Gaza framework remains incomplete, with the disarmament of Hamas, Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction unresolved. The West Bank remains volatile, with continuing settler violence and Palestinian attacks adding another layer of insecurity. Hezbollah remains a threat in Lebanon, while Iran and its regional proxies remain the strategic threat most capable of transforming Israel’s political debate overnight. Interestingly, the players in this scenario are expecting surprise attacks from other players and are preparing accordingly. May it be that we are never again surprised by any action or intention of our enemies.

Indeed, Netanyahu’s opponents have accused him of potentially seeking an “October surprise” – a dramatic military action before the election that could transform the political environment. Netanyahu has denied that he wants a pre-election attack on Iran. The very fact that such speculation has become part of the election campaign illustrates how deeply security and politics have become intertwined.

Perhaps nowhere is this intertwining more evident than in the extraordinary legal battle now unfolding between Netanyahu and his former security establishment.

Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar filed a NIS 3 million defamation lawsuit against Netanyahu this week. Bar alleges that Netanyahu has attempted to rewrite the history of October 7 by shifting responsibility for the security failures onto the Shin Bet and its leadership. The lawsuit details warnings that Bar says were conveyed to Netanyahu’s office before the attack and alleges that the prime minister disregarded or failed to act upon them. Netanyahu rejects those allegations and has argued that Bar himself could have contacted him directly.

The lawsuit is significant not merely because of the money involved. It is effectively a courtroom extension of the national argument over October 7: who knew what, when did they know it, who warned whom, and who ultimately bears responsibility?

Netanyahu remains the only senior political figure from the pre-October 7 leadership who remains prime minister. He has resisted establishing a state commission of inquiry, arguing that the traditional mechanism would not command public confidence. His opponents see that refusal as an attempt to avoid personal accountability. The Bar lawsuit therefore arrives at precisely the moment when Israelis are being asked to decide whether the political leadership that presided over the greatest security catastrophe in the country’s history should be entrusted with another term.

This election is consequently about much more than Netanyahu’s political survival.

It is about whether Israelis believe that security is best protected by continuity or by change; whether military strength can coexist with institutional restraint; whether a Jewish state can maintain a genuinely democratic political system when almost 20 percent of its citizens are viewed by much of the political establishment as unacceptable coalition partners; whether the ultra-Orthodox can continue to receive exemptions from military service while the burden of prolonged warfare falls disproportionately upon others; and whether Israel can restore relations with allies without compromising its security.

The opposition has an opportunity, but it also faces a warning. It is relatively easy to campaign against Netanyahu. It is considerably harder to construct a coherent government from parties that range from the secular right through the centre to the Zionist left. The differences over Arab participation, religion and state, the Palestinians, the judiciary and the premiership itself are not cosmetic differences. They could destroy an opposition coalition before it begins.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, faces his own paradox. His political strength has always rested on the proposition that when Israelis are afraid, they turn to him. Yet the defining question of this election is whether October 7 permanently reversed that equation. For some Israelis, the attack proves that only a leader with Netanyahu’s experience and determination can protect the country. For others, it proves the opposite: that the man who was in charge when the catastrophe occurred should not be the man entrusted to prevent the next one.

The answer will be delivered on October 27. But even then, Israel may not immediately know what the answer means. If neither bloc reaches 61 seats, the Arab parties could become kingmakers. If the major Jewish parties refuse to cooperate with them, Israel could face another prolonged period of coalition negotiations – or another election. If a government is eventually formed, it will inherit a country still carrying the physical and psychological scars of October 7, a fragile situation in Gaza, an unresolved confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah, deepening Jewish-Arab tensions, a bitter dispute over judicial and governmental authority, and a public increasingly impatient for accountability.

Israel therefore approaches this election not simply as a country choosing a government, but as a country asking itself what kind of country it wants to be after October 7.

The most important ballot may not be the one that determines who wins the most seats. It may be the one that determines whether Israel can once again translate an election victory into a government capable of governing – and whether that government can restore the one commodity that neither military power nor political rhetoric can manufacture: public trust.

Do not trust in princes, in mortal man, in whom there is no salvation. His spirit departs, he returns to the earth; In that very day his thoughts perish. How blessed is he whose help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the LORD his God. (Psalm 146:3-5)

Trust in the LORD with all your heart, and do not lean on your own understanding. (Proverbs 3:5)

Have a great week. Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Marvin

Israel’s Eighth Front – The War For Truth

Shalom all,

Two days ago, 24 September 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly. The full text of his speech was reported by Jerusalem News Syndicate, among others.

The speech is best understood as three speeches delivered simultaneously: (1) a defense of Israel’s military conduct and national legitimacy; (2) an indictment of Iran, Hamas, Qatar, Turkey and what Netanyahu portrayed as Western double standards; and (3) a deliberately national, Jewish and civilizational message aimed at an Israeli and Jewish audience as much as at the UN.

1. The central message of the speech: Netanyahu presented the current conflict not simply as the Gaza war, but as a much broader struggle involving Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and other regional actors, antisemitism, terrorism and what he called the battle over information and truth. The transcript of the speech shows several recurring themes: Israel’s right and obligation to defend itself; the October 7th attack as the starting point for the present war; Iran as a strategic and potentially existential threat; the IDF as an army whose conduct Netanyahu defended as exceptionally moral; rejection of allegations that Israel is committing genocide; criticism of Qatar for its relationship with Hamas and its influence through media and educational institutions; criticism of Turkey and President Erdoğan; criticism of European governments and Western political leaders; criticism of New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani; praise for U.S. President Donald Trump; and an appeal to Jewish historical continuity and Israel’s connection to the biblical land.

One particularly significant feature is that Netanyahu did not present himself as seeking the UN’s approval. His rhetorical posture was essentially: Israel will defend itself whether the international community approves or not. That explains both the enthusiastic reaction among his supporters and the exceptionally hostile reaction among his opponents. It took guts to stand up and look the world in the face and say, “We will do what we need to do, whether you approve of it or not.”

2. The walkout – a major visual success and a major diplomatic liability: The most powerful image generated by the speech was actually produced before Netanyahu began to speak. Numerous delegations left the chamber as he approached the podium. Reporting differs somewhat regarding the precise number and composition of the departing delegations, but the walkout was unquestionably substantial. One media outlet described the event as a large diplomatic walkout, while other reports put the number of participating delegations considerably higher. Supporters interpreted the scene as demonstrating the UN’s hostility toward Israel. Critics interpreted precisely the same scene as evidence of Israel’s international isolation. That distinction is important.

Politically, the walkout accomplished two different things simultaneously:
For Netanyahu’s domestic audience, it provided a dramatic illustration of his argument that Israel is confronting an international system that has become hostile to it. His response to those leaving reinforced that narrative, as did his words: “Before I begin, just a quick announcement: If there are any other moral cowards who haven’t yet left this hall – please do so now. Thank you very much.” This is one of those statements that do not require a lot of explanation.

For Israel’s diplomatic position:
It also created a very powerful image of Israel standing virtually alone while large numbers of representatives departed, evidencing increasingly severe international criticism of Israel over Gaza. Without doubt, the speech was delivered amid growing international isolation. But Netanyahu used the occasion to attack European governments, Qatar, Turkey and Mamdani. So the walkout cannot objectively be classified as either simply a “victory” or simply a “defeat.” Its political meaning depended heavily upon the audience.

3. What Netanyahu did particularly effectively: The Times of Israel referred to Netanyahu’s speech as “fiery”. This description can easily be understood when recognizing that he seized control of the narrative. Netanyahu refused to spend the entire speech answering accusations against Israel. Instead, he attempted to reverse the prosecutorial relationship: Israel is not the defendant; the organizations and governments attacking Israel should themselves be questioned. This was one of the speech’s clearest strategic characteristics.

Rather than allowing the discussion to remain exclusively about Gaza, he moved the discussion toward: Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Qatar; Turkey; antisemitism, European policy, Western double standards and the security of Israel and the wider West.

Reuters described the address as a forceful defense of Israel’s regional military actions. That is important because agenda-setting is itself a diplomatic objective. Even an adversarial audience can be forced to discuss the subjects introduced by the speaker.

4. The “war for truth” was arguably the speech’s most important conceptual contribution: Netanyahu’s discussion of an information/influence battlefield deserves particular attention. Essentially, he argued that Israel is fighting simultaneously on: the physical battlefield; the diplomatic battlefield; the legal battlefield, and the information battlefield. Military power alone cannot determine the ultimate outcome, because Israel is also engaged in a struggle over how the conflict is interpreted. But, as the Prime Minister stated in his remarks to New York’s Mayor Zohran Mamdani: “You can’t silence the truth.”

5. Qatar and Turkey: a significant part of the speech: Rather than presenting a conventional diplomatic program, Netanyahu devoted considerable attention to Qatar and Turkey. He emphasized that the modern conflict is not fought solely with tanks, aircraft, missiles and soldiers. It is also fought through image, social media, financial support, journalism, universities, international organizations, diplomatic networks, political narratives, legal proceedings and, significantly, public opinion. This is a strategically important expansion of the definition of the battlefield.

The Jerusalem Post reported that Netanyahu specifically accused Qatar of supporting influence operations and criticized Turkey and Erdoğan over their relationship with Hamas and their rhetoric concerning Israel.

But there was an interesting Israeli criticism of Netanyahu here. Former prime minister Naftali Bennett argued that Netanyahu did not go far enough against Qatar, because he stopped short of formally designating Qatar an enemy despite accusing it of supporting Hamas and disseminating anti-Israel messaging. That criticism is revealing. It demonstrates that Netanyahu’s speech was not necessarily viewed as sufficiently aggressive even by some Israeli critics of his government.

6. The IDF argument: Netanyahu made the moral conduct of the IDF one of the speech’s central defenses. His argument was essentially: Israel is fighting an extraordinarily difficult enemy in an environment in which Hamas operates among civilians, while Israel attempts to maintain humanitarian standards. Thus, he rejected the proposition that civilian suffering in Gaza demonstrates an Israeli intention to destroy the Arab population there. That is a crucial distinction in the speech: civilian casualties in not automatic proof of genocidal intent. However, this is precisely where the speech encountered its strongest international opposition.

The above article from The Times of Israel noted that Netanyahu strongly rejected the genocide allegation while defending the IDF but also observed that he gave relatively little attention to certain issues, including settler violence. As expected, the opposite interpretation posited by anti-Israel media characterized the speech as a defense of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and emphasized continuing international isolation. The important point here is, therefore:
Netanyahu successfully articulated Israel’s legal/moral defense, but the speech did not resolve the underlying international dispute over the claims raised concerning Israel’s response to the October 7th onslaught, death, destruction, and kidnapping by Hamas. It was an argument, and a good one, but not an adjudication.

7. The speech’s strongest emotional dimension: Jewish historical continuity – Most conventional news reporting tends to miss that Netanyahu’s references to David, Solomon, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jerusalem and the biblical connection to the Land of Israel were not merely historical references, but constituted the theological foundation of Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel.

That is a different proposition from saying: “Israel has a historical claim.” Netanyahu’s references essentially contended that Jewish sovereignty has a purpose beyond physical survival. The inclusion of historical, Biblical personalities gives Israel a mission involving: justice, morality, human dignity, responsibility, courage, holiness and the transformation of power into something ethically constructive. It is an important supplement to Netanyahu’s speech because the Prime Minister’s address was overwhelmingly defensive and military.

But, understanding the Biblical references begs the question: What is Israel ultimately defending itself for? This is substantially more profound than simply asking how Israel defeats Hamas or Iran.

8. The Sukkot imagery in the article: The opening Sukkot metaphor is theological rather than political. The article contrasts: permanent buildings and physical security with the temporary sukkah and divine protection. Its underlying message is that Jewish security cannot ultimately be reduced to: military superiority, intelligence, concrete walls, technology and international alliances. Those things are necessary, but they are not regarded as the ultimate source of Jewish existence.

From a theological framework, the Sukkah, or Booth, represents the proposition that Israel’s survival ultimately rests on God, rather than merely on military capability. Thus, in effect, while Netanyahu said that Israel will defend itself, the larger, philosophical issue is that Israel must understand why it exists and what its power is supposed to accomplish. This could have been expanded upon, even if briefly.

9. Netanyahu’s reference to the Netanel Shukrun episode: His reference to Netanel Shukrun was not merely rhetorical. The basic event is independently reported: Shukrun, a French Israeli, father of six from Alei Zahav, was killed in a shooting at a natural spring near Neve Tzuf on September 20, shortly before Yom HaKippurim. He had gone there with his eldest son to immerse before the holiday. His son survived, and accounts from the funeral describe Shukrun warning his son about the attacker. That event served to provide the speech with a human-scale example of the security dilemma Netanyahu described at the UN.

10. Positive reactions and results: There are several identifiable positive effects – Strong domestic reception; strong support among Netanyahu’s coalition; He put Israel’s security concerns back at the center of the discussion; the speech reinforced the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship; the speech was memorable.

11. But there were also significant negative reactions and consequences: The diplomatic walkout became the dominant visual. This is probably the single greatest problem. Instead of the world’s media showing a united diplomatic audience listening to Israel’s case, many viewers saw delegates leaving. That gave Israel’s opponents an extraordinarily useful image.

Netanyahu intended the walkout to demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of his opponents. But his opponents used the same walkout to demonstrate Israel’s international isolation. Both narratives were generated by the same event.

12. International condemnations: As expected, there were objections to Netanyahu’s accusations by Qatar, Turkey, Zohran Mamdani, the leadership of the “Palestinian” Authority and the international media.

13. One particularly important criticism: what Netanyahu did NOT say: This may be more important analytically than some of what he said. The Times of Israel pointed out several omissions: no new Iranian intelligence despite expectations; little discussion of Saudi Arabia; no major new diplomatic initiative; little emphasis on expanding the Abraham Accords; and relatively little discussion of what comes after the current wars.

This is important because the speech was overwhelmingly defensive and confrontational. It explained: Why Israel is right. It was less developed on: What Israel wants the Middle East and international system to look like after the war.

14. The most important strategic deficiency in Netanyahu’s speech: The speech successfully answered: “Why should Israel continue fighting?” However, it was much less successful at answering: “What is Israel fighting toward?” That distinction is crucial.

A state cannot indefinitely define itself through its enemies. Iran cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. Hamas cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. October 7th cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. Nor can international hostility.

A more ambitious Israeli message might have been: We possess the power to defend ourselves because we have returned to sovereignty; but sovereignty carries obligations. Jewish power exists not merely to prevent Jewish death but to enable Jewish life, justice, creativity, responsibility and moral leadership.

15. Does the speech strengthen or damage Israel’s international position? The evidence points in different directions depending upon the measure being used.
Communication to Israel and Israel’s supporters: Clearly strengthened.
Communication to sympathetic governments: Potentially strengthened.
Persuasion of governments already critical of Israel: Limited.
Israel’s broader international image: Mixed to negative.
Domestic political impact: Potentially significant.

The speech was broadcast prominently in Israel and clearly resonated with Netanyahu’s supporters. Contemporary Israeli commentary nevertheless questioned whether it provided enough of a vision for the country’s future. 

16. Overall assessment: I would characterize Netanyahu’s UN address as a highly effective, defensive political speech, but a less developed strategic vision for Israel’s future.

Its greatest strengths were: clarity: Israel’s position was unmistakable; confidence: Netanyahu refused to speak as though Israel required permission to exist or defend itself; agenda-setting: Iran, Hamas, Qatar, Turkey and antisemitism were placed prominently into the international conversation; historical continuity: Israel was presented as the continuation of an ancient Jewish national story; domestic mobilization: supporters received a forceful articulation of their worldview; memorability: the walkout, pager and Starlink imagery created substantial media attention.

Its principal weaknesses were: the walkout became a symbol of international isolation; the rhetoric was too confrontational and left little room for persuasion of undecided audiences; the Gaza humanitarian and legal criticisms were answered largely through denial and counterargument, rather than through a detailed positive humanitarian program; the speech offered little concrete vision of the postwar regional order; it did not sufficiently explain what Israel wants to build, as opposed to what Israel wants to defeat.

17. When the dust settles, the speech can be understood to convey: “Israel will not surrender.” Israel’s military strength exists to protect Jewish sovereignty. Jewish sovereignty exists to enable Jewish life. Jewish life, according to the biblical conception, carries obligations toward justice, human dignity and moral responsibility. Therefore, Israel must defeat terrorism without defining itself by hatred, defend itself without abandoning morality, and exercise power without allowing power itself to become the national purpose.

The challenge for Israel is therefore to move from a narrative of “Israel versus the world” to a narrative of “Israel defending itself while contributing something morally constructive to the world.” And so we press on.

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Marvin
© 26.09.2026
If you have any thoughts about this post, please comment, I’d be happy to hear from you.

“Winter is Coming!”

Shalom all,

For almost three years, Israel has been fighting a war – or, more accurately, a series of interconnected wars – across multiple fronts. The country has demonstrated repeatedly that it can mobilize, absorb enormous pressure, sustain military operations and strike at threats far beyond its immediate borders. But military capacity is not the same thing as strategy.

The question increasingly confronting Israel is what happens when the fighting stops – when the intensity of fighting eventually declines. What political and security architecture will be left behind? That question has now entered the election campaign in a particularly direct way, through the emergence of Ofer Winter.

From the battlefield to the ballot box: Winter is not an outsider parachuting into Israeli politics. He is a retired IDF Brigadier General and former commander of the elitie Givati Brigade, a highly visible figure within Israel’s religious-nationalist camp. On August 25th, he formally launched Amcha Yisrael – “People of Israel”, a new right-wing party ahead of the October 27 Knesset election. His timing is significant.

Even before formally launching the party, Winter had been arguing that Israel’s three years of war had produced major military achievements, but had failed to deliver a decisive result. His proposed alternative was a shift from what he describes as reactive “rounds” and containment toward initiative, decisiveness and victory. That message is remarkably well suited to the political mood of the moment.

Winter is essentially arguing that Israelis will not accept a return to the political assumptions (“conceptzia”=political/military perspective and misunderstanding) that existed before October 7th. His party combines a hawkish security doctrine with an appeal to national cohesion. At the launch, he called for a tougher approach to Israel’s enemies, advocated what he calls voluntary emigration from Gaza, demanded broader Haredi participation in military service, and presented a slate that deliberately crossed some of Israel’s conventional political boundaries. 

His candidates are taken from diverse backgrounds and include, among others: Arab-Israeli public-diplomacy activist Yoseph Haddad, former Jerusalem deputy mayor Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, reservists, bereaved relatives, as well as representatives of communities affected by October 7th and figures from professional and civil society backgrounds. That combination is not accidental.

Winter is not presenting himself simply as another figure on the far right. His pitch is more ambitious: Israel can become more uncompromising toward its enemies while becoming less divided internally. That is potentially a powerful political proposition. It is also what makes the party more interesting than its initial number of Knesset seats might suggest.

Winter’s challenge to Netanyahu comes from inside the security camp: For years, Benjamin Netanyahu’s strongest political argument has been that Israel’s security requires experienced leadership – and that changing governments amid a prolonged regional conflict entails unacceptable risk.

Winter complicates that argument because he comes from the military establishment himself.

His implicit question is not whether Israel should be tougher. It is whether Israel can achieve better results with a different political leadership and a different security doctrine. That distinction matters.

Winter’s criticism is directed not only at the opposition. It is also directed at the governing system that, in his view, has failed to convert military power into decisive strategic outcomes.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted almost immediately to Winter’s entry, warning that the proliferation of small nationalist parties could fragment the right-wing vote and prevent the right from forming a government. The concern is hardly theoretical. Polls published since Winter’s launch have produced radically different pictures of his strength. One Haaretz poll put the new party below the electoral threshold, while an i24NEWS survey gave it eight seats. Another Times of Israel poll put it at six, while a Maariv survey reported five. 

That volatility itself is significant. It means that nobody yet knows whether Amcha Yisrael is a serious emerging political force or an unusually successful launch that will fade as voters make their final calculations. But Winter has already accomplished something politically important: he has introduced a demand for change from within the nationalist-security camp rather than from Israel’s traditional opposition.

The Netanyahu paradox:  And then came the twist. On Thursday, August 27, Winter announced that if Amcha Yisrael enters the next Knesset, it will recommend Benjamin Netanyahu – and only Benjamin Netanyahu – for prime minister. “We are in the right-wing camp,” Winter said. “The leader of the right-wing camp is Netanyahu, and we will only recommend him.” 

At first glance, this appears to resolve Netanyahu’s problem.  If Winter is not trying to replace Netanyahu, why should Likud voters be afraid of him? But the announcement may actually create a more interesting political equation. Winter is attempting to say: We support Netanyahu for prime minister – but we do not work for Netanyahu. He simultaneously insists that his party will remain independent and that it will not “dance to anyone’s tune.” 

He is demanding Haredi enlistment “with or without” the Haredi political establishment and continues to advocate a substantially different approach to Gaza and national security. That is a very different proposition from joining Likud. The distinction could become central to Winter’s campaign. A right-wing voter dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s government can now tell himself that voting for Winter does not necessarily mean voting to replace Netanyahu. At the same time, that voter can use Winter’s party to register dissatisfaction with the existing government’s handling of security, Haredi enlistment, Gaza and the broader political system.

In other words, Winter is trying to make his party a pressure mechanism inside the right-wing camp.

That may prove more consequential than simply declaring himself Netanyahu’s opponent.

The Jerusalem Post has similarly noted the possibility that Winter could attract voters dissatisfied with the current right-wing government while also drawing support from voters who had considered or supported parties associated with Gadi Eisenkot and Avigdor Liberman. 

The Eisenkot confrontation is revealing. The emerging confrontation with former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot adds another dimension. Eisenkot was asked whether Winter could serve as defense minister in a government led by him. His answer was essentially no: He described Winter as a good field commander, but argued that Winter had not served at the strategic level of the military and had not held sufficiently senior positions. Winter responded sharply, rejecting the premise that Eisenkot’s approach represented the necessary standard for strategic leadership. 

The exchange is more than personal politics. It highlights a fundamental question that will probably follow Winter throughout the campaign: What kind of military experience qualifies someone to translate battlefield experience into national strategy?

Winter’s supporters see his operational experience as precisely what Israel needs after October 7th. His critics argue that commanding combat units is not the same thing as running national security policy. That debate is likely to become especially important if, as some reports suggest, Winter is positioning himself for the defense portfolio. 

The Haddad factor: The inclusion of Yoseph Haddad may be the most revealing element of Winter’s political project. Haddad is an Arab-Israeli activist who has become prominent internationally as a public advocate for Israel. He joined Winter as number two on the list and has said he wants to become Israel’s next public-diplomacy minister – and potentially the first Arab member of the security cabinet. This is an important political calculation.

Winter’s message is not simply “more force.” It is force combined with national cohesion and an assertive Israeli narrative abroad. That explains why the party has gone out of its way to emphasize its mixture of secular and religious Jews, immigrants, Arab citizens, reservists, bereaved families and residents of communities hit by October 7th. Whether this represents a genuinely broad national movement or simply a sophisticated way of packaging a strongly right-wing platform remains to be seen.

But the symbolism is unmistakable. Winter wants to define the political divide not as Jew versus Arab, or even simply right versus left, but as those who believe Israel must fundamentally change after October 7th versus those who believe the existing political system can continue. That is a much broader appeal.

What exactly does Winter want? This may be the most important unanswered question.

Is Winter trying to become another right-wing party? A future defense minister? The political home for disillusioned security voters? A mechanism for forcing the next Netanyahu government further to the right? Or the nucleus of a much larger post-Netanyahu political movement? There are indications of several of these ambitions simultaneously.

His party is clearly positioning itself to influence security policy. It advocates a more proactive military doctrine, rejects the creation of a “Palestinian” state, supports a radically different approach to Gaza, and calls for universalizing national service. It also speaks about judicial reform, crime and governance rather than limiting itself to foreign policy. 

And Winter’s language is deliberately about victory, not merely deterrence. That distinction deserves attention. Israel has spent decades developing a doctrine in which deterrence, containment and periodic military operations could coexist with the absence of a comprehensive political settlement. October 7th exposed the limitations of that model in its most devastating form.

Winter’s answer is essentially that Israel must regain the initiative. But initiative by itself is not a strategy. And victory is not an end state. 

The danger of confusing military success with strategic success: This brings us back to the larger question. Israel has demonstrated that it can fight. It can mobilize reserves. It can strike distant targets. It can defend its population. It can absorb extraordinary pressure and continue functioning.

The more difficult question is: What happens after the fighting? What replaces UNRWA, if anything? What replaces Hamas governance in Gaza? Who governs Gaza? What security arrangement will ultimately exist along Israel’s northern border? What happens in Lebanon if the Lebanese state remains unable—or unwilling—to fully control Hezbollah? What happens in Syria as its political order continues to evolve? What is Israel’s long-term policy in Judea and Samaria – the West Bank? How does Israel prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear, missile and regional infrastructure? And how does Israel preserve its indispensable relationship with Washington while maintaining the freedom of action it considers necessary for its security?

These questions are not independent. They are parts of one strategic problem: Israel has too many unresolved fronts.That statement should become more than a description of the problem. It should become a prescription for the next government.

Strategic closure: Israel’s first strategic priority should therefore be to establish an explicit hierarchy of objectives – and then finish what can actually be finished. That means distinguishing between existential threats, manageable security problems and political disputes that cannot be solved militarily.

Preventing another October 7th belongs in the first category. Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities belong there as well.

But not every unresolved political question can be settled through another military operation.

A strategy of permanent crisis management eventually becomes its own strategic failure. Israel needs to move toward strategic closure: defeat or contain immediate threats; establish who governs the territories in question; replace failed institutions where necessary; create enforceable security arrangements; and define what Israel is actually prepared to accept as an end state. That is the missing bridge between military power and national strategy.

And it is precisely here that Winter’s political emergence becomes interesting – even for people who have no intention of voting for him. Because Winter is forcing a question onto the political agenda that Israel’s established parties cannot easily avoid: What does “victory” actually mean?

The test for Netanyahu, Winter – and everyone else: The next election should, therefore, not be judged solely by the familiar question of who is right-wing and who is left-wing. It should be judged by something more demanding.

What is the government’s theory of the region? What does it intend to do with Gaza? What does it want the future of the West Bank to look like? How will it manage Lebanon? How will it deal with Iran? How will it rebuild deterrence without creating an endless cycle of escalation? How will it maintain American support? How will it address the enormous internal burden created by prolonged mobilization? And, ultimately, how does it intend to turn military power into a sustainable political order?

That should be the standard by which Netanyahu, Winter, Eisenkot and every other candidate are judged. Not who can promise the hardest response. Not who can produce the most dramatic military operation. Not who can identify the greatest number of enemies. But who has a credible plan for getting Israel from war to security – and from security to a sustainable political order. That is the priority Israel cannot afford to postpone. Because the greatest danger of having too many unresolved fronts is not that Israel will lose any one of them. 

Winter’s emergence does not answer that question. His party is far too new, and its policies are themselves controversial, for that. But he has changed the political conversation. He has taken the argument that Israel needs a fundamentally different security doctrine out of the military and into the electoral arena. He has combined it with demands for Haredi enlistment, national unity and a more assertive Israeli diplomatic effort. And, by pledging to recommend Netanyahu while remaining politically independent of him, he has created a potentially unusual role for his party: not an alternative government, but an alternative power center within the right.

Whether that becomes a significant political force will depend on whether Amcha Yisrael can turn attention into enough votes to survive the electoral threshold. But the underlying issue is larger than Ofer Winter. Israel could win every battle it fights this year and still find itself fighting the same battles five years from now.

That would not be strategic victory. It would simply be another round.

He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore. (Isaiah 2:4)

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing!

Have a safe, God-honoring week.

Marvin