Shalom all,

This past week has pulled into sharp focus the delicate balance between war-termination, diplomacy and Israel’s security red-lines. From the return of bodies of slain hostages, through the ongoing failure of Hamas to meaningfully disarm, to the heightened role of the United States and the unfolding architecture of a multinational stabilization force for Gaza, the central question facing Israel remains the same: can we move from crisis to credible security?

Here are the main developments and why they matter.

1. The return of the remains of hostages – a moral, operational and political pressure cooker

This week, Israeli authorities confirmed the identification of the bodies of two additional hostages. While this is a moment of closure for the families involved, the fact remains: a double-digit number of deceased hostages still remain in Gaza under Hamas control.

From an operational point of view, the grafting of this process onto the ceasefire/hostage-deal framework is revealing several points of distortion: locating bodies under rubble, verifying identity, coordinating cross-border transfers – these are all time-consuming, hazardous tasks. Hamas repeatedly cites the difficulty of locating remains under rubble and the need for heavy equipment. Israel doesn’t believe Hamas’s claims that it cannot locate the remains of the dead hostages whose bodies have yet to be returned.

Politically and morally, Israel is under intense pressure. Families of hostages and the wider Israeli public are demanding that every body be returned before moving to any further concessions. The slow pace feeds suspicion that Hamas is deliberately using the remaining bodies as leverage and Israeli officials are saying exactly that.

The implication is that until Israel has credible assurances of the return of all remains of the deceased hostages, any “next stage” of the deal will face both public resistance and operational uncertainty. In other words, the return of remains is not simply a humanitarian detail – it is part of the power-balance and sequencing of the deal.

2. Hamas remains armed – crisis in disarmament

If the return of bodies is the moral/operational metric, the disarmament of Hamas is the strategic one. Israel has stressed one uncompromising condition, that any viable peace architecture must include the demilitarisation of Gaza and the complete removal of Hamas, so that the horrors of 7 October 2023 cannot be repeated.

Hamas officials have already made clear they could not commit to full disarmament. Meanwhile, Israeli commentary warns that the deal will collapse if disarmament is not enforced.

Put simply: Israel is being asked to walk a tightrope. On the one had, there is the public/political pressure to move toward “normalisation” (a term that needs consensual clarification); on the other had there is the ever-present risk that a still-armed Hamas will be able to reconstitute its capability. Without real disarmament, the so-called “peace phase” is provisional at best and delusional at worst.

The policy implication for Israel is stark: if disarmament is not verifiable, then security fallback options must be retained, namely, Israel must have the right and responsibility to resume operations. A deal without that capacity is like a cloud without water.

3. U.S. role and Israeli diplomacy this week

This week saw intensive U.S.–Israel interaction. The J.D. Vance visit to Israel, and follow-up engagements by U.S. envoys such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, signal Washington’s commitment to ensure the Gaza ceasefire and the hostage deal don’t unravel. 

One key piece of the diplomatic puzzle is the U.S. establishing a “Civil-Military Coordination Centre” in southern Israel, amazingly with Israel’s consent, and deploying surveillance drones over Gaza to monitor implementation. Such a move, however, underscores the fact that Israel cannot proceed to act unilaterally. It also means Israel must accept a degree of external scrutiny and coordination of its operations and the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement.

On the bilateral front, Israel is using the U.S. connection to shape the composition of the international force for Gaza, insisting on certain red lines, for example, Turkish troops are reported to have been vetoed from the Gaza force. In effect, Israel is saying: yes to international partners, no to honey-traps that might compromise its security.

In sum, the U.S. is playing the role of architect and monitor. Israel is the guarantor and ultimate fallback. Any mis-alignment between them will quickly translate into operational and political risk.

4. The Multinational Stabilization Force for Gaza – design, pitfalls and impact

One of the week’s most under-reported, but strategically vital, items is the emerging architecture of the proposed international stabilization force for Gaza (the “ISF”). According to Israeli media, the core of the force will be drawn from two Muslim-majority states, Indonesia and Azerbaijan, following Israeli insistence that Turkey be excluded. The force is expected to number in the tens of thousands (though details remain inexact). The United States will provide oversight and a coordination hub, but will not place large combat units inside Gaza.

This is important, because for Israel, the presence of a credible external force provides a potential exit strategy: if Gaza is stabilised, Hamas demilitarised and reconstruction underway, Israeli forces can gradually withdraw and focus on high-risk corridors rather than continued full presence.

However, the pitfalls are numerous:

Legitimacy vs capability: While Indonesia’s peacekeeping credentials and Azerbaijan’s security ties with Israel are encouraging, deploying a tens-of-thousands-strong force in Gaza is uncharted territory. Will they have the legal mandate, the logistics and the trust of Gazans?

Rules of engagement & Israeli control: Israel insists it must approve any operations inside Gaza. This is a “yellow line” of demarcation on the ground, marked by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) this week. It is already a reminder that Israel’s position is that it will retain territorial and operational control until disarmament is assured.

Verification of disarmament: Even if the ISF deploys, what will it monitor? Without access to tunnels and weapons caches, the presence of the international force may become symbolic rather than effective. Indeed, one analysis warned that successful disarmament historically depends on an independent body that will have intrusive inspection powers.

Timing and sequencing: Israel is clear: the ISF’s deployment and Israel’s withdrawal must be conditional on Hamas’ compliance. The deal’s next phases cannot be front-loaded ahead of verification. (The legal framing of “what happens if Hamas violates the deal” remains alarmingly fuzzy.)

Bottom line: This force could provide a gateway out of perpetual war for Israel, but only if it is built on a solid foundation of Hamas disarmament, credible oversight and guaranteed Israeli involvement. If those plugins fail, the force could become a liability, providing illusions of stability while Israel remains exposed. In the absence of clear operational guidelines, the ISF’s mission will be doomed to failure and it should be renamed the IMF (“Impossible Mission Force”).

5. Implication for Security Policy and Domestic Priorities

Security posture remains paramount. Despite the diplomatic moves, Israel is not in “normalisation” mode. The slow pace of the return of the remains of hostages, the absence of real disarmament and the need to guard against a repeat of the October 7 devastation mean Israeli leaders must retain a robust fallback plan for renewed operations.

Domestic pressures are intense. Hostage families continue to dominate the public narrative. Any sense that Israel is conceding territory or reducing operational vigilance without full returns and verifiable disarmament will create political backlash. The past week’s developments show that the issue of the return of the hostages is a litmus test of Israel’s credibility.

Diplomatic stamina is required. Israel is leveraging its U.S. relationship but must remain vigilant that Washington’s demands (for sequencing, for international oversight) do not constrain Israel’s ability to act decisively when required. Israel’s ability to approve or reject participating states in the international force, for instance, reflects Israel’s insistence on preserving its security prerogatives.

Long-term change remains conditional. The promise of reconstruction, normalized relations with Arab states and a post-war Gaza are still in play, but they hinge on three pre-conditions this week: (1) full return of hostages/remains, (2) Hamas disarmament, (3) credible deployment of the stabilization force under Israeli-acceptable terms. Without all three, the status quo of frozen war and controlled presence in Gaza continues.

Final word

This week underscored a simple but uncomfortable truth for Israel: the peace deal is only as strong as the weakest link. That link now resides in the intertwined areas of remains-return, disarmament, and the architecture of international involvement. Israel is ahead on diplomacy and framing the deal, but the deal’s fragile nature means there is zero room for complacency.

For Israel, this means staying alert, maintaining operational freedom, and not handing over the keys before the door is unlocked. For policymakers, the lesson is clear: the devil is in the sequencing. If the returns aren’t complete, if Hamas doesn’t disarm and its the weapons remain hidden, if the international force lacks political heft or legitimacy, the deal may fall for lack of structure and operational authority.

Israel is not seeking war today; it is seeking security tomorrow. How this week’s maneuvers play out in the coming weeks will tell whether the peace track is credible, or merely another pause in a cycle.

One last point: Under the Gaza–Israel truce, Israel deported 154 convicted terrorists to Egypt rather than allowing them to remain in the territories under the control of the “Palestinian” Authority. A report claims many of them have been staying comfortably at a five‐star hotel in Cairo, raising serious security, accountability and political concerns about how the truce’s terms are being implemented. The article highlights the potential for these individuals to move, network and regroup, with little transparency on oversight or funding, and raises questions about the future stability and efficacy of the agreement. Freedom from an Israel jail and living it up in a luxury hotel after release, with minimal restrictions – it would seem that, at least for them, it pays to be a terrorist.

“They have healed the brokenness of My people superficially, saying, ‘Peace, peace’, but there is no peace.” (Jeremiah 6:14) 

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing.

Marvin