Tag: zionism

Israel at the Crossroads: An Election About More Than Netanyahu

On By marvinskLeave a comment

Shalom all,

Israel enters the final days before its October 27 election with an extraordinary contradiction. After three years of war, regional confrontation and national trauma, Israelis are being asked to make a political decision about the country’s future while many of the questions that ought to define that future remain unresolved. Who is responsible for October 7? What does victory in Gaza mean? How should Israel deal with Iran and Hezbollah? Can the country remain both Jewish and democratic while its Jewish and Arab citizens become increasingly estranged?

And, perhaps most immediately, can any political leader assemble a government capable of governing?

The election is therefore not simply a contest between Benjamin Netanyahu and his opponents. It is a referendum on responsibility, security, the character of the State of Israel and the political system that Israelis want to emerge from the wreckage of the past three years.

The political map is unusually fluid. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party continue to campaign on the familiar combination of national security, a strong Jewish-national identity and the argument that Israel needs experienced leadership in an exceptionally dangerous region. Netanyahu insists that his government has demonstrated Israel’s ability to confront Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran and that Israel must not gamble with its survival. This week he specifically rejected speculation that he intends to launch another preemptive attack on Iran before the election, while warning that Israel would respond forcefully to any Iranian or proxy attack.

His opponents, however, argue that the central issue is precisely Netanyahu’s record of leadership. They point to October 7, the absence of a state commission of inquiry, the continuing political influence of the ultra-Orthodox parties and the growing power of the far right. For them, the election is an opportunity to replace what they describe as a government of division with a government of “repair and reconstruction.”

The principal challenger is former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and his Yashar (“Direct”) party. Eisenkot has emerged as the strongest individual challenger in many polls, presenting himself as a security-minded alternative who can restore public trust without abandoning Israel’s military strength. His message is deliberately not one of a traditional Israeli “peace camp.”  Indeed, most of the principal opposition leaders remain firmly within the Zionist security consensus and do not advocate the immediate creation of a Palestinian state. Their argument is rather that Israel can be equally determined about its security while changing the way the country is governed and the way it conducts itself internationally.

Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad (“Together”) party represents another important strand of the opposition: economically reformist, security-minded and generally right of centre, but opposed to the present political arrangement. Bennett has emphasized reducing the cost of living, breaking monopolies, streamlining government and expanding military service. His party also supports civil marriage and changes to the existing arrangements with the ultra-Orthodox. Bennett has made three particularly significant demands for any future government: a state commission of inquiry into October 7, universal military enlistment and a constitution for Israel.

Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel Our Home”) party occupies a distinctly hawkish and secular position. He supports, among other things, a strong national-security posture and universal military service, but is deeply hostile to the political power of the ultra-Orthodox parties. His refusal to support a government dependent upon the Arab parties is particularly significant because it could make the arithmetic of a post-election coalition much more difficult.

Yair Golan’s Democrats party represent the clearest ideological break with the Netanyahu government. The party places democracy, judicial independence, separation of religion and state, civil marriage and institutional accountability at the centre of its programme. It opposes annexation of Judea and Samaria (what is referred to as “the West Bank” [of the Jordan River]), supports a more diplomatic approach to the “Palestinian” issue and, significantly, is the only major opposition party openly prepared to contemplate the participation of an Arab party in a governing coalition.

Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”) party remains a centrist, secular and liberal alternative, while also opposing Netanyahu’s return to power. Together, Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan and Liberman have publicly pledged to cooperate in an effort to establish what they call a Zionist, statesmanlike government devoted to “repair and reconstruction.” They have promised not to attack one another during the campaign and to establish joint working groups on such issues as ultra-Orthodox enlistment and the creation of a state commission of inquiry into October 7. This promise had a short life, as Liberman took a stand against Eisenkot. The attack followed Liberman’s declaration Thursday that if the opposition fails to obtain a majority vote, he would not support a minority government that would allow the Likud to become a coalition partner, even temporarily, but without Netanyahu – an option floated by Eisenkot.

Yet there is an even greater weakness in this apparent unity: they have not agreed who should actually lead the country.

That may become the election’s central problem. Israel’s proportional electoral system means that winning the largest number of seats does not automatically make a party’s leader prime minister. A government requires the support of at least 61 of the 120 members of the Knesset. Current polling suggests that neither the Netanyahu camp nor the opposition has a guaranteed path to that number. Israel could therefore emerge from October 27 with a clear electoral winner but without a clear government.

Another potentially important player is former IDF Brigadier General Ofer Winter and his new Amcha Yisrael (“Your People, Israel”) party. Winter, a highly decorated combat commander and former commander of the Givati Brigade and Fire Formation, has positioned Amcha Yisrael as a broad, national movement rather than a sectoral religious party. The slate combines a strongly security-oriented outlook with an attempt to appeal beyond the religious-Zionist constituency, most notably through the inclusion of Arab-Israeli public figure Yoseph Haddad in the number-two position. Winter has called for a broad right-wing government and has taken a particularly hard line on Gaza, including support for what he describes as voluntary emigration of Gazans.

The party’s immediate challenge, however, is crossing the electoral threshold. Its entry into the Knesset could materially affect the coalition arithmetic on the right. If it does cross the threshold, Amcha Yisrael could potentially become a natural partner in a Netanyahu-led government, although Winter’s insistence on his own political red lines could make coalition negotiations less straightforward than simply assuming that his seats would automatically join the Likud bloc. At the same time, the campaign surrounding Haddad illustrates the increasingly personal and sometimes vicious nature of this election. He is a journalist and activist who advocates for Israel on social media and international speaking tours. He served as a Commander of the elite Golani Brigade of the IDF and was seriously injured during a fierce battle during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Haddad has been subjected to attacks and attempts to undermine his reputation precisely because of his prominent position on the Amcha Yisrael list and his role as an Arab-Israeli advocate for Israel. Whatever one’s political view of Haddad or Winter, the effort to discredit Haddad raises a broader question: is Israel prepared to recognize an Arab-Israeli patriot as a legitimate participant in a predominantly Jewish political movement, or will political opponents attempt to turn his identity itself into a weapon? That question gives Amcha Yisrael an importance disproportionate to its current polling numbers.

And this brings us to the most uncomfortable question in this election: the Arab vote.

Arab citizens constitute roughly one-fifth of Israel’s population, and the Arab parties could hold the balance of power in a closely divided Knesset. Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am (an acronym for “Reshima Aravit Meuhedet” – “United Arab List”) is particularly important. Abbas has condemned the October 7 attack, has concentrated heavily on crime and socioeconomic issues affecting Arab communities and has previously demonstrated that an Arab party can participate pragmatically in an Israeli governing coalition. Yet Netanyahu and virtually all of his principal opposition rivals have said they will not include an Arab-led party in a coalition.

This creates an extraordinary political paradox. The Arab parties may be sufficiently strong to determine who can form a government, while the principal Jewish parties insist that they will not permit them actually to be part of that government. That position may be politically understandable in the aftermath of October 7 and amid continuing security concerns. The issue is made more sensitive by what happened earlier in the campaign. The Central Elections Committee voted to disqualify Ra’am and the Joint List from participating in the election, but the Supreme Court subsequently overturned those disqualifications. The episode exposed just how politically charged the electoral process has become. The argument is no longer merely about policies; it is increasingly about who is regarded as legitimately entitled to participate in Israel’s democracy.

There is another problem. Israel is attempting to conduct a national election while still living under extraordinary security conditions. Authorities are preparing polling stations for possible missile attacks, sirens and other emergencies, including plans involving shelters and potentially extended voting hours. Postponing an election would itself require an extraordinary parliamentary threshold. At the same time, Israeli security officials are preparing for possible attacks and foreign interference directed at the electoral process.

The security situation remains inseparable from the politics. Gaza is no longer experiencing the same level of fighting that characterized the height of the war, but the conflict is not simply over. The implementation of the American-sponsored Gaza framework remains incomplete, with the disarmament of Hamas, Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction unresolved. The West Bank remains volatile, with continuing settler violence and Palestinian attacks adding another layer of insecurity. Hezbollah remains a threat in Lebanon, while Iran and its regional proxies remain the strategic threat most capable of transforming Israel’s political debate overnight. Interestingly, the players in this scenario are expecting surprise attacks from other players and are preparing accordingly. May it be that we are never again surprised by any action or intention of our enemies.

Indeed, Netanyahu’s opponents have accused him of potentially seeking an “October surprise” – a dramatic military action before the election that could transform the political environment. Netanyahu has denied that he wants a pre-election attack on Iran. The very fact that such speculation has become part of the election campaign illustrates how deeply security and politics have become intertwined.

Perhaps nowhere is this intertwining more evident than in the extraordinary legal battle now unfolding between Netanyahu and his former security establishment.

Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar filed a NIS 3 million defamation lawsuit against Netanyahu this week. Bar alleges that Netanyahu has attempted to rewrite the history of October 7 by shifting responsibility for the security failures onto the Shin Bet and its leadership. The lawsuit details warnings that Bar says were conveyed to Netanyahu’s office before the attack and alleges that the prime minister disregarded or failed to act upon them. Netanyahu rejects those allegations and has argued that Bar himself could have contacted him directly.

The lawsuit is significant not merely because of the money involved. It is effectively a courtroom extension of the national argument over October 7: who knew what, when did they know it, who warned whom, and who ultimately bears responsibility?

Netanyahu remains the only senior political figure from the pre-October 7 leadership who remains prime minister. He has resisted establishing a state commission of inquiry, arguing that the traditional mechanism would not command public confidence. His opponents see that refusal as an attempt to avoid personal accountability. The Bar lawsuit therefore arrives at precisely the moment when Israelis are being asked to decide whether the political leadership that presided over the greatest security catastrophe in the country’s history should be entrusted with another term.

This election is consequently about much more than Netanyahu’s political survival.

It is about whether Israelis believe that security is best protected by continuity or by change; whether military strength can coexist with institutional restraint; whether a Jewish state can maintain a genuinely democratic political system when almost 20 percent of its citizens are viewed by much of the political establishment as unacceptable coalition partners; whether the ultra-Orthodox can continue to receive exemptions from military service while the burden of prolonged warfare falls disproportionately upon others; and whether Israel can restore relations with allies without compromising its security.

The opposition has an opportunity, but it also faces a warning. It is relatively easy to campaign against Netanyahu. It is considerably harder to construct a coherent government from parties that range from the secular right through the centre to the Zionist left. The differences over Arab participation, religion and state, the Palestinians, the judiciary and the premiership itself are not cosmetic differences. They could destroy an opposition coalition before it begins.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, faces his own paradox. His political strength has always rested on the proposition that when Israelis are afraid, they turn to him. Yet the defining question of this election is whether October 7 permanently reversed that equation. For some Israelis, the attack proves that only a leader with Netanyahu’s experience and determination can protect the country. For others, it proves the opposite: that the man who was in charge when the catastrophe occurred should not be the man entrusted to prevent the next one.

The answer will be delivered on October 27. But even then, Israel may not immediately know what the answer means. If neither bloc reaches 61 seats, the Arab parties could become kingmakers. If the major Jewish parties refuse to cooperate with them, Israel could face another prolonged period of coalition negotiations – or another election. If a government is eventually formed, it will inherit a country still carrying the physical and psychological scars of October 7, a fragile situation in Gaza, an unresolved confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah, deepening Jewish-Arab tensions, a bitter dispute over judicial and governmental authority, and a public increasingly impatient for accountability.

Israel therefore approaches this election not simply as a country choosing a government, but as a country asking itself what kind of country it wants to be after October 7.

The most important ballot may not be the one that determines who wins the most seats. It may be the one that determines whether Israel can once again translate an election victory into a government capable of governing – and whether that government can restore the one commodity that neither military power nor political rhetoric can manufacture: public trust.

Do not trust in princes, in mortal man, in whom there is no salvation. His spirit departs, he returns to the earth; In that very day his thoughts perish. How blessed is he whose help is the God of Jacob, whose hope is in the LORD his God. (Psalm 146:3-5)

Trust in the LORD with all your heart, and do not lean on your own understanding. (Proverbs 3:5)

Have a great week. Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Marvin

Israel’s Eighth Front – The War For Truth

On By marvinskLeave a comment

Shalom all,

Two days ago, 24 September 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly. The full text of his speech was reported by Jerusalem News Syndicate, among others.

The speech is best understood as three speeches delivered simultaneously: (1) a defense of Israel’s military conduct and national legitimacy; (2) an indictment of Iran, Hamas, Qatar, Turkey and what Netanyahu portrayed as Western double standards; and (3) a deliberately national, Jewish and civilizational message aimed at an Israeli and Jewish audience as much as at the UN.

1. The central message of the speech: Netanyahu presented the current conflict not simply as the Gaza war, but as a much broader struggle involving Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and other regional actors, antisemitism, terrorism and what he called the battle over information and truth. The transcript of the speech shows several recurring themes: Israel’s right and obligation to defend itself; the October 7th attack as the starting point for the present war; Iran as a strategic and potentially existential threat; the IDF as an army whose conduct Netanyahu defended as exceptionally moral; rejection of allegations that Israel is committing genocide; criticism of Qatar for its relationship with Hamas and its influence through media and educational institutions; criticism of Turkey and President Erdoğan; criticism of European governments and Western political leaders; criticism of New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani; praise for U.S. President Donald Trump; and an appeal to Jewish historical continuity and Israel’s connection to the biblical land.

One particularly significant feature is that Netanyahu did not present himself as seeking the UN’s approval. His rhetorical posture was essentially: Israel will defend itself whether the international community approves or not. That explains both the enthusiastic reaction among his supporters and the exceptionally hostile reaction among his opponents. It took guts to stand up and look the world in the face and say, “We will do what we need to do, whether you approve of it or not.”

2. The walkout – a major visual success and a major diplomatic liability: The most powerful image generated by the speech was actually produced before Netanyahu began to speak. Numerous delegations left the chamber as he approached the podium. Reporting differs somewhat regarding the precise number and composition of the departing delegations, but the walkout was unquestionably substantial. One media outlet described the event as a large diplomatic walkout, while other reports put the number of participating delegations considerably higher. Supporters interpreted the scene as demonstrating the UN’s hostility toward Israel. Critics interpreted precisely the same scene as evidence of Israel’s international isolation. That distinction is important.

Politically, the walkout accomplished two different things simultaneously:
For Netanyahu’s domestic audience, it provided a dramatic illustration of his argument that Israel is confronting an international system that has become hostile to it. His response to those leaving reinforced that narrative, as did his words: “Before I begin, just a quick announcement: If there are any other moral cowards who haven’t yet left this hall – please do so now. Thank you very much.” This is one of those statements that do not require a lot of explanation.

For Israel’s diplomatic position:
It also created a very powerful image of Israel standing virtually alone while large numbers of representatives departed, evidencing increasingly severe international criticism of Israel over Gaza. Without doubt, the speech was delivered amid growing international isolation. But Netanyahu used the occasion to attack European governments, Qatar, Turkey and Mamdani. So the walkout cannot objectively be classified as either simply a “victory” or simply a “defeat.” Its political meaning depended heavily upon the audience.

3. What Netanyahu did particularly effectively: The Times of Israel referred to Netanyahu’s speech as “fiery”. This description can easily be understood when recognizing that he seized control of the narrative. Netanyahu refused to spend the entire speech answering accusations against Israel. Instead, he attempted to reverse the prosecutorial relationship: Israel is not the defendant; the organizations and governments attacking Israel should themselves be questioned. This was one of the speech’s clearest strategic characteristics.

Rather than allowing the discussion to remain exclusively about Gaza, he moved the discussion toward: Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Qatar; Turkey; antisemitism, European policy, Western double standards and the security of Israel and the wider West.

Reuters described the address as a forceful defense of Israel’s regional military actions. That is important because agenda-setting is itself a diplomatic objective. Even an adversarial audience can be forced to discuss the subjects introduced by the speaker.

4. The “war for truth” was arguably the speech’s most important conceptual contribution: Netanyahu’s discussion of an information/influence battlefield deserves particular attention. Essentially, he argued that Israel is fighting simultaneously on: the physical battlefield; the diplomatic battlefield; the legal battlefield, and the information battlefield. Military power alone cannot determine the ultimate outcome, because Israel is also engaged in a struggle over how the conflict is interpreted. But, as the Prime Minister stated in his remarks to New York’s Mayor Zohran Mamdani: “You can’t silence the truth.”

5. Qatar and Turkey: a significant part of the speech: Rather than presenting a conventional diplomatic program, Netanyahu devoted considerable attention to Qatar and Turkey. He emphasized that the modern conflict is not fought solely with tanks, aircraft, missiles and soldiers. It is also fought through image, social media, financial support, journalism, universities, international organizations, diplomatic networks, political narratives, legal proceedings and, significantly, public opinion. This is a strategically important expansion of the definition of the battlefield.

The Jerusalem Post reported that Netanyahu specifically accused Qatar of supporting influence operations and criticized Turkey and Erdoğan over their relationship with Hamas and their rhetoric concerning Israel.

But there was an interesting Israeli criticism of Netanyahu here. Former prime minister Naftali Bennett argued that Netanyahu did not go far enough against Qatar, because he stopped short of formally designating Qatar an enemy despite accusing it of supporting Hamas and disseminating anti-Israel messaging. That criticism is revealing. It demonstrates that Netanyahu’s speech was not necessarily viewed as sufficiently aggressive even by some Israeli critics of his government.

6. The IDF argument: Netanyahu made the moral conduct of the IDF one of the speech’s central defenses. His argument was essentially: Israel is fighting an extraordinarily difficult enemy in an environment in which Hamas operates among civilians, while Israel attempts to maintain humanitarian standards. Thus, he rejected the proposition that civilian suffering in Gaza demonstrates an Israeli intention to destroy the Arab population there. That is a crucial distinction in the speech: civilian casualties in not automatic proof of genocidal intent. However, this is precisely where the speech encountered its strongest international opposition.

The above article from The Times of Israel noted that Netanyahu strongly rejected the genocide allegation while defending the IDF but also observed that he gave relatively little attention to certain issues, including settler violence. As expected, the opposite interpretation posited by anti-Israel media characterized the speech as a defense of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and emphasized continuing international isolation. The important point here is, therefore:
Netanyahu successfully articulated Israel’s legal/moral defense, but the speech did not resolve the underlying international dispute over the claims raised concerning Israel’s response to the October 7th onslaught, death, destruction, and kidnapping by Hamas. It was an argument, and a good one, but not an adjudication.

7. The speech’s strongest emotional dimension: Jewish historical continuity – Most conventional news reporting tends to miss that Netanyahu’s references to David, Solomon, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jerusalem and the biblical connection to the Land of Israel were not merely historical references, but constituted the theological foundation of Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel.

That is a different proposition from saying: “Israel has a historical claim.” Netanyahu’s references essentially contended that Jewish sovereignty has a purpose beyond physical survival. The inclusion of historical, Biblical personalities gives Israel a mission involving: justice, morality, human dignity, responsibility, courage, holiness and the transformation of power into something ethically constructive. It is an important supplement to Netanyahu’s speech because the Prime Minister’s address was overwhelmingly defensive and military.

But, understanding the Biblical references begs the question: What is Israel ultimately defending itself for? This is substantially more profound than simply asking how Israel defeats Hamas or Iran.

8. The Sukkot imagery in the article: The opening Sukkot metaphor is theological rather than political. The article contrasts: permanent buildings and physical security with the temporary sukkah and divine protection. Its underlying message is that Jewish security cannot ultimately be reduced to: military superiority, intelligence, concrete walls, technology and international alliances. Those things are necessary, but they are not regarded as the ultimate source of Jewish existence.

From a theological framework, the Sukkah, or Booth, represents the proposition that Israel’s survival ultimately rests on God, rather than merely on military capability. Thus, in effect, while Netanyahu said that Israel will defend itself, the larger, philosophical issue is that Israel must understand why it exists and what its power is supposed to accomplish. This could have been expanded upon, even if briefly.

9. Netanyahu’s reference to the Netanel Shukrun episode: His reference to Netanel Shukrun was not merely rhetorical. The basic event is independently reported: Shukrun, a French Israeli, father of six from Alei Zahav, was killed in a shooting at a natural spring near Neve Tzuf on September 20, shortly before Yom HaKippurim. He had gone there with his eldest son to immerse before the holiday. His son survived, and accounts from the funeral describe Shukrun warning his son about the attacker. That event served to provide the speech with a human-scale example of the security dilemma Netanyahu described at the UN.

10. Positive reactions and results: There are several identifiable positive effects – Strong domestic reception; strong support among Netanyahu’s coalition; He put Israel’s security concerns back at the center of the discussion; the speech reinforced the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship; the speech was memorable.

11. But there were also significant negative reactions and consequences: The diplomatic walkout became the dominant visual. This is probably the single greatest problem. Instead of the world’s media showing a united diplomatic audience listening to Israel’s case, many viewers saw delegates leaving. That gave Israel’s opponents an extraordinarily useful image.

Netanyahu intended the walkout to demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of his opponents. But his opponents used the same walkout to demonstrate Israel’s international isolation. Both narratives were generated by the same event.

12. International condemnations: As expected, there were objections to Netanyahu’s accusations by Qatar, Turkey, Zohran Mamdani, the leadership of the “Palestinian” Authority and the international media.

13. One particularly important criticism: what Netanyahu did NOT say: This may be more important analytically than some of what he said. The Times of Israel pointed out several omissions: no new Iranian intelligence despite expectations; little discussion of Saudi Arabia; no major new diplomatic initiative; little emphasis on expanding the Abraham Accords; and relatively little discussion of what comes after the current wars.

This is important because the speech was overwhelmingly defensive and confrontational. It explained: Why Israel is right. It was less developed on: What Israel wants the Middle East and international system to look like after the war.

14. The most important strategic deficiency in Netanyahu’s speech: The speech successfully answered: “Why should Israel continue fighting?” However, it was much less successful at answering: “What is Israel fighting toward?” That distinction is crucial.

A state cannot indefinitely define itself through its enemies. Iran cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. Hamas cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. October 7th cannot be the permanent definition of Israel. Nor can international hostility.

A more ambitious Israeli message might have been: We possess the power to defend ourselves because we have returned to sovereignty; but sovereignty carries obligations. Jewish power exists not merely to prevent Jewish death but to enable Jewish life, justice, creativity, responsibility and moral leadership.

15. Does the speech strengthen or damage Israel’s international position? The evidence points in different directions depending upon the measure being used.
Communication to Israel and Israel’s supporters: Clearly strengthened.
Communication to sympathetic governments: Potentially strengthened.
Persuasion of governments already critical of Israel: Limited.
Israel’s broader international image: Mixed to negative.
Domestic political impact: Potentially significant.

The speech was broadcast prominently in Israel and clearly resonated with Netanyahu’s supporters. Contemporary Israeli commentary nevertheless questioned whether it provided enough of a vision for the country’s future. 

16. Overall assessment: I would characterize Netanyahu’s UN address as a highly effective, defensive political speech, but a less developed strategic vision for Israel’s future.

Its greatest strengths were: clarity: Israel’s position was unmistakable; confidence: Netanyahu refused to speak as though Israel required permission to exist or defend itself; agenda-setting: Iran, Hamas, Qatar, Turkey and antisemitism were placed prominently into the international conversation; historical continuity: Israel was presented as the continuation of an ancient Jewish national story; domestic mobilization: supporters received a forceful articulation of their worldview; memorability: the walkout, pager and Starlink imagery created substantial media attention.

Its principal weaknesses were: the walkout became a symbol of international isolation; the rhetoric was too confrontational and left little room for persuasion of undecided audiences; the Gaza humanitarian and legal criticisms were answered largely through denial and counterargument, rather than through a detailed positive humanitarian program; the speech offered little concrete vision of the postwar regional order; it did not sufficiently explain what Israel wants to build, as opposed to what Israel wants to defeat.

17. When the dust settles, the speech can be understood to convey: “Israel will not surrender.” Israel’s military strength exists to protect Jewish sovereignty. Jewish sovereignty exists to enable Jewish life. Jewish life, according to the biblical conception, carries obligations toward justice, human dignity and moral responsibility. Therefore, Israel must defeat terrorism without defining itself by hatred, defend itself without abandoning morality, and exercise power without allowing power itself to become the national purpose.

The challenge for Israel is therefore to move from a narrative of “Israel versus the world” to a narrative of “Israel defending itself while contributing something morally constructive to the world.” And so we press on.

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Marvin
© 26.09.2026
If you have any thoughts about this post, please comment, I’d be happy to hear from you.

“Winter is Coming!”

On By marvinsk1 Comment

Shalom all,

For almost three years, Israel has been fighting a war – or, more accurately, a series of interconnected wars – across multiple fronts. The country has demonstrated repeatedly that it can mobilize, absorb enormous pressure, sustain military operations and strike at threats far beyond its immediate borders. But military capacity is not the same thing as strategy.

The question increasingly confronting Israel is what happens when the fighting stops – when the intensity of fighting eventually declines. What political and security architecture will be left behind? That question has now entered the election campaign in a particularly direct way, through the emergence of Ofer Winter.

From the battlefield to the ballot box: Winter is not an outsider parachuting into Israeli politics. He is a retired IDF Brigadier General and former commander of the elitie Givati Brigade, a highly visible figure within Israel’s religious-nationalist camp. On August 25th, he formally launched Amcha Yisrael – “People of Israel”, a new right-wing party ahead of the October 27 Knesset election. His timing is significant.

Even before formally launching the party, Winter had been arguing that Israel’s three years of war had produced major military achievements, but had failed to deliver a decisive result. His proposed alternative was a shift from what he describes as reactive “rounds” and containment toward initiative, decisiveness and victory. That message is remarkably well suited to the political mood of the moment.

Winter is essentially arguing that Israelis will not accept a return to the political assumptions (“conceptzia”=political/military perspective and misunderstanding) that existed before October 7th. His party combines a hawkish security doctrine with an appeal to national cohesion. At the launch, he called for a tougher approach to Israel’s enemies, advocated what he calls voluntary emigration from Gaza, demanded broader Haredi participation in military service, and presented a slate that deliberately crossed some of Israel’s conventional political boundaries. 

His candidates are taken from diverse backgrounds and include, among others: Arab-Israeli public-diplomacy activist Yoseph Haddad, former Jerusalem deputy mayor Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, reservists, bereaved relatives, as well as representatives of communities affected by October 7th and figures from professional and civil society backgrounds. That combination is not accidental.

Winter is not presenting himself simply as another figure on the far right. His pitch is more ambitious: Israel can become more uncompromising toward its enemies while becoming less divided internally. That is potentially a powerful political proposition. It is also what makes the party more interesting than its initial number of Knesset seats might suggest.

Winter’s challenge to Netanyahu comes from inside the security camp: For years, Benjamin Netanyahu’s strongest political argument has been that Israel’s security requires experienced leadership – and that changing governments amid a prolonged regional conflict entails unacceptable risk.

Winter complicates that argument because he comes from the military establishment himself.

His implicit question is not whether Israel should be tougher. It is whether Israel can achieve better results with a different political leadership and a different security doctrine. That distinction matters.

Winter’s criticism is directed not only at the opposition. It is also directed at the governing system that, in his view, has failed to convert military power into decisive strategic outcomes.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted almost immediately to Winter’s entry, warning that the proliferation of small nationalist parties could fragment the right-wing vote and prevent the right from forming a government. The concern is hardly theoretical. Polls published since Winter’s launch have produced radically different pictures of his strength. One Haaretz poll put the new party below the electoral threshold, while an i24NEWS survey gave it eight seats. Another Times of Israel poll put it at six, while a Maariv survey reported five. 

That volatility itself is significant. It means that nobody yet knows whether Amcha Yisrael is a serious emerging political force or an unusually successful launch that will fade as voters make their final calculations. But Winter has already accomplished something politically important: he has introduced a demand for change from within the nationalist-security camp rather than from Israel’s traditional opposition.

The Netanyahu paradox:  And then came the twist. On Thursday, August 27, Winter announced that if Amcha Yisrael enters the next Knesset, it will recommend Benjamin Netanyahu – and only Benjamin Netanyahu – for prime minister. “We are in the right-wing camp,” Winter said. “The leader of the right-wing camp is Netanyahu, and we will only recommend him.” 

At first glance, this appears to resolve Netanyahu’s problem.  If Winter is not trying to replace Netanyahu, why should Likud voters be afraid of him? But the announcement may actually create a more interesting political equation. Winter is attempting to say: We support Netanyahu for prime minister – but we do not work for Netanyahu. He simultaneously insists that his party will remain independent and that it will not “dance to anyone’s tune.” 

He is demanding Haredi enlistment “with or without” the Haredi political establishment and continues to advocate a substantially different approach to Gaza and national security. That is a very different proposition from joining Likud. The distinction could become central to Winter’s campaign. A right-wing voter dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s government can now tell himself that voting for Winter does not necessarily mean voting to replace Netanyahu. At the same time, that voter can use Winter’s party to register dissatisfaction with the existing government’s handling of security, Haredi enlistment, Gaza and the broader political system.

In other words, Winter is trying to make his party a pressure mechanism inside the right-wing camp.

That may prove more consequential than simply declaring himself Netanyahu’s opponent.

The Jerusalem Post has similarly noted the possibility that Winter could attract voters dissatisfied with the current right-wing government while also drawing support from voters who had considered or supported parties associated with Gadi Eisenkot and Avigdor Liberman. 

The Eisenkot confrontation is revealing. The emerging confrontation with former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot adds another dimension. Eisenkot was asked whether Winter could serve as defense minister in a government led by him. His answer was essentially no: He described Winter as a good field commander, but argued that Winter had not served at the strategic level of the military and had not held sufficiently senior positions. Winter responded sharply, rejecting the premise that Eisenkot’s approach represented the necessary standard for strategic leadership. 

The exchange is more than personal politics. It highlights a fundamental question that will probably follow Winter throughout the campaign: What kind of military experience qualifies someone to translate battlefield experience into national strategy?

Winter’s supporters see his operational experience as precisely what Israel needs after October 7th. His critics argue that commanding combat units is not the same thing as running national security policy. That debate is likely to become especially important if, as some reports suggest, Winter is positioning himself for the defense portfolio. 

The Haddad factor: The inclusion of Yoseph Haddad may be the most revealing element of Winter’s political project. Haddad is an Arab-Israeli activist who has become prominent internationally as a public advocate for Israel. He joined Winter as number two on the list and has said he wants to become Israel’s next public-diplomacy minister – and potentially the first Arab member of the security cabinet. This is an important political calculation.

Winter’s message is not simply “more force.” It is force combined with national cohesion and an assertive Israeli narrative abroad. That explains why the party has gone out of its way to emphasize its mixture of secular and religious Jews, immigrants, Arab citizens, reservists, bereaved families and residents of communities hit by October 7th. Whether this represents a genuinely broad national movement or simply a sophisticated way of packaging a strongly right-wing platform remains to be seen.

But the symbolism is unmistakable. Winter wants to define the political divide not as Jew versus Arab, or even simply right versus left, but as those who believe Israel must fundamentally change after October 7th versus those who believe the existing political system can continue. That is a much broader appeal.

What exactly does Winter want? This may be the most important unanswered question.

Is Winter trying to become another right-wing party? A future defense minister? The political home for disillusioned security voters? A mechanism for forcing the next Netanyahu government further to the right? Or the nucleus of a much larger post-Netanyahu political movement? There are indications of several of these ambitions simultaneously.

His party is clearly positioning itself to influence security policy. It advocates a more proactive military doctrine, rejects the creation of a “Palestinian” state, supports a radically different approach to Gaza, and calls for universalizing national service. It also speaks about judicial reform, crime and governance rather than limiting itself to foreign policy. 

And Winter’s language is deliberately about victory, not merely deterrence. That distinction deserves attention. Israel has spent decades developing a doctrine in which deterrence, containment and periodic military operations could coexist with the absence of a comprehensive political settlement. October 7th exposed the limitations of that model in its most devastating form.

Winter’s answer is essentially that Israel must regain the initiative. But initiative by itself is not a strategy. And victory is not an end state. 

The danger of confusing military success with strategic success: This brings us back to the larger question. Israel has demonstrated that it can fight. It can mobilize reserves. It can strike distant targets. It can defend its population. It can absorb extraordinary pressure and continue functioning.

The more difficult question is: What happens after the fighting? What replaces UNRWA, if anything? What replaces Hamas governance in Gaza? Who governs Gaza? What security arrangement will ultimately exist along Israel’s northern border? What happens in Lebanon if the Lebanese state remains unable—or unwilling—to fully control Hezbollah? What happens in Syria as its political order continues to evolve? What is Israel’s long-term policy in Judea and Samaria – the West Bank? How does Israel prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear, missile and regional infrastructure? And how does Israel preserve its indispensable relationship with Washington while maintaining the freedom of action it considers necessary for its security?

These questions are not independent. They are parts of one strategic problem: Israel has too many unresolved fronts.That statement should become more than a description of the problem. It should become a prescription for the next government.

Strategic closure: Israel’s first strategic priority should therefore be to establish an explicit hierarchy of objectives – and then finish what can actually be finished. That means distinguishing between existential threats, manageable security problems and political disputes that cannot be solved militarily.

Preventing another October 7th belongs in the first category. Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities belong there as well.

But not every unresolved political question can be settled through another military operation.

A strategy of permanent crisis management eventually becomes its own strategic failure. Israel needs to move toward strategic closure: defeat or contain immediate threats; establish who governs the territories in question; replace failed institutions where necessary; create enforceable security arrangements; and define what Israel is actually prepared to accept as an end state. That is the missing bridge between military power and national strategy.

And it is precisely here that Winter’s political emergence becomes interesting – even for people who have no intention of voting for him. Because Winter is forcing a question onto the political agenda that Israel’s established parties cannot easily avoid: What does “victory” actually mean?

The test for Netanyahu, Winter – and everyone else: The next election should, therefore, not be judged solely by the familiar question of who is right-wing and who is left-wing. It should be judged by something more demanding.

What is the government’s theory of the region? What does it intend to do with Gaza? What does it want the future of the West Bank to look like? How will it manage Lebanon? How will it deal with Iran? How will it rebuild deterrence without creating an endless cycle of escalation? How will it maintain American support? How will it address the enormous internal burden created by prolonged mobilization? And, ultimately, how does it intend to turn military power into a sustainable political order?

That should be the standard by which Netanyahu, Winter, Eisenkot and every other candidate are judged. Not who can promise the hardest response. Not who can produce the most dramatic military operation. Not who can identify the greatest number of enemies. But who has a credible plan for getting Israel from war to security – and from security to a sustainable political order. That is the priority Israel cannot afford to postpone. Because the greatest danger of having too many unresolved fronts is not that Israel will lose any one of them. 

Winter’s emergence does not answer that question. His party is far too new, and its policies are themselves controversial, for that. But he has changed the political conversation. He has taken the argument that Israel needs a fundamentally different security doctrine out of the military and into the electoral arena. He has combined it with demands for Haredi enlistment, national unity and a more assertive Israeli diplomatic effort. And, by pledging to recommend Netanyahu while remaining politically independent of him, he has created a potentially unusual role for his party: not an alternative government, but an alternative power center within the right.

Whether that becomes a significant political force will depend on whether Amcha Yisrael can turn attention into enough votes to survive the electoral threshold. But the underlying issue is larger than Ofer Winter. Israel could win every battle it fights this year and still find itself fighting the same battles five years from now.

That would not be strategic victory. It would simply be another round.

He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore. (Isaiah 2:4)

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing!

Have a safe, God-honoring week.

Marvin