To Deal or Not to Deal – That is the Question!

This past week, Hamas released two videos of hostages, one on April 24th of Hersh Goldberg-Polin, a 23-year-old American-Israeli hostage, here and here, and one on Saturday, April 27th, of Keith Segal, 64, and Omri Miran, 47. The statements in the videos were condemnatory of Israel and of the failure of the IDF to protect the country’s citizens. They called for the continuation of the protests and demonstrations, as well as the call, voiced by the relatives of the hostages and members in the political opposition, to replace the present government. While some media outlets posted the videos, it should be understood that the various videos that have been produced by Hamas from time to time have also been directed by it and that the hostages who appear in those videos have been coached, under duress, to make the anti-Israel, anti-government statements. The Jerusalem Post said that it would not publish those videos, because “they are part of Hamas’s psychological warfare.” That would appear to be a good policy to follow.

Attempts are being made to jump-start the hostage negotiations. Egypt submitted a proposal that it hoped would end the deadlock and bring about a breakthrough that will result in a deal between Hamas and Israel. The last proposal of Hamas included, among other things, a moratorium on the fighting for six weeks and the release of fewer than 20 hostages, which was, obviously, rejected by Israel.

A meeting was held last week between the chief of Egyptian Intelligence, General Abbas Kamel, and the IDF Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi and the head of the Israeli Security Service, Ronen Bar. During the course of that meeting, Kamel presented Egypt’s proposal for ending the war and releasing the hostages, the main points of which are, as follows:

The first point: Israel would commit to ceasing all preparations for an IDF operation in Rafiah (“Rafah”). It should be noted that this is a major concern for Egypt and, of course, other nations such as the U.S. and members of the European Union. A military push into Rafiah would end up spilling over into Egypt, as civilians in Gaza would push their way through the border and into Egypt. The President of Egypt, Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi made it clear that his country is opposed to the migration of Gaza residents to the Sinai, or to any other place. Obviously, Egypt is in a position to alleviate civilian casualties in the event of a military campaign against Hamas in Rafiah, but it would prefer not to be placed in a position of having to decide whether or not to do so.

The second point: All of the Israeli hostages, including the bodies of those were killed, or died, but remain in the control of Hamas, would be released in two stages that would extend over a period of 10 weeks. This would be in exchange for hundreds (in reality, thousands) of “Palestinian” prisoners in Israeli jails. The total number of Israeli hostages was not specified in the Egyptian proposal, most probably due to the fact that they do not know the exact number who will untimately be released, both alive and dead. This is seriously problematic. Apparently, it was not specified in the Egyptian proposal whether the two stages would be separately negotiated. If so, it would provide Hamas with the opportunity to once again make exhorbitant demands for the second stage of the hostage release and fail to provide full disclosure to Israel, similar to what it did following the first “deal” back in November. Moreover, a 10-week ceasefire will enable Hamas to regroup from the pressure of the IDF and recruit the prisoners who are released in a renewed resistance against Israel. If one is thinking that I do not trust anything that Hamas promises to do, you would be right.

The third point is the most serious and problematic. It calls for an absolute ceasefire for the period of a full year, where both sides agree not to fire upon or use weapons against the other, whether on the ground or in the air. This mutuality aspect of the proposal was obviously included to be conciliatory towards Hamas, to whom the statement was clearly intended. Upon the declaration of the commencement of the ceasefire, steps would be undertaken towards the establishment of a “Palestinian” state, with the declaration being supported by the United States, Egypt, Jordan and the “Palestinian” Authority. Not mentioned, of course, is the fact that Hamas would remain intact and that it  would play an active role in the leadership of such a “Palestinian” state – a situation that could quickly revert to the conditions existing in the Gaza enclave for the past 17 years.

If the Egyptian proposal was intended to be fair and impartial, the third point is anything but that. The “Palestinian” Authority is politically at odds with Hamas and it is a pipe dream to think that they can work together. However, in essence, they have the same goals and perspectives vis-a-vis Israel, namely: that we cannot continue to exist, not here and not at all. The demands related to the  establishment of a “Palestinian” state have always included uniting the West Bank (of the Jordan River, Biblically known as Judea and Samaria) with Gaza, with pre-1967 borders. The contiguous territory to unite those two areas would mean slicing Israel in half. It would, in reality, also require the removal of a half million Israelis from the area of Judea and Samaria, and include the dividing of Jerusalem. And, if a “Palestinian” state were to be created in the areas mentioned, it would not have any restrictions as to importation of weapons or individuals. There are, of course, other significant issues. But, agreeing to the establishment of a “Palestinian” state would be like placing a ticking bomb on our doorsteps and it would be only a matter of time before that bomb explodes. 

Halevi and Bar did not respond to the Egyptian proposal, but agreed to present it to Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Security Cabinet. 

It is conceivable that Hamas would agree to the Egyptian proposal, at least to most of it. After all, it contains most of what they have been demanding since the outset of the present war. Israel, on the other hand, would be out of its mind to accept such a proposal. It would be conceding that it lost not only the war against Hamas, but would tacitly be admitting that it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, particularly if our citizens are taken hostage by the terrorists. 

It bears repeating that Hamas has kept secret all information concerning the hostages, except what it chose to make public through selective videos. Israel has demanded information in the past, but its demands were ignored by Hamas. It was inconceivable that Israel negotiated for, and previously agreed to, the partial release of hostages, rather than all of the hostages at one time. And now, there appears to be a willingness to do the same thing. But, the final price is too much to pay and the consequences of “making a deal” are seriously problematic and explosive. 

Israeli sources (in Hebrew) disclose that during the second stage of the Egyptian proposal, some senior Hamas leaders would be allowed leave the Gaza enclave for Cairo to carry on the negotiations by themselves, with guarantees by Qatar, Egypt and the United States that they will not be harmed by Israel. The rats coming out of their holes would provide a golden opportunity to Israel for their elimination. Yet, Israel is being asked not to take advantage of that opportunity.

Sources in Israel DENY that it agreed to the Egyptian proposal and claim that Israel presented its own conditions for a deal, which did not contain an agreement to withdraw the IDF from the Gaza Strip or end the war. It is also asserted that Israel did not agree to other demands presented by Hamas. The full terms of Israel’s counter-proposal were not immediately disclosed.

Nevertheless, Israel’s proposal is said to include a demand for the release of 33 hostages – on humanitarian grounds – in exchange for releasing multitudes of terrorists, many with blood on their hands and that the preliminary ceasefire would be extended by one day for each additional hostage that is released. In addition, Israel would agree to allow the return to the north of the Gaza Strip men over the age of 65, as well as women and children.

At this point, everyone is waiting for the response of Hamas to the proposals that have been submitted. 

It needs to be clarified that Egypt, which now has a vested interest in bringing about an agreement between Hamas and Israel, which would forestall military action in Rafiah (Rafah), is pushing hard to bring about an inclusive deal between the parties. If they don’t reach an overall agreement, an attempt would be made to push for a staged agreement, whereby the initial demands of both sides would be agreed upon and that the disputed issues would be left for future discussions. Israel, of course, wants the return of the hostages first and foremost. Hamas wants a ceasefire. Egypt wants a delay in Israel’s decision to move against Rafiah.

Hebrew media sources further report that Yehya Sinwar said that Hamas is not worried about a military campaign in the area of Rafiah. Hamas sources further indicate that Sinwar and his companion in terror, Mohammed Deif, informed their colleagues abroad that the military arm of Hamas is well prepared for a military operation in Rafiah and that there should not be any waivers in the negotiations. Given the military successes of the IDF against Hamas, these latest comments by Hamas could well be just another form of psychological warfare, and their claims of readiness could be completely the opposite of the concerns of the military wing of Hamas.

What is clear, however, is that the desire of Hamas to minimize the number of hostages who will be released in any deal reflects a difficult reality that the longer the fighting continues, the fewer the number of hostages who will remain alive. The argument that only a military victory against Hamas would bring about the release of the hostages is the government’s message that is being rejected by the families of the hostages.

How do things look in reality, on the ground?

The IDF is preparing for an intensive ground operation against Hamas in Rafiah, while Gaza residents enjoy hot days at the beach and our hostages are being kept in tunnels, or in diverse private locations.

Some Gaza residents that were displaced from the north of the enclave during the early stages of the IDF ground operation are being allowed to return.

Humanitarian aid entering the Strip are at peak levels, in addition to the fact that markets in Gaza are still open and operational.

Hamas totally controls the distribution of humanitarian aid and sells it to those who can afford it, while others who cannot afford it, suffer.

The IDF has only two divisions remaining in Gaza.

Rockets from Gaza continue to be fired into communities in and around the Gaza Envelope.

Israel is pushing for a deal, one that is far from ideal, that would bring about the return of the hostages – at least some of them – and allow for an end to  the fighting – at least temporarily, until Hamas violates the terms of any agreement that it would make.

What conclusiona are we to draw from these facts? From a practical point of view, as of today – while waiting for an official response from Hamas to the latest proposal(s) – the war is just about at an end. The claim of “total victory”, which was touted in good faith at the beginning of the military campaign, appears to be increasingly unattainable today. And, Hamas will claim victory, UNLESS: Hamas refuses the proposals on the table and Israel continues its pursuit of the elimination or substantial crippling of the terrorist organization’s remaining forces in Rafiah, where the military campaign of urban warfare will be severe and costly, but eventually successful. OR UNLESS: Irrespective of any potential deal, Israel decides that the need to eliminate the threat of Hamas is seen as paramount for the welfare of the nation as a whole, despite all of the other pressures placed upon the country to accede to a deal at any price.

If the hostage / prisoner release / ceasefire negotiations are rejected by Hamas, then rockets, which continue to be launched from Gaza into communities in the southwest of Israel, will continue to be launched against us until we make a renewed and determined decision to put an end to them. The once-thriving communities in the Gaza Envelope will become only sparesly populated. We will return to, and continue with, the “normal situation” that existed on the 6th of October – they fire upon us and we retaliate and so we will continue our existence as if nothing happened the following day. Again, UNLESS the ability of Hamas to wage war against Israel is eliminated.

The “Palestinians” refer to October 7th as “the day of the crossing” – when they crossed over from the Strip to “occupied Palestine”. That statement is taken from a similar one used by the Egyptians, when on October 6, 1973, they “crossed the [Suez] Canal”. In a worst-case scenario, if Hamas claims victory, real or imagined, the next “crossing” will be right around the corner.

And what about the threats from within the political sphere? The opinions are, as expected, varied and in opposition to one another. Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, of the Religious Zionist Party, in a message intended for P.M. Netanyahu, said: “If you decide to fly a white flag and cancel the order to conquer Rafah immediately to complete the mission of destroying Hamas and restore peace for the residents of southern Israel and all of the country’s citizens, and return our abducted brothers and sisters who are held hostage to their homes – then the government you head will have no right of existence.” His comments were echoed by Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, of the Jewish National Front Party, who said that a “reckless deal equals the dissolution of the government.” They are veiled threats of the withdrawal from the government of the political entities that they represent and the resultant dissolution of the government coalition.

War Cabinet Minister, Benny Gantz, of the National Unity Party, said that although pursuing a military operation in Rafiah against Hamas “is important in the long struggle against Hamas, the return of our hostages — who were abandoned by the government on October 7 — is urgent and of far greater importance…[adding] If a responsible outline is reached for the return of the hostages with the backing of the entire security establishment — which does not involve ending the war — and the ministers who led the government on October 7 prevent it, the government will have no right to continue to exist and lead the campaign.”

Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, said that “In Gaza, we are obligated to eliminate Hamas and also to return the hostages. We are working on these two tasks and I am determined to accomplish both things. It will take as long as it takes, but we must do this task.” 

While we all wait for an answer from Hamas to the proposals that were submitted, the Israeli government needs to prepare for mulitple eventualities. It clearly needs the wisdom of Solomon. 

And we did not even discuss the growing antisemitic and anti-Israel protests and confrontations on college and university campuses. Enough for now. One headache at a time.

This is the seventh day of the Feast of Unleavened Bread (which immediately follows Passover). According to tradition, it commemorates the day of passing through the Red Sea, a seemingly impassable obstacle in the face of a pursuing enemy, leading to freedom from oppression, as well as new life after being cleansed from sin. A Red-Sea opening for Israel right now would be greatly appreciated!

Bless, be blessed and be a blessing. 

Marvin

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